## Shun Kurokawa

List of Publications by Year in descending order

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840776 752698 28 396 11 20 citations h-index g-index papers 28 28 28 159 docs citations times ranked citing authors all docs

#	Article	IF	CITATIONS
1	Emergence of cooperation in public goods games. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 2009, 276, 1379-1384.	2.6	127
2	Evolution of social behavior in finite populations: A payoff transformation in general -player games and its implications. Theoretical Population Biology, 2013, 84, 1-8.	1.1	32
3	Generous cooperators can outperform non-generous cooperators when replacing a population of defectors. Theoretical Population Biology, 2010, 77, 257-262.	1.1	31
4	Rare but severe concerted punishment that favors cooperation. Theoretical Population Biology, 2012, 81, 284-291.	1.1	22
5	How Life History Can Sway the Fixation Probability of Mutants. Genetics, 2016, 203, 1297-1313.	2.9	19
6	Evolutionary stagnation of reciprocators. Animal Behaviour, 2016, 122, 217-225.	1.9	15
7	Imperfect information facilitates the evolution of reciprocity. Mathematical Biosciences, 2016, 276, 114-120.	1.9	15
8	Imitation dynamics with time delay. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 2017, 420, 8-11.	1.7	15
9	Evolution of group-wise cooperation: Is direct reciprocity insufficient?. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 2017, 415, 20-31.	1.7	15
10	Does imperfect information always disturb the evolution of reciprocity?. Letters on Evolutionary Behavioral Science, 2016, 7, 14-16.	0.3	15
11	Unified and simple understanding for the evolution of conditional cooperators. Mathematical Biosciences, 2016, 282, 16-20.	1.9	12
12	Persistence extends reciprocity. Mathematical Biosciences, 2017, 286, 94-103.	1.9	10
13	The extended reciprocity: Strong belief outperforms persistence. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 2017, 421, 16-27.	1.7	10
14	Three-player repeated games with an opt-out option. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 2019, 480, 13-22.	1.7	9
15	Payoff non-linearity sways the effect of mistakes on the evolution of reciprocity. Mathematical Biosciences, 2016, 279, 63-70.	1.9	8
16	Evolution of Groupwise Cooperation: Generosity, Paradoxical Behavior, and Non-Linear Payoff Functions. Games, 2018, 9, 100.	0.6	8
17	Effect of the group size on the evolution of cooperation when an exit option is present. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 2021, 521, 110678.	1.7	6
18	Cooperation evolves more when players keep the interaction with unknown players. Applied Mathematics and Computation, 2019, 350, 209-216.	2.2	4

#	Article	lF	CITATIONS
19	How memory cost, switching cost, and payoff non-linearity affect the evolution of persistence. Applied Mathematics and Computation, 2019, 341, 174-192.	2.2	4
20	Evolution of cooperation: The analysis of the case wherein a different player has a different benefit and a different cost. Letters on Evolutionary Behavioral Science, 2016, 7, .	0.3	4
21	The occasional absence of resources for cooperation and its role in the evolution of direct reciprocity. Ecological Complexity, 2018, 36, 196-205.	2.9	3
22	The role of generosity on the evolution of cooperation. Ecological Complexity, 2019, 40, 100778.	2.9	3
23	How much cost should reciprocators pay in order to distinguish the opponent's cooperation from the opponent's defection?. Applied Mathematics and Computation, 2018, 336, 301-314.	2.2	2
24	Disbandment rule sways the evolution of tolerance. Applied Mathematics and Computation, 2021, 392, 125678.	2.2	2
25	For whom is it more beneficial to stop interactions with defectors: Cooperators or defectors?. Ecological Complexity, 2021, 48, 100968.	2.9	2
26	Which facilitates the evolution of cooperation more, retaliation or persistence?. Mathematical Biosciences, 2017, 289, 20-28.	1.9	1
27	Time to extinction of a cultural trait in an overlapping generation model. Theoretical Population Biology, 2021, 137, 32-45.	1.1	1
28	Evolution of trustfulness in the case where resources for cooperation are sometimes absent. Theoretical Population Biology, 2022, 145, 63-79.	1.1	1