Theories of Confirmation in Which Hypotheses Have Probabilities and Inference to the Best Explanation

Pinkston, John Alexander

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-44270-5_3

John Alexander Pinkston⁷

Part of the book series: Synthese Library ((SYLI,volume 426))

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Abstract

In this chapter, I discuss Bayesianism and Peter Achinstein’s theory together since in both theories hypotheses have probabilities (i.e., p(h) = r; 0 ≤ r ≤ 1). I also consider Inference to the Best Explanation as a method of theory choice since Achinstein has incorporated the requirement of an explanatory connection between hypothesis and evidence into his theory. I attempt to provide sufficient background to argue in later chapters that they do not provide satisfactory theories of evidence for clinical medical science. I argue that the concepts of explanation employed by Achinstein and Inference to the Best Explanation are different, and that at least the explanatory concept in the latter is not necessary for confirmation. After presenting part of a theory of explanation advanced by Bas van Fraassen, I argue that correct hypotheses are sought in clinical medical science, and that explanations are secondary.

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Notes

1.
Howson and Urbach (2006, 94) explain that when h logically entails e, p(e/h) = 1; thus if 0 < p(e) < 1, and p(h) > 0, then p(h/e) > p(h), which means that e confirms h.
2.
The extent to which Bayesianism may offer a solution to the Raven Paradox is controversial. For further discussion see, e.g., Earman (1992, 69–73) and Howson and Urbach (2006, 99–103).
3.
As Achinstein notes, whether (a), (b), and (c) require (d) depends on his argument in his Book of Evidence (2001, 115–116).

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Birmingham Radiological Group, Birmingham, AL, USA
John Alexander Pinkston

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Pinkston, J.A. (2020). Theories of Confirmation in Which Hypotheses Have Probabilities and Inference to the Best Explanation. In: Evidence and Hypothesis in Clinical Medical Science. Synthese Library, vol 426. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44270-5_3

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44270-5_3
Published: 09 May 2020
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-44269-9
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-44270-5
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