

Kam-Ming Wan

List of Publications by Year in descending order

Source: <https://exaly.com/author-pdf/983920/publications.pdf>

Version: 2024-02-01

15
papers

340
citations

1684188

5
h-index

1372567

10
g-index

15
all docs

15
docs citations

15
times ranked

199
citing authors

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
1	CEO Compensation and Board Structure Revisited. <i>Journal of Finance</i> , 2012, 67, 1149-1168.	5.1	181
2	Does CEO compensation reflect managerial ability or managerial power? Evidence from the compensation of powerful CEOs. <i>Journal of Corporate Finance</i> , 2019, 56, 1-14.	5.5	51
3	Economic impact of political barriers to cross-border acquisitions: An empirical study of CNOOC's unsuccessful takeover of Unocal. <i>Journal of Corporate Finance</i> , 2009, 15, 447-468.	5.5	47
4	Effect of the Sarbanesâ€“Oxley act on CEOsâ€™ stock ownership and pay-performance sensitivity. <i>Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting</i> , 2012, 38, 177-207.	1.6	21
5	Explicit employment contracts and CEO compensation. <i>Journal of Corporate Finance</i> , 2017, 44, 540-560.	5.5	11
6	Incentive Contracts are not Rigged by Powerful CEOs. <i>Critical Finance Review</i> , 2014, 3, 99-152.	0.9	8
7	State pricing, effectively complete markets, and corporate finance. <i>Journal of Corporate Finance</i> , 2020, 60, 101542.	5.5	5
8	Independent Directors, Executive Pay, and Firm Performance. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 0, , .	0.4	5
9	Call auction design and closing price manipulation: Evidence from the Hong Kong stock exchange. <i>Journal of Financial Markets</i> , 2022, 58, 100700.	1.3	4
10	CEO Compensation and Board Structure Revisited â€“ Addendum. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 0, , .	0.4	2
11	Incentive Contracts are Not Rigged by Powerful CEOs. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 2012, , .	0.4	1
12	CEO Compensation and Board Structure â€“ Rejoinder. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 2012, , .	0.4	1
13	Explicit Employment Contracts and CEO Compensation. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 2014, , .	0.4	1
14	Treatment of Outliers: Firm Heterogeneity in Managerial Incentive and Corporate Innovation. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 2018, , .	0.4	1
15	Managerial compensation when managers are principals. <i>Corporate Ownership and Control</i> , 2003, 1, 106-121.	1.0	1