

Robert Fraser

List of Publications by Year in descending order

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Version: 2024-02-01

24
papers

298
citations

933447

10
h-index

888059

17
g-index

27
all docs

27
docs citations

27
times ranked

219
citing authors

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
1	Key actions for a sustainable chemicals policy. <i>Environment International</i> , 2020, 137, 105463.	10.0	11
2	Compensation Payments and Animal Disease: Incentivising Farmers Both to Undertake Costly On-farm Biosecurity and to Comply with Disease Reporting Requirements. <i>Environmental and Resource Economics</i> , 2018, 70, 617-629.	3.2	10
3	Comment 1 on "Risk and uncertainty"™ by Quiggin and Anderson. <i>Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics</i> , 2016, 60, 550-551.	2.6	0
4	To Cheat or Not To Cheat: Moral Hazard and Agri-Environmental Policy. <i>Journal of Agricultural Economics</i> , 2013, 64, 527-536.	3.5	6
5	Moral Hazard, Targeting and Contract Duration in Agri-Environmental Policy. <i>Journal of Agricultural Economics</i> , 2012, 63, 56-64.	3.5	15
6	Farmer Compensation and its Consequences for Environmental Benefit Provision in the Higher Level Stewardship Scheme. <i>Journal of Agricultural Economics</i> , 2011, 62, 330-339.	3.5	17
7	Adverse Selection in the Environmental Stewardship Scheme: Does the Higher Level Stewardship Scheme Design Reduce Adverse Selection?. <i>Journal of Agricultural Economics</i> , 2010, 61, 369-380.	3.5	32
8	Climate Change and Coordinated Farmer Behaviour "Changement climatique et comportement coordonné des agriculteurs" Klimawandel und koordiniertes Verhalten von Landwirten. <i>EuroChoices</i> , 2010, 9, 53-53.	1.7	0
9	Land Heterogeneity, Agricultural Income Forgone and Environmental Benefit: An Assessment of Incentive Compatibility Problems in Environmental Stewardship Schemes. <i>Journal of Agricultural Economics</i> , 2009, 60, 190-201.	3.5	31
10	Using Principal-Agent Theory to Deal with Output Slippage in the European Union Set-Aside Policy. <i>Journal of Agricultural Economics</i> , 2008, 52, 29-41.	3.5	3
11	Targeting Monitoring Resources to Enhance the Effectiveness of the CAP. Cibler le controle des ressources pour ameliorer l'efficacite de la PAC. Die Zielausrichtung von Uberwachungsressourcen zur Effektivitatsverbesserung der GAP. <i>EuroChoices</i> , 2005, 4, 22-27.	1.7	9
12	On the Use of Targeting to Reduce Moral Hazard in Agri-Environmental Schemes. <i>Journal of Agricultural Economics</i> , 2004, 55, 525-540.	3.5	26
13	An Evaluation of the Compensation Required by European Union Cereal Growers to Accept the Removal of Price Support. <i>Journal of Agricultural Economics</i> , 2003, 54, 431-445.	3.5	5
14	Moral Hazard and Risk Management in Agri-Environmental Policy. <i>Journal of Agricultural Economics</i> , 2002, 53, 475-487.	3.5	42
15	The role of expected protein levels in determining the impact of protein premiums and discounts: a note. <i>Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics</i> , 2000, 44, 289-298.	2.6	1
16	An analysis of the Western Australian gold royalty. <i>Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics</i> , 1999, 43, 35-50.	2.6	4
17	The State of Resource Taxation in Australia: "An Inexcusable Folly for the Nation"™?. <i>Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics</i> , 1999, 43, 259-278.	2.6	8
18	The Value of an Ocean View: an Example of Hedonic Property Amenity Valuation. <i>Geographical Research</i> , 1998, 36, 94-98.	0.6	28

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19	Seasonal variability and a farmer's supply response to protein premiums and discounts. Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 1998, 42, 25-33.	2.6	0
20	LAND HETEROGENEITY AND THE MAY 1992 REFORM OF CAP CEREAL PRICE SUPPORT. Journal of Agricultural Economics, 1997, 48, 65-70.	3.5	5
21	LAND HETEROGENEITY AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CAP SET-ASIDE. Journal of Agricultural Economics, 1996, 47, 255-260.	3.5	15
22	PRIVATISATION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM: LESSONS FOR AUSTRALIA. Economic Papers, 1996, 15, 14-19.	0.9	1
23	On the Neutrality of the Resource Rent Tax. Economic Record, 1993, 69, 56-60.	0.4	17
24	â€˜Nice work if you can get itâ€™: An analysis of optimal set-aside. Oxford Agrarian Studies, 1991, 19, 61-69.	0.1	9