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Expressing Receipt-Freeness and Coercion-Resistance in Logics of Strategic Ability: Preliminary Attempt

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Published:29 August 2016Publication History

ABSTRACT

Voting is a mechanism of utmost importance to social processes. In this paper, we focus on the strategic aspect of information security in voting procedures. We argue that the notions of receipt-freeness and coercion resistance are underpinned by existence (or nonexistence) of a suitable strategy for some participants of the voting process. In order to back the argument formally, we provide logical "transcriptions" of the informal intuitions behind coercion-related properties that can be found in the existing literature. The transcriptions are formulated in the modal game logic ATL*, well known in the area of multi-agent systems.

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  1. Expressing Receipt-Freeness and Coercion-Resistance in Logics of Strategic Ability: Preliminary Attempt

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      • Published in

        cover image ACM Other conferences
        PrAISe '16: Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on AI for Privacy and Security
        August 2016
        91 pages
        ISBN:9781450343046
        DOI:10.1145/2970030

        Copyright © 2016 ACM

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        • Published: 29 August 2016

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