

# Keith L Dougherty

## List of Publications by Year in descending order

Source: <https://exaly.com/author-pdf/6553581/publications.pdf>

Version: 2024-02-01

29  
papers

263  
citations

933264

10  
h-index

1058333

14  
g-index

31  
all docs

31  
docs citations

31  
times ranked

78  
citing authors

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
1	The effect of unconditional preferences on Sen's paradox. <i>Theory and Decision</i> , 2022, 93, 427-447.	0.5	1
2	Slavery in the Constitution: Why the Lower South Occasionally Succeeded at the Constitutional Convention. <i>Political Research Quarterly</i> , 2020, 73, 638-650.	1.1	2
3	Stopping rules for majority voting: A public choice experiment. <i>Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization</i> , 2020, 175, 353-364.	1.0	2
4	The probability of violating Arrow's conditions. <i>European Journal of Political Economy</i> , 2020, 65, 101936.	1.0	3
5	TRENDS: Creating Parties in Congress: The Emergence of a Social Network. <i>Political Research Quarterly</i> , 2020, 73, 759-773.	1.1	0
6	Coalitional Instability and the Three-Fifths Compromise. <i>American Journal of Political Science</i> , 2018, 62, 861-872.	2.9	4
7	The Consistency of James Madison's Politics. <i>American Political Thought</i> , 2017, 6, 201-227.	0.0	1
8	An expected utility analysis of k-majority rules. <i>Constitutional Political Economy</i> , 2016, 27, 332-353.	0.7	2
9	The value of formalism: re-examining external costs and decision costs with multiple groups. <i>Public Choice</i> , 2015, 163, 31-52.	1.0	5
10	An experimental study of the efficiency of unanimity rule and majority rule. <i>Public Choice</i> , 2014, 158, 359-382.	1.0	9
11	A Spatial Analysis of Delegate Voting at the Constitutional Convention. <i>Journal of Economic History</i> , 2013, 73, 407-444.	1.0	16
12	A New Dataset of Delegate Positions on All Substantive Roll Calls at the U.S. Constitutional Convention. <i>Historical Methods</i> , 2012, 45, 135-141.	0.9	6
13	Buchanan and Tullock's apple. <i>Public Choice</i> , 2012, 152, 403-406.	1.0	0
14	Voting for Pareto optimality: a multidimensional analysis. <i>Public Choice</i> , 2012, 151, 655-678.	1.0	11
15	A Spatial Analysis of Delegate Voting at the Constitutional Convention. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 2011, , .	0.4	2
16	The Calculus of Consent and Constitutional Design. <i>Studies in Public Choice</i> , 2011, , .	0.0	31
17	Personality interests at the Constitutional Convention: new tests of the Beard thesis. <i>Cliometrica</i> , 2010, 4, 207-228.	1.3	8
18	Majority Rule versus Supermajority Rules: Their Effects on Narrow and Broad Taxes. <i>Public Finance Review</i> , 2010, 38, 738-761.	0.2	21

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
19	The Properties of Simple Vs. Absolute Majority Rule: Cases Where Absences and Abstentions Are Important. <i>Journal of Theoretical Politics</i> , 2010, 22, 85-122.	0.3	13
20	Odd or Even: Assembly Size and Majority Rule. <i>Journal of Politics</i> , 2009, 71, 733-747.	1.4	8
21	An Empirical Test of Federalist and Anti-Federalist Theories of State Contributions, 1775-1783. <i>Social Science History</i> , 2009, 33, 47-74.	0.5	2
22	Voting on slavery at the Constitutional Convention. <i>Public Choice</i> , 2008, 136, 293.	1.0	20
23	An Economic Interpretation of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 Revisited. <i>Journal of Economic History</i> , 2007, 67, 829-848.	1.0	16
24	A Pivotal Voter from a Pivotal State: Roger Sherman at the Constitutional Convention. <i>American Political Science Review</i> , 2006, 100, 297-302.	2.6	15
25	A NONEQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS OF UNANIMITY RULE, MAJORITY RULE, AND PARETO. <i>Economic Inquiry</i> , 2005, 43, 855-864.	1.0	14
26	Public Goods Theory from Eighteenth Century Political Philosophy to Twentieth Century Economics. <i>Public Choice</i> , 2003, 117, 239-253.	1.0	16
27	Suppressing Shays' Rebellion. <i>Journal of Theoretical Politics</i> , 1999, 11, 233-260.	0.3	21
28	Personalty Interests at the Constitutional Convention: New Tests of the Beard Thesis. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 0, , .	0.4	1
29	Congressional apportionment and the fourteenth amendment. <i>Public Choice</i> , 0, , .	1.0	0