

Alvin E Roth

List of Publications by Year in descending order

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Version: 2024-02-01

81
papers

10,641
citations

87888

38
h-index

74163

75
g-index

86
all docs

86
docs citations

86
times ranked

3982
citing authors

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
1	Forbidden Transactions and Black Markets. <i>Mathematics of Operations Research</i> , 2022, 47, 3084-3109.	1.3	1
2	Promoting Ethical Payment in Human Infection Challenge Studies. <i>American Journal of Bioethics</i> , 2021, 21, 11-31.	0.9	25
3	Non-simultaneous kidney exchange cycles in resource-restricted countries without non-directed donation – a prospective single-center cohort study. <i>Transplant International</i> , 2021, 34, 669-680.	1.6	7
4	Plumbing the Depths of Ethical Payment for Research Participation. <i>American Journal of Bioethics</i> , 2021, 21, W8-W11.	0.9	0
5	Global kidney chains. <i>Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America</i> , 2021, 118, .	7.1	3
6	Kidney Exchange: An Operations Perspective. <i>Management Science</i> , 2021, 67, 5455-5478.	4.1	17
7	Explaining a Potential Interview Match for Graduate Medical Education. <i>Journal of Graduate Medical Education</i> , 2021, 13, 764-767.	1.3	5
8	The design and performance of markets: a discussion. <i>AMS Review</i> , 2021, 11, 219-239.	2.5	6
9	Popular repugnance contrasts with legal bans on controversial markets. <i>Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America</i> , 2020, 117, 19792-19798.	7.1	19
10	Global kidney exchange should expand wisely. <i>Transplant International</i> , 2020, 33, 985-988.	1.6	9
11	Borrow crisis tactics to get COVID-19 supplies to where they are needed. <i>Nature</i> , 2020, 582, 334-336.	27.8	23
12	Payment in challenge studies from an economics perspective. <i>Journal of Medical Ethics</i> , 2020, 46, 831-832.	1.8	8
13	Efficiency, Justified Envy, and Incentives in Priority-Based Matching. <i>American Economic Review Insights</i> , 2020, 2, 425-442.	3.2	23
14	How Market Design Emerged from Game Theory: A Mutual Interview. <i>Journal of Economic Perspectives</i> , 2019, 33, 118-143.	5.9	27
15	The 6-year clinical outcomes for patients registered in a multiregional United States Kidney Paired Donation program – a retrospective study. <i>Transplant International</i> , 2019, 32, 839-853.	1.6	7
16	Effect of match-run frequencies on the number of transplants and waiting times in kidney exchange. <i>American Journal of Transplantation</i> , 2018, 18, 1177-1186.	4.7	30
17	Complete Chain of the First Global Kidney Exchange Transplant and 3-yr Follow-up. <i>European Urology Focus</i> , 2018, 4, 190-197.	3.1	15
18	Marketplaces, Markets, and Market Design. <i>American Economic Review</i> , 2018, 108, 1609-1658.	8.5	76

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19	Incentivizing Organ Donor Registrations with Organ Allocation Priority. Health Economics (United) Tj ETQq1 1 0.784314 rgBT ₃₁ /Overlock	1.7	31
20	The promise of organ and tissue preservation to transform medicine. Nature Biotechnology, 2017, 35, 530-542.	17.5	371
21	Some Memories of My Academic Grandfather. Negotiation Journal, 2017, 33, 373-374.	0.5	0
22	Open dialogue between professionals with different opinions builds the best policy. American Journal of Transplantation, 2017, 17, 2749.	4.7	7
23	People should not be banned from transplantation only because of their country of origin. American Journal of Transplantation, 2017, 17, 2747-2748.	4.7	10
24	5. Experiments in Market Design. , 2016, , .		12
25	Minimax across a population of games. Journal of the Economic Science Association, 2016, 2, 144-156.	2.3	0
26	More Money, More Problems? Can High Pay be Coercive and Repugnant?. American Economic Review, 2015, 105, 357-360.	8.5	41
27	Transplantation. Transplantation, 2015, 99, 261-264.	1.0	2
28	Finding long chains in kidney exchange using the traveling salesman problem. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 2015, 112, 663-668.	7.1	82
29	Kidney Exchange and the Alliance for Paired Donation: Operations Research Changes the Way Kidneys Are Transplanted. Interfaces, 2015, 45, 26-42.	1.5	30
30	The redesign of the medical intern assignment mechanism in Israel. Israel Journal of Health Policy Research, 2015, 4, 11.	2.6	6
31	Why do stable clearinghouses work so well? - Small sets of stable matchings in typical environments, and the limits-on-manipulation theorem of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor. Journal of Dynamics and Games, 2015, 2, 331-340.	1.0	1
32	Maximization, learning, and economic behavior. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 2014, 111, 10818-10825.	7.1	120
33	How Werner GÅ¼th's ultimatum game shaped our understanding of social behavior. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2014, 108, 292-318.	2.0	49
34	Is avatar-to-avatar communication as effective as face-to-face communication? An Ultimatum Game experiment in First and Second Life. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2014, 108, 374-382.	2.0	35
35	Getting More Organs for Transplantation. American Economic Review, 2014, 104, 425-430.	8.5	70
36	Loopholes undermine donation: An experiment motivated by an organ donation priority loophole in Israel. Journal of Public Economics, 2014, 114, 19-28.	4.3	28

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37	Free riding and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange. <i>Theoretical Economics</i> , 2014, 9, 817-863.	0.8	59
38	Some memories of Cy Derman. <i>Annals of Operations Research</i> , 2013, 208, 3-3.	4.1	0
39	Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets*. <i>Quarterly Journal of Economics</i> , 2013, 128, 1585-1632.	8.6	110
40	Marketplace Institutions Related to the Timing of Transactions: Reply to Priest. <i>Journal of Labor Economics</i> , 2012, 30, 479-494.	2.8	5
41	Organ Allocation Policy and the Decision to Donate. <i>American Economic Review</i> , 2012, 102, 2018-2047.	8.5	85
42	New Challenges in Multihospital Kidney Exchange. <i>American Economic Review</i> , 2012, 102, 354-359.	8.5	38
43	Kidney paired donation. <i>Nephrology Dialysis Transplantation</i> , 2011, 26, 2091-2099.	0.7	90
44	A Choice Prediction Competition for Social Preferences in Simple Extensive Form Games: An Introduction. <i>Games</i> , 2011, 2, 257-276.	0.6	16
45	The Job Market for New Economists: A Market Design Perspective. <i>Journal of Economic Perspectives</i> , 2010, 24, 187-206.	5.9	84
46	A Nonsimultaneous, Extended, Altruistic-Donor Chain. <i>New England Journal of Medicine</i> , 2009, 360, 1096-1101.	27.0	264
47	If you are offered the Right of First Refusal, should you accept? An investigation of contract design. <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i> , 2009, 65, 176-204.	0.8	16
48	Market Culture: How Rules Governing Exploding Offers Affect Market Performance. <i>American Economic Journal: Microeconomics</i> , 2009, 1, 199-219.	1.2	51
49	Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match. <i>American Economic Review</i> , 2009, 99, 1954-1978.	8.5	384
50	Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions. <i>International Journal of Game Theory</i> , 2008, 36, 537-569.	0.5	322
51	What Have We Learned from Market Design?. <i>Economic Journal</i> , 2008, 118, 285-310.	3.6	313
52	The Gastroenterology Fellowship Match—The First Two Years. <i>Gastroenterology</i> , 2008, 135, 344-346.	1.3	27
53	AOA Symposium. <i>Journal of Bone and Joint Surgery - Series A</i> , 2008, 90, 1375-1384.	3.0	22
54	Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in Markets with Compatibility-Based Preferences. <i>American Economic Review</i> , 2007, 97, 828-851.	8.5	295

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55	Multi-agent learning and the descriptive value of simple models. <i>Artificial Intelligence</i> , 2007, 171, 423-428.	5.8	19
56	Learning and equilibrium as useful approximations: Accuracy of prediction on randomly selected constant sum games. <i>Economic Theory</i> , 2007, 33, 29-51.	0.9	38
57	Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets. <i>Journal of Economic Perspectives</i> , 2007, 21, 37-58.	5.9	433
58	Late and multiple bidding in second price Internet auctions: Theory and evidence concerning different rules for ending an auction. <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i> , 2006, 55, 297-320.	0.8	210
59	The Speed of Learning in Noisy Games: Partial Reinforcement and the Sustainability of Cooperation. <i>American Economic Review</i> , 2006, 96, 1029-1042.	8.5	124
60	Increasing the Opportunity of Live Kidney Donation by Matching for Two- and Three-Way Exchanges. <i>Transplantation</i> , 2006, 81, 773-782.	1.0	182
61	The dynamics of law clerk matching: An experimental and computational investigation of proposals for reform of the market. <i>Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control</i> , 2006, 30, 457-486.	1.6	62
62	The Gastroenterology Fellowship Market: Should There Be a Match?. <i>American Economic Review</i> , 2005, 95, 372-375.	8.5	40
63	A Kidney Exchange Clearinghouse in New England. <i>American Economic Review</i> , 2005, 95, 376-380.	8.5	199
64	The Boston Public School Match. <i>American Economic Review</i> , 2005, 95, 368-371.	8.5	365
65	The New York City High School Match. <i>American Economic Review</i> , 2005, 95, 364-367.	8.5	471
66	The Collapse of a Medical Labor Clearinghouse (and Why Such Failures Are Rare). <i>American Economic Review</i> , 2005, 95, 878-889.	8.5	76
67	Pairwise kidney exchange. <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 2005, 125, 151-188.	1.1	375
68	The Nash equilibrium: A perspective. <i>Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America</i> , 2004, 101, 3999-4002.	7.1	182
69	Kidney Exchange. <i>Quarterly Journal of Economics</i> , 2004, 119, 457-488.	8.6	606
70	Auctions of Homogeneous Goods with Increasing Returns: Experimental Comparison of Alternative "Dutch" Auctions. <i>Management Science</i> , 2004, 50, 1044-1063.	4.1	56
71	The Origins, History, and Design of the Resident Match. <i>JAMA - Journal of the American Medical Association</i> , 2003, 289, 909.	7.4	135
72	The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics. <i>Econometrica</i> , 2002, 70, 1341-1378.	4.2	734

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73	Form and function in experimental design. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2001, 24, 427-428.	0.7	29
74	The Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks. University of Chicago Law Review, 2001, 68, 793.	0.1	137
75	The Dynamics of Reorganization in Matching Markets: A Laboratory Experiment Motivated by A Natural Experiments*. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2000, 115, 201-235.	8.6	182
76	Truncation Strategies in Matching Markets-in Search of Advice for Participants. Econometrica, 1999, 67, 21-43.	4.2	118
77	The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design. American Economic Review, 1999, 89, 748-780.	8.5	586
78	The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory. Journal of Political Economy, 1984, 92, 991-1016.	4.5	920
79	Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods. Economics Letters, 1982, 9, 127-132.	1.9	211
80	The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives. Mathematics of Operations Research, 1982, 7, 617-628.	1.3	600
81	Criminal, Legal, and Ethical Kidney Donation and Transplantation: A Conceptual Framework to Enable Innovation. Transplant International, 0, 35, .	1.6	0