## Nicola Doni

## List of Publications by Year in descending order

Source: https://exaly.com/author-pdf/708387/publications.pdf

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1684188 1372567 14 121 5 10 citations h-index g-index papers 14 14 14 89 docs citations citing authors all docs times ranked

#	Article	IF	CITATIONS
1	THE IMPORTANCE OF REPUTATION IN AWARDING PUBLIC CONTRACTS. Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 2006, 77, 401-429.	2.4	37
2	Market equilibrium in the presence of green consumers and responsible firms: A comparative statics analysis. Resources and Energy Economics, 2013, 35, 380-395.	2.5	35
3	Revenue Comparison in Asymmetric Auctions with Discrete Valuations. B E Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2013, 13, 429-461.	0.2	8
4	Information policies in procurement auctions with heterogeneous suppliers. Journal of Economics/Zeitschrift Fur Nationalokonomie, 2015, 114, 211-238.	0.7	7
5	The economics of procurement contract awarding: problems and solutions in theory and practice. Journal of Public Procurement, 2010, 10, 93-120.	2.0	6
6	Auctioning wind power sites when environmental quality matters. Energy Policy, 2010, 38, 1734-1740.	8.8	6
7	Preferential treatment in procurement auctions through information revelation. Economics Letters, 2012, 117, 883-886.	1.9	6
8	Sustainable Entrepreneurship: Good Deeds, Business, Social and Environmental Responsibility in a Market Experiment. Sustainability, 2022, 14, 3577.	3.2	6
9	Competition and Regulation in Franchise Bidding. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2004, 25, 223-242.	1.4	3
10	Information Revelation in Procurement Auctions with Twoâ€Sided Asymmetric Information. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 2014, 23, 952-968.	0.8	3
11	A note on information revelation in procurement auctions. Economics Letters, 2010, 108, 307-310.	1.9	2
12	Market Equilibrium in the Presence of Green Consumers and Responsible Firms: A Comparative Statics Analysis. SSRN Electronic Journal, 2011, , .	0.4	2
13	A First Price Auction with an Arbitrary Number of Asymmetric Bidders. B E Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2019, 19, .	0.2	O
14	Dynamics in Non-Binding Procurement Auctions with Boundedly Rational Bidders. , 2010, , 181-193.		0