## Nicholas Agar

List of Publications by Year in descending order

Source: https://exaly.com/author-pdf/9435050/publications.pdf

Version: 2024-02-01

933447 839539 32 611 10 18 citations h-index g-index papers 36 36 36 222 docs citations times ranked citing authors all docs

#	Article	IF	CITATIONS
1	What do frogs really believe?. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1993, 71, 1-12.	0.8	92
2	Truly Human Enhancement. , 2013, , .		83
3	Why is it possible to enhance moral status and why doing so is wrong?. Journal of Medical Ethics, 2013, 39, 67-74.	1.8	32
4	Liberal eugenics. Public Affairs Quarterly, 1998, 12, 137-55.	0.2	31
5	Valuing Species and Valuing Individuals. Environmental Ethics, 1995, 17, 397-415.	0.4	24
6	Biocentrism and the Concept of Life. Ethics, 1997, 108, 147-168.	0.5	22
7	Moral bioenhancement is dangerous. Journal of Medical Ethics, 2015, 41, 343-345.	1.8	22
8	Enhancing genetic virtue?. Politics and the Life Sciences, 2010, 29, 73-75.	0.7	17
9	A question about defining moral bioenhancement. Journal of Medical Ethics, 2014, 40, 369-370.	1.8	17
10	How to Treat Machines that Might Have Minds. Philosophy and Technology, 2020, 33, 269-282.	4.3	17
11	Why We Should Defend Gene Editing as Eugenics. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 2019, 28, 9-19.	0.8	14
12	Can â€~eugenics' be defended?. Monash Bioethics Review, 2021, 39, 60-67.	0.8	13
13	EMBRYONIC POTENTIAL AND STEM CELLS. Bioethics, 2007, 21, 198-207.	1.4	11
14	DESIGNING BABIES: MORALLY PERMISSIBLE WAYS TO MODIFY THE HUMAN GENOME. Bioethics, 1995, 9, 1-15.	1.4	9
15	Moral Bioenhancement and the Utilitarian Catastrophe. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 2015, 24, 37-47.	0.8	7
16	On the irrationality of mind-uploading: a rely to Neil Levy. Al and Society, 2012, 27, 431-436.	4.6	6
17	Functionalism and Personal Identity. Nous, 2003, 37, 52-70.	2.2	5
18	Cloning and Identity. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 2003, 28, 9-26.	0.8	3

#	Article	IF	CITATIONS
19	We must not create beings with moral standing superior to our own. Journal of Medical Ethics, 2013, 39, 709-709.	1.8	3
20	Teleogy and genes. Biology and Philosophy, 1996, 11, 289-300.	1.4	2
21	Still afraid of needy post-persons. Journal of Medical Ethics, 2013, 39, 81-83.	1.8	2
22	Human Enhancement and the Story of Job. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 2017, 26, 449-458.	0.8	2
23	The Problem with Nature. Hastings Center Report, 2002, 32, 39.	1.0	1
24	Agar's Review of Katz. Biology and Philosophy, 2002, 17, 123-139.	1.4	1
25	Why we can't really say what post-persons are. Journal of Medical Ethics, 2012, 38, 144-145.	1.8	1
26	How to insure against utilitarian overconfidence. Monash Bioethics Review, 2014, 32, 162-171.	0.8	1
27	Transformative change in Invasion of the Body Snatchers. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, 2018, 21, 279-286.	1.8	1
28	Commentary: The Implementation Ethics of Moral Enhancement. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 2019, 28, 55-61.	0.8	1
29	We should eliminate the concept of disease from mental health. Journal of Medical Ethics, 2019, 45, 591-591.	1.8	1
30	Philosophical Naturalism. Mind and Language, 1995, 10, 194-197.	2.3	0
31	Agar's Review of Katz. Biology and Philosophy, 2002, 17, 301-301.	1.4	0
32	GM Food, Risk, and Taste. Biology and Philosophy, 2003, 18, 599-606.	1.4	0