

# Edouard Machery

## List of Publications by Year in descending order

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Version: 2024-02-01

107  
papers

5,881  
citations

136885

32  
h-index

102432

66  
g-index

118  
all docs

118  
docs citations

118  
times ranked

5298  
citing authors

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
1	Demographic Differences in Philosophical Intuition: a Reply to Joshua Knobe. <i>Review of Philosophy and Psychology</i> , 2023, 14, 401-434.	1.0	9
2	Responses to Herman Cappelen and Jennifer Nado. <i>Philosophical Studies</i> , 2022, 179, 329-342.	0.5	3
3	Anomalies in implicit attitudes research. <i>Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science</i> , 2022, 13, e1569.	1.4	14
4	Anomalies in implicit attitudes research: Not so easily dismissed. <i>Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science</i> , 2022, 13, e1591.	1.4	1
5	Estimating the Reproducibility of Experimental Philosophy. <i>Review of Philosophy and Psychology</i> , 2021, 12, 9-44.	1.0	61
6	The Alpha War. <i>Review of Philosophy and Psychology</i> , 2021, 12, 75-99.	1.0	4
7	Religious Affiliation and Conceptions of the Moral Domain. <i>Social Cognition</i> , 2021, 39, 139-165.	0.5	8
8	A mistaken confidence in data. <i>European Journal for Philosophy of Science</i> , 2021, 11, 1.	0.6	8
9	Response to Alexander and Weinberg, Baz and Deutsch By Edouard Machery. <i>Analysis</i> , 2021, 80, 771-788.	0.3	4
10	No way around cross-cultural and cross-linguistic epistemology. <i>Behavioral and Brain Sciences</i> , 2021, 44, e160.	0.4	4
11	Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds By Edouard Machery. <i>Analysis</i> , 2021, 80, 735-737.	0.3	1
12	What do plants and bacteria want? Commentary on Carrie Figdor's <i>Pieces of mind</i> . <i>Mind and Language</i> , 2020, 35, 677-686.	1.2	3
13	Response to Chris Crandall and John Symons. <i>Inquiry (United Kingdom)</i> , 2020, , 1-16.	0.4	0
14	What Is a Replication?. <i>Philosophy of Science</i> , 2020, 87, 545-567.	0.5	38
15	Love and Power: Grau and Pury (2014) as a Case Study in the Challenges of X-Phi Replication. <i>Review of Philosophy and Psychology</i> , 2020, 11, 995-1011.	1.0	8
16	<i>De Pulchritudine non est Disputandum</i> ? A cross-cultural investigation of the alleged intersubjective validity of aesthetic judgment. <i>Mind and Language</i> , 2019, 34, 317-338.	1.2	12
17	Beyond mind-body dualism: embracing pluralism in psychiatric research" introduction to the special issue, "Psychiatry and Its Philosophy". <i>Synthese</i> , 2019, 196, 2111-2115.	0.6	2
18	For Whom Does Determinism Undermine Moral Responsibility? Surveying the Conditions for Free Will Across Cultures. <i>Frontiers in Psychology</i> , 2019, 10, 2428.	1.1	18

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19	P-curving x-phi: Does experimental philosophy have evidential value?. <i>Analysis</i> , 2019, 79, 669-684.	0.3	8
20	Precis of Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds. <i>International Journal of Philosophical Studies</i> , 2019, 27, 581-584.	0.2	0
21	Response to Akagi, Hughes, and Springle. <i>International Journal of Philosophical Studies</i> , 2019, 27, 608-623.	0.2	1
22	Response to Janet Levin and Michael Strevens. <i>Philosophy and Phenomenological Research</i> , 2019, 98, 246-255.	0.5	0
23	No luck for moral luck. <i>Cognition</i> , 2019, 182, 331-348.	1.1	65
24	Nothing at Stake in Knowledge*. <i>Nous</i> , 2019, 53, 224-247.	1.4	36
25	Is utilitarian sacrifice becoming more morally permissible?. <i>Cognition</i> , 2018, 170, 95-101.	1.1	41
26	Redefine statistical significance. <i>Nature Human Behaviour</i> , 2018, 2, 6-10.	6.2	1,763
27	Do the folk need a meta-ethics?. <i>Behavioral and Brain Sciences</i> , 2018, 41, e109.	0.4	1
28	“Defeaters” don't matter. <i>Behavioral and Brain Sciences</i> , 2018, 41, e63.	0.4	0
29	Gettier Across Cultures <sup>1</sup> . <i>Nous</i> , 2017, 51, 645-664.	1.4	86
30	A deterministic worldview promotes approval of state paternalism. <i>Journal of Experimental Social Psychology</i> , 2017, 70, 251-259.	1.3	8
31	The Gettier Intuition from South America to Asia. <i>Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research</i> , 2017, 34, 517-541.	0.1	48
32	Behavioral Circumscription and the Folk Psychology of Belief. <i>Thought</i> , 2017, 6, 193-203.	0.3	7
33	An Open Letter to Our Students: Doing Interdisciplinary Moral Psychology. , 2017, , 119-143.		8
34	Do Indirect Measures of Biases Measure Traits or Situations?. <i>Psychological Inquiry</i> , 2017, 28, 288-291.	0.4	12
35	The intuitive is a red herring. <i>Inquiry (United Kingdom)</i> , 2017, 60, 403-419.	0.4	13
36	Why Do We Think Racially? Culture, Evolution, and Cognition. , 2017, , 1135-1175.		8

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37	Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds. , 2017, , .		218
38	The reification objection to bottom-up cognitive ontology revision. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2016, 39, e125.	0.4	7
39	De-Freuding Implicit Attitudes. , 2016, , 104-129.		105
40	Scientific Concepts. , 2016, , .		1
41	The amodal brain and the offloading hypothesis. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 2016, 23, 1090-1095.	1.4	37
42	Speaker's Reference and Cross-Cultural Semantics. , 2015, , 62-76.		63
43	Evolutionary Psychology: Issues, Results, Debates. , 2015, , 647-657.		2
44	EPISTEMIC INTUITIONS IN FAKE-BARN THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS. Epistēmōm, 2014, 11, 199-212.	0.6	102
45	Is psychological essentialism an inherent feature of human cognition?. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2014, 37, 499-499.	0.4	8
46	Demoralizing causation. Philosophical Studies, 2014, 171, 251-277.	0.5	18
47	Significance Testing in Neuroimager. , 2014, , 262-277.		2
48	Neo-Empiricism and the Structure of Thoughts. , 2014, , 335-350.		1
49	If Folk Intuitions Vary, Then What?. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2013, 86, 618-635.	0.5	28
50	Editorial: Formal epistemology meets experimental philosophy. Synthēse, 2013, 190, 1333-1335.	0.6	4
51	You can't have it both ways: What is the relation between morality and fairness?. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2013, 36, 95-95.	0.4	3
52	Power and Negative Results. Philosophy of Science, 2012, 79, 808-820.	0.5	14
53	Philosophical issues about concepts. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science, 2012, 3, 265-279.	1.4	11
54	Dissociations in Neuropsychology and Cognitive Neuroscience. Philosophy of Science, 2012, 79, 490-518.	0.5	35

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55	The evolution of punishment. <i>Biology and Philosophy</i> , 2012, 27, 833-850.	0.7	18
56	Reconceptualizing Human Nature: Response to Lewens. <i>Philosophy and Technology</i> , 2012, 25, 475-478.	2.6	5
57	Deep trouble for the deep self. <i>Philosophical Psychology</i> , 2012, 25, 629-646.	0.5	26
58	On the relevance of folk intuitions: A commentary on Talbot. <i>Consciousness and Cognition</i> , 2012, 21, 654-660.	0.8	13
59	The Two Sources of Moral Standing. <i>Review of Philosophy and Psychology</i> , 2012, 3, 303-324.	1.0	52
60	Why I stopped worrying about the definition of life... and why you should as well. <i>Synthese</i> , 2012, 185, 145-164.	0.6	134
61	Semantic Epistemology: A Brief Response to Devitt. <i>Theoria (Spain)</i> , 2012, 27, 223-227.	0.2	8
62	A better philosophy for a better psychology: Comment on Slaney and Racine (2011).. <i>Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology</i> , 2011, 31, 90-95.	0.6	2
63	THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS AND PHILOSOPHICAL KNOWLEDGE. <i>Metaphilosophy</i> , 2011, 42, 191-214.	0.2	67
64	Précis de <i>Doing without Concepts</i> . <i>Dialogue-Canadian Philosophical Review</i> , 2011, 50, 141-152.	0.1	0
65	Exploring the folkbiological conception of human nature. <i>Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences</i> , 2011, 366, 444-453.	1.8	62
66	Replies to Lombrozo, Piccinini, and Poirier and Beaulac. <i>Dialogue-Canadian Philosophical Review</i> , 2011, 50, 195-212.	0.1	3
67	What is the significance of The Origin of Concepts for philosophers' and psychologists' theories of concepts?. <i>Behavioral and Brain Sciences</i> , 2011, 34, 137-138.	0.4	1
68	Explaining why experimental behavior varies across cultures: A missing step in "The weirdest people in the world?". <i>Behavioral and Brain Sciences</i> , 2010, 33, 101-102.	0.4	20
69	The heterogeneity of knowledge representation and the elimination of <i>concept</i> . <i>Behavioral and Brain Sciences</i> , 2010, 33, 231-244.	0.4	8
70	Editorial: Psychology and Experimental Philosophy. <i>Review of Philosophy and Psychology</i> , 2010, 1, 157-160.	1.0	5
71	Editorial: Dimensions of Experimental Philosophy. <i>Review of Philosophy and Psychology</i> , 2010, 1, 315-318.	1.0	1
72	The Bleak Implications of Moral Psychology. <i>Neuroethics</i> , 2010, 3, 223-231.	1.7	15

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73	Symposium on J.-L. Dessalles's <i>Why we Talk</i> (OUP, 2007): Precis by J.-L. Dessalles, commentaries by E. Machery, F. Cowie, and J. Alexander, Replies by J.-L. Dessalles. <i>Biology and Philosophy</i> , 2010, 25, 851-901.	0.7	1
74	The Motives Underlying Stereotype-Based Discrimination Against Members of Stigmatized Groups. <i>Social Justice Research</i> , 2010, 23, 1-16.	0.6	38
75	Two conceptions of subjective experience. <i>Philosophical Studies</i> , 2010, 151, 299-327.	0.5	102
76	Precis of Doing without Concepts. <i>Philosophical Studies</i> , 2010, 149, 401-410.	0.5	3
77	Replies to my critics. <i>Philosophical Studies</i> , 2010, 149, 429-436.	0.5	31
78	Semantic intuitions: Reply to Lam. <i>Cognition</i> , 2010, 117, 361-366.	1.1	28
79	Getting Rid of Racism: Assessing Three Proposals in Light of Psychological Evidence. <i>Journal of Social Philosophy</i> , 2010, 41, 293-322.	0.6	21
80	Precis of Doing without Concepts. <i>Mind and Language</i> , 2010, 25, 602-611.	1.2	2
81	Reply to Barbara Malt and Jesse Prinz. <i>Mind and Language</i> , 2010, 25, 634-646.	1.2	4
82	Precis of <i>Doing without Concepts</i> . <i>Behavioral and Brain Sciences</i> , 2010, 33, 195-206.	0.4	47
83	Philosophical temperament. <i>Philosophical Psychology</i> , 2010, 23, 313-330.	0.5	47
84	Evolution of Morality <sup>1</sup> . , 2010, , 3-46.		65
85	Race and Racial Cognition. , 2010, , 433-472.		14
86	The Vernacular Concept of Innateness. <i>Mind and Language</i> , 2009, 24, 605-630.	1.2	67
87	How to study folk intuitions about phenomenal consciousness <sup>1</sup> . <i>Philosophical Psychology</i> , 2009, 22, 21-35.	0.5	48
88	Against Arguments from Reference*. <i>Philosophy and Phenomenological Research</i> , 2009, 79, 332-356.	0.5	173
89	The Folk Concept of Intentional Action: Philosophical and Experimental Issues. <i>Mind and Language</i> , 2008, 23, 165-189.	1.2	103
90	Massive Modularity and the Flexibility of Human Cognition. <i>Mind and Language</i> , 2008, 23, 263-272.	1.2	42

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91	A Plea for Human Nature. <i>Philosophical Psychology</i> , 2008, 21, 321-329.	0.5	53
92	Innateness, Canalization, and "Biologizing the Mind". <i>Philosophical Psychology</i> , 2008, 21, 397-414.	0.5	31
93	From Meehl to Fast and Frugal Heuristics (and Back). <i>Theory and Psychology</i> , 2008, 18, 443-464.	0.7	40
94	Massive Modularity and Brain Evolution. <i>Philosophy of Science</i> , 2007, 74, 825-838.	0.5	24
95	100 years of psychology of concepts: the theoretical notion of concept and its operationalization. <i>Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences</i> , 2007, 38, 63-84.	0.8	19
96	The Folk Probably Don't Think What You Think They Think: Experiments on Causation by Absence. <i>Midwest Studies in Philosophy</i> , 2007, 31, 107-127.	0.2	39
97	Concept empiricism: A methodological critique. <i>Cognition</i> , 2007, 104, 19-46.	1.1	190
98	The role of psychology in the study of culture. <i>Behavioral and Brain Sciences</i> , 2006, 29, 355-355.	0.4	3
99	Essay Review: Debunking <i>Adapting Minds</i> * David J. Buller, <i>Adapting Minds: Evolutionary Psychology and the Persistent Quest for Human Nature</i> . Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (2005), 552 pp., \$37.00 (cloth).. <i>Philosophy of Science</i> , 2006, 73, 232-246.	0.5	72
100	Two Dogmas of Neo-Empiricism. <i>Philosophy Compass</i> , 2006, 1, 398-412.	0.7	55
101	How to Split Concepts: A Reply to Piccinini and Scott*. <i>Philosophy of Science</i> , 2006, 73, 410-418.	0.5	41
102	Moral realism and cross-cultural normative diversity. <i>Behavioral and Brain Sciences</i> , 2005, 28, 830-830.	0.4	6
103	You Don't Know How You Think: Introspection and Language of Thought. <i>British Journal for the Philosophy of Science</i> , 2005, 56, 469-485.	1.4	22
104	Social Construction and the Concept of Race. <i>Philosophy of Science</i> , 2005, 72, 1208-1219.	0.5	65
105	Concepts Are Not a Natural Kind*. <i>Philosophy of Science</i> , 2005, 72, 444-467.	0.5	120
106	Semantics, cross-cultural style. <i>Cognition</i> , 2004, 92, B1-B12.	1.1	431
107	A new challenge to conceptual engineering. <i>Inquiry (United Kingdom)</i> , 0, , 1-24.	0.4	5