

Salvador BarberÃ©

List of Publications by Year in descending order

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79
papers

3,224
citations

147566

31
h-index

182168

51
g-index

84
all docs

84
docs citations

84
times ranked

706
citing authors

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
1	Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models. Games and Economic Behavior, 2022, 131, 1-28.	0.4	3
2	Compromising on compromise rules. RAND Journal of Economics, 2022, 53, 95-112.	1.3	6
3	Daunou's voting rule and the lexicographic assignment of priorities. Social Choice and Welfare, 2021, 56, 259-289.	0.4	6
4	Information disclosure with many alternatives. Social Choice and Welfare, 2021, 57, 851-873.	0.4	1
5	Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel. Social Choice and Welfare, 2020, 54, 237-258.	0.4	3
6	Social Choice Theory. , 2020, , 511-528.		0
7	Theoretical Unification, Domain Restrictions and Further Applications: Some Comments on Future Research in Economic Design. Studies in Economic Design, 2019, , 21-25.	0.0	1
8	On the advantages and disadvantages of being the first mover under rules of <i>k</i> names. International Journal of Economic Theory, 2018, 14, 51-60.	0.4	5
9	On the Different Forms of Individual and Group Strategic Behavior, and Their Impact on Efficiency. Studies in Systems, Decision and Control, 2018, , 33-48.	0.8	1
10	Social Choice Theory. , 2018, , 1-19.		0
11	Balancing the power to appoint officers. Games and Economic Behavior, 2017, 101, 189-203.	0.4	11
12	Immunity to credible deviations from the truth. Mathematical Social Sciences, 2017, 90, 129-140.	0.3	2
13	Sequential voting and agenda manipulation. Theoretical Economics, 2017, 12, 211-247.	0.5	22
14	À l'équilibre l'information et l'analyse. Commentaire, 2017, Numéro 159, 617-622.	0.0	0
15	Group Strategy-Proofness in Private Good Economies. American Economic Review, 2016, 106, 1073-1099.	4.0	45
16	Meritocracy, egalitarianism and the stability of majoritarian organizations. Games and Economic Behavior, 2015, 91, 237-257.	0.4	17
17	Balancing the Power to Appoint Officers. SSRN Electronic Journal, 2013, , .	0.4	2
18	Some New Domain Restrictions in Social Choice, and Their Consequences. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2013, , 11-24.	1.0	1

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19	Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results. <i>International Journal of Game Theory</i> , 2012, 41, 791-808.	0.5	22
20	Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: On what domains are they also sufficient?. <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i> , 2012, 75, 490-509.	0.4	7
21	Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences. <i>Social Choice and Welfare</i> , 2012, 39, 335-352.	0.4	38
22	Top monotonicity: A common root for single peakedness, single crossing and the median voter result. <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i> , 2011, 73, 345-359.	0.4	37
23	Preference for flexibility and the opportunities of choice. <i>Journal of Mathematical Economics</i> , 2011, 47, 272-278.	0.4	3
24	Free triples, large indifference classes and the majority rule. <i>Social Choice and Welfare</i> , 2011, 37, 559-574.	0.4	8
25	Strategyproof Social Choice. <i>Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare</i> , 2011, 2, 731-831.	0.9	70
26	Individual versus group strategy-proofness: When do they coincide?. <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 2010, 145, 1648-1674.	0.5	75
27	On the rule of k names. <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i> , 2010, 70, 44-61.	0.4	22
28	How to choose a non-controversial list with k names. <i>Social Choice and Welfare</i> , 2008, 31, 79-96.	0.4	37
29	A note on the impossibility of a satisfactory concept of stability for coalition formation games. <i>Economics Letters</i> , 2007, 95, 85-90.	0.9	7
30	Indifferences and Domain Restrictions. <i>Analyse Und Kritik</i> , 2007, 29, 146-162.	0.2	14
31	Locating public facilities by majority: Stability, consistency and group formation. <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i> , 2006, 56, 185-200.	0.4	15
32	On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogeneous Union. <i>Journal of Political Economy</i> , 2006, 114, 317-339.	3.3	97
33	Voting by committees under constraints. <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 2005, 122, 185-205.	0.5	37
34	Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions. <i>Quarterly Journal of Economics</i> , 2004, 119, 1011-1048.	3.8	154
35	Ranking Sets of Objects. , 2004, , 893-977.		149
36	On coalition formation: durable coalition structures. <i>Mathematical Social Sciences</i> , 2003, 45, 185-203.	0.3	34

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37	Supporting others and the evolution of influence. <i>Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control</i> , 2002, 26, 2051-2092.	0.9	2
38	Self-Selection Consistent Functions. <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 2002, 105, 263-277.	0.5	24
39	Voting for Voters: A Model of Electoral Evolution. <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i> , 2001, 37, 40-78.	0.4	71
40	An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions. <i>Social Choice and Welfare</i> , 2001, 18, 619-653.	0.4	91
41	Strategy-proof Social Choice Correspondences. <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 2001, 101, 374-394.	0.5	79
42	Incentive compatible reward schemes for labour-managed firms. <i>Review of Economic Design</i> , 2000, 5, 111-127.	0.2	7
43	Maximal domains of preferences preserving strategy-proofness for generalized median voter schemes. <i>Social Choice and Welfare</i> , 1999, 16, 321-336.	0.4	24
44	Strategy-proof probabilistic rules for expected utility maximizers. <i>Mathematical Social Sciences</i> , 1998, 35, 89-103.	0.3	35
45	Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges. <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i> , 1998, 25, 272-291.	0.4	37
46	Strategy-Proof Allotment Rules. <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i> , 1997, 18, 1-21.	0.4	110
47	Voting under Constraints. <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 1997, 76, 298-321.	0.5	69
48	Notes on Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions. , 1996, , 26-45.		9
49	Strategy-Proof Exchange. <i>Econometrica</i> , 1995, 63, 51.	2.6	142
50	Protective behavior in matching models. <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i> , 1995, 8, 281-296.	0.4	17
51	A characterization of strategy-proof social choice functions for economies with pure public goods. <i>Social Choice and Welfare</i> , 1994, 11, 241.	0.4	83
52	Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems. <i>Economic Theory</i> , 1994, 4, 417-435.	0.5	105
53	Generalized Median Voter Schemes and Committees. <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 1993, 61, 262-289.	0.5	179
54	Voting by Committees. <i>Econometrica</i> , 1991, 59, 595.	2.6	260

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55	Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences. <i>Social Choice and Welfare</i> , 1990, 7, 31-38.	0.4	115
56	Maximin, leximin, and the protective criterion: Characterizations and comparisons. <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 1988, 46, 34-44.	0.5	59
57	Falmagne and the Rationalizability of Stochastic Choices in Terms of Random Orderings. <i>Econometrica</i> , 1986, 54, 707.	2.6	100
58	General, direct and self-implementation of social choice functions via protective equilibria. <i>Mathematical Social Sciences</i> , 1986, 11, 109-127.	0.3	11
59	On some axioms for ranking sets of alternatives. <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 1984, 33, 301-308.	0.5	51
60	Extending an order on a Set to the power set: Some remarks on Kannai and Peleg's approach. <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 1984, 32, 185-191.	0.5	59
61	Strategy-Proofness and Pivotal Voters: A Direct Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem. <i>International Economic Review</i> , 1983, 24, 413.	0.6	71
62	Collective Probabilistic Judgements. <i>Econometrica</i> , 1983, 51, 1033.	2.6	19
63	Pivotal voters: A simple proof of Arrow's theorem. <i>Contributions To Economic Analysis</i> , 1983, 145, 31-35.	0.1	4
64	Implementability via protective equilibria. <i>Journal of Mathematical Economics</i> , 1982, 10, 49-65.	0.4	31
65	Pivotal voters. <i>Economics Letters</i> , 1980, 6, 13-16.	0.9	73
66	Stable voting schemes. <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 1980, 23, 267-274.	0.5	8
67	Majority and Positional Voting in a Probabilistic Framework. <i>Review of Economic Studies</i> , 1979, 46, 379.	2.9	50
68	A Note on Group Strategy-Proof Decision Schemes. <i>Econometrica</i> , 1979, 47, 637.	2.6	24
69	Preference aggregation with randomized social orderings. <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 1978, 18, 244-254.	0.5	44
70	Nice Decision Schemes. , 1978, , 101-117.		8
71	The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance. <i>Econometrica</i> , 1977, 45, 1573.	2.6	121
72	Manipulation of social decision functions. <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 1977, 15, 266-278.	0.5	64

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73	Order-k rationality. Economic Theory, 0, , 1.	0.5	2
74	DECIDING ON WHAT TO DECIDE. International Economic Review, 0, , .	0.6	2
75	Voting for Voters: A Model of Electoral Evolution. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	6
76	Self-selection Consistent Choices. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	3
77	On the Selection of Compromise Arbitrators. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	2
78	A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	1
79	Arrow on Domain Conditions: A Fruitful Road to Travel. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	0