
## **George Tsebelis**

List of Publications by Year in descending order

Source: https://exaly.com/author-pdf/7607274/publications.pdf Version: 2024-02-01



#	Article	IF	CITATIONS
1	Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism. British Journal of Political Science, 1995, 25, 289-325.	3.1	2,079
2	The Power of the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter. American Political Science Review, 1994, 88, 128-142.	3.7	605
3	Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An Empirical Analysis. American Political Science Review, 1999, 93, 591-608.	3.7	473
4	Legislative Politics in the European Union. European Union Politics, 2000, 1, 9-36.	2.1	449
5	An institutional critique of intergovernmentalism. International Organization, 1996, 50, 269-299.	4.7	398
6	The Institutional Foundations of Intergovernmentalism and Supranationalism in the European Union. International Organization, 2001, 55, 357-390.	4.7	343
7	Veto Players and Institutional Analysis. Governance, 2000, 13, 441-474.	2.0	295
8	Coalition Formation in the European Parliament. Comparative Political Studies, 1999, 32, 933-966.	3.6	243
9	The Abuse of Probability in Political Analysis: The Robinson Crusoe Fallacy. American Political Science Review, 1989, 83, 77-91.	3.7	168
10	Agenda setting, vetoes and the european union's coâ€decision procedure. Journal of Legislative Studies, The, 1997, 3, 74-92.	0.7	127
11	Why Resist the Temptation to Apply Power Indices to the European Union?. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1999, 11, 291-308.	0.4	126
12	Conditional agendaâ€setting and decisionâ€makinginsidethe European parliament. Journal of Legislative Studies, The, 1995, 1, 65-93.	0.7	125
13	Veto players and the structure of budgets in advanced industrialized countries. European Journal of Political Research, 2004, 43, 449-476.	4.1	125
14	Veto Players and Referendums Around the World. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2002, 14, 465-515.	0.4	124
15	Are Sanctions Effective?. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1990, 34, 3-28.	2.0	121
16	Elite Interaction and Constitution Building in Consociational Democracies. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1990, 2, 5-29.	0.4	121
17	Penalty has no Impact on Crime:. Rationality and Society, 1990, 2, 255-286.	1.1	110
18	More on the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter: Response to Moser. American Political Science Review, 1996, 90, 839-844.	3.7	110

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#	Article	IF	CITATIONS
19	The history of conditional agenda-setting in european institutions. European Journal of Political Research, 1998, 33, 41-71.	4.1	109
20	Agenda setting power, power indices, and decision making in the European Union. International Review of Law and Economics, 1996, 16, 345-361.	0.8	104
21	Legislative Procedures in the European Union: An Empirical Analysis. British Journal of Political Science, 2001, 31, .	3.1	94
22	Veto Players and Decisionâ€making in the EU After Nice. Journal of Common Market Studies, 2002, 40, 283-307.	2.1	80
23	The European parliament and environmental legislation: The case of chemicals. European Journal of Political Research, 1999, 36, 119-154.	4.1	79
24	Political Parties and Government Coalitions in the Americas. Journal of Politics in Latin America, 2011, 3, 3-28.	0.7	77
25	Presidential Conditional Agenda Setting in Latin America. World Politics, 2005, 57, 396-420.	1.9	74
26	Lessons from the Greek crisis. Journal of European Public Policy, 2016, 23, 25-41.	4.0	56
27	A Long Constitution is a (Positively) Bad Constitution: Evidence from OECD Countries. British Journal of Political Science, 2016, 46, 457-478.	3.1	52
28	More on the coâ€decision endgame. Journal of Legislative Studies, The, 1997, 3, 139-143.	0.7	47
29	Veto Players and Referendums Around the World. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2002, 14, 465-515.	0.4	46
30	Even More Reasons to Resist the Temptation of Power Indices in the EU. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2001, 13, 99-105.	0.4	45
31	The Art of Political Manipulation in the European Convention. Journal of Common Market Studies, 2007, 45, 157-186.	2.1	43
32	Nested Games: The Cohesion of French Electoral Coalitions. British Journal of Political Science, 1988, 18, 145-170.	3.1	42
33	More Reasons to Resist the Temptation of Power Indices in the European Union. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1999, 11, 331-338.	0.4	42
34	Bicameral Negotiations: The Navette System in France. British Journal of Political Science, 1995, 25, 101-129.	3.1	40
35	A Ceneral Model of Tactical and Inverse Tactical Voting. British Journal of Political Science, 1986, 16, 395-404.	3.1	37
36	Crime and Punishment: Are One-Shot, Two-Person Games Enough?. American Political Science Review, 1990, 84, 569-586.	3.7	37

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#	Article	IF	CITATIONS
37	Nested Games. , 2019, , .		36
38	Coercion and revolution: Variations on a predator-prey model. Mathematical and Computer Modelling, 1989, 12, 547-559.	2.0	30
39	The Effect of Fines on Regulated Industries. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1991, 3, 81-101.	0.4	29
40	Bridging qualified majority and unanimity decisionmaking in the EU. Journal of European Public Policy, 2013, 20, 1083-1103.	4.0	28
41	Cicero's Puzzle: Upper House Power in Comparative Perspective. International Political Science Review, 1992, 13, 25-43.	2.8	27
42	Penalty and Crime: Further Theoretical Considerations and Empirical Evidence. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1993, 5, 349-374.	0.4	26
43	Suspending vetoes: how the euro countries achieved unanimity in the fiscal compact. Journal of European Public Policy, 2014, 21, 1388-1411.	4.0	26
44	Presidential Conditional Agenda Setting in the Former Communist Countries. Comparative Political Studies, 2007, 40, 1155-1182.	3.6	25
45	The European Parliament and environmental legislation: The case of chemicals. European Journal of Political Research, 1999, 36, 119-154.	4.1	23
46	The time inconsistency of long constitutions: Evidence from the world. European Journal of Political Research, 2017, 56, 820-845.	4.1	22
47	Thinking about the Recent Past and the Future of the EU*. Journal of Common Market Studies, 2008, 46, 265-292.	2.1	17
48	Coalition theory: a veto players' approach. European Political Science Review, 2014, 6, 331-357.	1.9	17
49	Maastricht and the Democratic Deficit. , 2000, , 16-47.		15
50	Agenda Setting and Executive Dominance in Politics. , 2009, , 13-24.		12
51	The Treaty of Nice, the Convention Draft and the Constitution for Europe Under a Veto Players Analysis. European Constitutional Law Review, 2005, 1, 429-451.	0.5	11
52	Constitutional Rigidity Matters: A Veto Players Approach. British Journal of Political Science, 2022, 52, 280-299.	3.1	8
53	When Do Allies Become Rivals?. Comparative Politics, 1988, 20, 233.	1.1	7
54	Monitoring Unemployment Benefits in Comparative Perspective. Political Research Quarterly, 1994, 47, 793-820.	1.7	7

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55	The political power of the french senate: Micromechanisms of bicameral negotiations. Journal of Legislative Studies, The, 1995, 1, 192-217.	0.7	5
56	Compromesso astorico: the role of the Senate after the Italian constitutional reform. Rivista Italiana Di Scienza Politica, 2017, 47, 87-104.	0.7	5
57	How Can We Keep Direct Democracy and Avoid "Kolotoumba― Homo Oeconomicus, 2018, 35, 81-90.	0.2	3
58	Decisionmaking Inside the European Parliament. European and Transatlantic Studies, 1995, , 42-64.	0.2	3
59	The Rules of Decisionmaking in EU Institutions. , 2012, , .		2
60	Monitoring Unemployment Benefits in Comparative Perspective. Political Research Quarterly, 1994, 47, 793.	1.7	1
61	The history of conditional agenda-setting in European institutions. European Journal of Political Research, 1998, 33, 41-71.	4.1	1
62	A Long Constitution is a (Positively) Bad Constitution: Evidence from OECD Countries – CORRIGENDUM. British Journal of Political Science, 2016, 46, 479-480.	3.1	1
63	Multiple vote electoral systems: a remedy for political polarization. Journal of European Public Policy, 0, , 1-21.	4.0	1

64 Chapitre 5. Institutional analyses of the european union. , 2004, , 117-141.