

# Shun Kurokawa

## List of Publications by Year in descending order

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Version: 2024-02-01

28  
papers

396  
citations

840776

11  
h-index

752698

20  
g-index

28  
all docs

28  
docs citations

28  
times ranked

159  
citing authors

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
1	Evolution of trustfulness in the case where resources for cooperation are sometimes absent. <i>Theoretical Population Biology</i> , 2022, 145, 63-79.	1.1	1
2	Time to extinction of a cultural trait in an overlapping generation model. <i>Theoretical Population Biology</i> , 2021, 137, 32-45.	1.1	1
3	Disbandment rule sways the evolution of tolerance. <i>Applied Mathematics and Computation</i> , 2021, 392, 125678.	2.2	2
4	Effect of the group size on the evolution of cooperation when an exit option is present. <i>Journal of Theoretical Biology</i> , 2021, 521, 110678.	1.7	6
5	For whom is it more beneficial to stop interactions with defectors: Cooperators or defectors?. <i>Ecological Complexity</i> , 2021, 48, 100968.	2.9	2
6	Three-player repeated games with an opt-out option. <i>Journal of Theoretical Biology</i> , 2019, 480, 13-22.	1.7	9
7	The role of generosity on the evolution of cooperation. <i>Ecological Complexity</i> , 2019, 40, 100778.	2.9	3
8	Cooperation evolves more when players keep the interaction with unknown players. <i>Applied Mathematics and Computation</i> , 2019, 350, 209-216.	2.2	4
9	How memory cost, switching cost, and payoff non-linearity affect the evolution of persistence. <i>Applied Mathematics and Computation</i> , 2019, 341, 174-192.	2.2	4
10	Evolution of Groupwise Cooperation: Generosity, Paradoxical Behavior, and Non-Linear Payoff Functions. <i>Games</i> , 2018, 9, 100.	0.6	8
11	The occasional absence of resources for cooperation and its role in the evolution of direct reciprocity. <i>Ecological Complexity</i> , 2018, 36, 196-205.	2.9	3
12	How much cost should reciprocators pay in order to distinguish the opponent's cooperation from the opponent's defection?. <i>Applied Mathematics and Computation</i> , 2018, 336, 301-314.	2.2	2
13	Persistence extends reciprocity. <i>Mathematical Biosciences</i> , 2017, 286, 94-103.	1.9	10
14	Imitation dynamics with time delay. <i>Journal of Theoretical Biology</i> , 2017, 420, 8-11.	1.7	15
15	Which facilitates the evolution of cooperation more, retaliation or persistence?. <i>Mathematical Biosciences</i> , 2017, 289, 20-28.	1.9	1
16	The extended reciprocity: Strong belief outperforms persistence. <i>Journal of Theoretical Biology</i> , 2017, 421, 16-27.	1.7	10
17	Evolution of group-wise cooperation: Is direct reciprocity insufficient?. <i>Journal of Theoretical Biology</i> , 2017, 415, 20-31.	1.7	15
18	Unified and simple understanding for the evolution of conditional cooperators. <i>Mathematical Biosciences</i> , 2016, 282, 16-20.	1.9	12

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
19	Payoff non-linearity sways the effect of mistakes on the evolution of reciprocity. <i>Mathematical Biosciences</i> , 2016, 279, 63-70.	1.9	8
20	How Life History Can Sway the Fixation Probability of Mutants. <i>Genetics</i> , 2016, 203, 1297-1313.	2.9	19
21	Evolutionary stagnation of reciprocators. <i>Animal Behaviour</i> , 2016, 122, 217-225.	1.9	15
22	Imperfect information facilitates the evolution of reciprocity. <i>Mathematical Biosciences</i> , 2016, 276, 114-120.	1.9	15
23	Does imperfect information always disturb the evolution of reciprocity?. <i>Letters on Evolutionary Behavioral Science</i> , 2016, 7, 14-16.	0.3	15
24	Evolution of cooperation: The analysis of the case wherein a different player has a different benefit and a different cost. <i>Letters on Evolutionary Behavioral Science</i> , 2016, 7, .	0.3	4
25	Evolution of social behavior in finite populations: A payoff transformation in general -player games and its implications. <i>Theoretical Population Biology</i> , 2013, 84, 1-8.	1.1	32
26	Rare but severe concerted punishment that favors cooperation. <i>Theoretical Population Biology</i> , 2012, 81, 284-291.	1.1	22
27	Generous cooperators can outperform non-generous cooperators when replacing a population of defectors. <i>Theoretical Population Biology</i> , 2010, 77, 257-262.	1.1	31
28	Emergence of cooperation in public goods games. <i>Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences</i> , 2009, 276, 1379-1384.	2.6	127