

The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives

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Citation Report

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
2	Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods. <i>Economics Letters</i> , 1982, 9, 127-132.	0.9	211
3	Non-cooperative implementation: A survey of recent results. <i>Mathematical Social Sciences</i> , 1982, 3, 243-257.	0.3	9
4	The Philanthropy Marketplace. <i>Economic Geography</i> , 1984, 60, 197.	2.1	17
5	Every finite distributive lattice is a set of stable matchings. <i>Journal of Combinatorial Theory - Series A</i> , 1984, 37, 353-356.	0.5	43
6	Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem. <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 1984, 34, 383-387.	0.5	100
7	Group incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods. <i>Economics Letters</i> , 1984, 14, 309-313.	0.9	48
8	Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching. <i>Econometrica</i> , 1984, 52, 47.	2.6	271
9	The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory. <i>Journal of Political Economy</i> , 1984, 92, 991-1016.	3.3	920
10	A Note on the Room-Mates Problem and a Related Revenue Allocation Problem. <i>Management Science</i> , 1984, 30, 633-643.	2.4	17
11	The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem. <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 1985, 36, 277-288.	0.5	339
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15	A further note on the stable matching problem. <i>Discrete Applied Mathematics</i> , 1987, 16, 217-222.	0.5	58
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21	Existence and computation of matching equilibria. <i>European Journal of Political Economy</i> , 1989, 5, 285-296.	1.0	15
22	Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences. <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i> , 1989, 1, 191-209.	0.4	88
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84	Affinity driven social networks. European Physical Journal: Special Topics, 2007, 143, 29-37.	1.2	3
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99	Expanding 'Choice' in School Choice. SSRN Electronic Journal, 2008, , .	0.4	19

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136	A note on strategy-proofness from the doctor side in matching with contracts. Review of Economic Design, 2011, 15, 337-342.	0.2	5

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195	A new perspective on Kesten's school choice with consent idea. <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 2014, 154, 543-561.	0.5	47
196	Task assignment with controlled and autonomous agents. <i>Mathematical Social Sciences</i> , 2014, 71, 116-121.	0.3	3
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