
Philippe Jehiel

List of Publications by Year in descending order

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Риннорг Ірнірі

#	Article	IF	CITATIONS
1	Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations. Econometrica, 2001, 69, 1237-1259.	2.6	358
2	Analogy-based expectation equilibrium. Journal of Economic Theory, 2005, 123, 81-104.	0.5	300
3	Multidimensional Mechanism Design for Auctions with Externalities. Journal of Economic Theory, 1999, 85, 258-293.	0.5	209
4	Auctions with Downstream Interaction among Buyers. RAND Journal of Economics, 2000, 31, 768.	1.3	184
5	The Limits of ex post Implementation. Econometrica, 2006, 74, 585-610.	2.6	125
6	Dynamic Processes of Social and Economic Interactions: On the Persistence of Inefficiencies. Journal of Political Economy, 2005, 113, 626-667.	3.3	122
7	Strategic Nonparticipation. RAND Journal of Economics, 1996, 27, 84.	1.3	114
8	Revisiting games of incomplete information with analogy-based expectations. Games and Economic Behavior, 2008, 62, 533-557.	0.4	103
9	Product differentiation and price collusion. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 1992, 10, 633-641.	0.6	75
10	Gradualism in Bargaining and Contribution Games. Review of Economic Studies, 2004, 71, 975-1000.	2.9	74
11	Auctions and information acquisition: sealed bid or dynamic formats?. RAND Journal of Economics, 2007, 38, 355-372.	1.3	73
12	Partnership dissolution with interdependent values. RAND Journal of Economics, 2006, 37, 1-22.	1.3	66
13	Negative Externalities May Cause Delay in Negotiation. Econometrica, 1995, 63, 1321.	2.6	63
14	Constitutional Rules of Exclusion in Jurisdiction Formation. Review of Economic Studies, 2001, 68, 393-413.	2.9	63
15	On the Role of Outside Options in Bargaining with Obstinate Parties. Econometrica, 2002, 70, 1477-1517.	2.6	60
16	The Coalitional Nash Bargaining Solution. Econometrica, 2010, 78, 1593-1623.	2.6	60
17	License Auctions and Market Structure. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 2006, 15, 371-396.	0.4	59
18	Bargaining and Majority Rules: A Collective Search Perspective. Journal of Political Economy, 2010, 118, 189-221.	3.3	57

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19	Resale Markets and the Assignment of Property Rights. Review of Economic Studies, 1999, 66, 971-991.	2.9	54
20	On Transparency in Organizations. Review of Economic Studies, 2015, 82, 736-761.	2.9	54
21	Collusion in Auctions with Externalities. RAND Journal of Economics, 1998, 29, 680.	1.3	50
22	Investment Strategy and Selection Bias: An Equilibrium Perspective on Overoptimism. American Economic Review, 2018, 108, 1582-1597.	4.0	48
23	Mixed bundling auctions. Journal of Economic Theory, 2007, 134, 494-512.	0.5	47
24	Feedback spillover and analogy-based expectations: A multi-game experiment. Games and Economic Behavior, 2011, 71, 351-365.	0.4	47
25	A Theory of Deception. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2010, 2, 1-20.	0.7	42
26	Limited Foresight May Force Cooperation. Review of Economic Studies, 2001, 68, 369-391.	2.9	36
27	On Discrimination in Auctions with Endogenous Entry. American Economic Review, 2015, 105, 2595-2643.	4.0	31
28	Learning to play games in extensive form by valuation. Journal of Economic Theory, 2005, 124, 129-148.	0.5	28
29	Social Learning with Coarse Inference. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2013, 5, 147-174.	0.7	28
30	Voluntary contributions to a joint project with asymmetric agents. Journal of Economic Theory, 2003, 112, 334-342.	0.5	25
31	Learning to Play Limited Forecast Equilibria. Games and Economic Behavior, 1998, 22, 274-298.	0.4	24
32	On the Value of Competition in Procurement Auctions. Econometrica, 2002, 70, 343-355.	2.6	22
33	Manipulative auction design. Theoretical Economics, 2011, 6, 185-217.	0.5	22
34	Information Aggregation and Communication in Organizations. Management Science, 1999, 45, 659-669.	2.4	21
35	On absolute auctions and secret reserve prices. RAND Journal of Economics, 2015, 46, 241-270.	1.3	20
36	Veto Constraint in Mechanism Design: Inefficiency with Correlated Types. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2009, 1, 182-206.	0.7	19

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#	Article	IF	CITATIONS
37	Locally robust implementation and its limits. Journal of Economic Theory, 2012, 147, 2439-2452.	0.5	18
38	Equilibrium on a Traffic Corridor with Several Congested Modes. Transportation Science, 1993, 27, 16-24.	2.6	17
39	Reputation with Analogical Reasoning*. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2012, 127, 1927-1969.	3.8	17
40	Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials. Economic Theory, 2008, 37, 469-490.	0.5	16
41	The Wait-and-See Option in Ascending Price Auctions. Journal of the European Economic Association, 2004, 2, 494-503.	1.9	15
42	Non-Bayesian updating in a social learning experiment. Journal of Economic Theory, 2022, 199, 105188.	0.5	14
43	On Quitting Rights in Mechanism Design. American Economic Review, 2007, 97, 137-141.	4.0	12
44	Financial reporting and market efficiency with extrapolative investors. Journal of Economic Theory, 2015, 157, 842-878.	0.5	12
45	The Design of an Efficient Private Industry. Journal of the European Economic Association, 2004, 2, 516-525.	1.9	11
46	Gathering information before signing a contract: A screening perspective. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2008, 26, 206-212.	0.6	9
47	Smoking Today and Stopping Tomorrow: a Limited Foresight Perspective. CESifo Economic Studies, 2010, 56, 141-164.	0.3	9
48	Repeated games and limited forecasting. European Economic Review, 1998, 42, 543-551.	1.2	6
49	Posterior implementation vs ex-post implementation. Economics Letters, 2007, 97, 70-73.	0.9	6
50	A Mechanism Design Approach to the Tiebout Hypothesis. Journal of Political Economy, 2018, 126, 735-760.	3.3	6
51	On the Benefits of Set-Asides. Journal of the European Economic Association, 2020, 18, 1655-1696.	1.9	6
52	Communication with forgetful liars. Theoretical Economics, 2021, 16, 605-638.	0.5	6
53	COLLUSION AND ANTITRUST DETECTION. Japanese Economic Review, 1995, 46, 226-246.	0.8	4
54	Public Statistics and Private Experience: Varying Feedback Information in a Take-or-Pass Game. German Economic Review, 2016, 17, 359-377.	0.5	4

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#	Article	IF	CITATIONS
55	Polycentric spatial development, externalities and cost-benefit analysis. Annals of Regional Science, 1991, 25, 193-208.	1.0	3
56	Bundlers' dilemmas in financial markets with sampling investors. Theoretical Economics, 2020, 15, 545-582.	0.5	3
57	How to win a decision in a confederation. Journal of Public Economics, 2005, 89, 1191-1210.	2.2	2
58	Selective Sampling with Information-Storage Constraints. Economic Journal, 2020, 130, 1753-1781.	1.9	2
59	Information Redundancy Neglect versus Overconfidence: A Social Learning Experiment. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2021, 13, 163-197.	0.7	2
60	Bargaining while searching for outside options: A potential role for unions. European Economic Review, 1998, 42, 909-918.	1.2	1
61	An experiment on deception, reputation and trust. Experimental Economics, 2021, 24, 821-853.	1.0	1
62	Selective Sampling with Information-Storage Constraints. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	1
63	Multi-state choices with aggregate feedback on unfamiliar alternatives. Games and Economic Behavior, 2021, 130, 1-24.	0.4	Ο