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The power dynamics of campaign contributions and legislative rhetoric

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Abstract

Do committee speeches predict campaign contributions or vice versa? I study the dynamic endogenous interactions of energy sector campaign contributions to members of the U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources and their reactions in the 105th–112th Congresses. Utilizing a Bayesian Structural VAR approach, I find evidence for a dynamic model where the interactions between rhetoric and contributions are bidirectional—donors and senators are sensitive to changes in each others’ signaling and their responses follow immediately. The analysis shows that lags, leads, and contemporaneous effects in the exchanges are not mutually exclusive. The signaling of both sets of political actors is sensitive to external pressures and these effects differ depending on their party’s position of power. The contributions drive most of the variation in the rhetoric, and Democrats and Republicans follow similar strategies dependent on their position of power.

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Notes

  1. Chosen following lag length evaluation and in accordance with Brandt and Williams (2006, 25), who note that models with up to 8 to 10 lags will capture most of the expected seasonality.

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  1. School of Social Science and Global Studies, The University of Southern Mississippi, Liberal Arts Building (LAB), 442 118 College Drive, #5108, Hattiesburg, MS, 39406, USA

    Iliyan R. Iliev

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Iliev, I.R. The power dynamics of campaign contributions and legislative rhetoric. Int Groups Adv 10, 240–263 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41309-021-00125-0

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