Keith L Dougherty

List of Publications by Year in descending order

Source: https://exaly.com/author-pdf/6553581/publications.pdf

Version: 2024-02-01

29 263 10 14 g-index

31 31 31 31 78

times ranked

citing authors

docs citations

all docs

#	Article	IF	CITATIONS
1	The Calculus of Consent and Constitutional Design. Studies in Public Choice, 2011, , .	0.0	31
2	Suppressing Shays' Rebellion. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1999, 11, 233-260.	0.3	21
3	Majority Rule versus Supermajority Rules: Their Effects on Narrow and Broad Taxes. Public Finance Review, 2010, 38, 738-761.	0.2	21
4	Voting on slavery at the Constitutional Convention. Public Choice, 2008, 136, 293.	1.0	20
5	Public Goods Theory from Eighteenth Century Political Philosophy to Twentieth Century Economics. Public Choice, 2003, 117, 239-253.	1.0	16
6	An Economic Interpretation of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 Revisited. Journal of Economic History, 2007, 67, 829-848.	1.0	16
7	A Spatial Analysis of Delegate Voting at the Constitutional Convention. Journal of Economic History, 2013, 73, 407-444.	1.0	16
8	A Pivotal Voter from a Pivotal State: Roger Sherman at the Constitutional Convention. American Political Science Review, 2006, 100, 297-302.	2.6	15
9	A NONEQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS OF UNANIMITY RULE, MAJORITY RULE, AND PARETO. Economic Inquiry, 2005, 43, 855-864.	1.0	14
10	The Properties of Simple Vs. Absolute Majority Rule: Cases Where Absences and Abstentions Are Important. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2010, 22, 85-122.	0.3	13
11	Voting for Pareto optimality: a multidimensional analysis. Public Choice, 2012, 151, 655-678.	1.0	11
12	An experimental study of the efficiency of unanimity rule and majority rule. Public Choice, 2014, 158, 359-382.	1.0	9
13	Odd or Even: Assembly Size and Majority Rule. Journal of Politics, 2009, 71, 733-747.	1.4	8
14	Personalty interests at the Constitutional Convention: new tests of the Beard thesis. Cliometrica, 2010, 4, 207-228.	1.3	8
15	A New Dataset of Delegate Positions on All Substantive Roll Calls at the U.S. Constitutional Convention. Historical Methods, 2012, 45, 135-141.	0.9	6
16	The value of formalism: re-examining external costs and decision costs with multiple groups. Public Choice, 2015, 163, 31-52.	1.0	5
17	Coalitional Instability and the Threeâ€Fifths Compromise. American Journal of Political Science, 2018, 62, 861-872.	2.9	4
18	The probability of violating Arrow's conditions. European Journal of Political Economy, 2020, 65, 101936.	1.0	3

#	Article	IF	CITATIONS
19	An Empirical Test of Federalist and Anti-Federalist Theories of State Contributions, 1775-1783. Social Science History, 2009, 33, 47-74.	0.5	2
20	A Spatial Analysis of Delegate Voting at the Constitutional Convention. SSRN Electronic Journal, 2011,	0.4	2
21	An expected utility analysis of k-majority rules. Constitutional Political Economy, 2016, 27, 332-353.	0.7	2
22	Slavery in the Constitution: Why the Lower South Occasionally Succeeded at the Constitutional Convention. Political Research Quarterly, 2020, 73, 638-650.	1.1	2
23	Stopping rules for majority voting: A public choice experiment. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2020, 175, 353-364.	1.0	2
24	The Consistency of James Madison's Politics. American Political Thought, 2017, 6, 201-227.	0.0	1
25	Personalty Interests at the Constitutional Convention: New Tests of the Beard Thesis. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	1
26	The effect of unconditional preferences on Sen's paradox. Theory and Decision, 2022, 93, 427-447.	0.5	1
27	Buchanan and Tullock's apple. Public Choice, 2012, 152, 403-406.	1.0	O
28	TRENDS: Creating Parties in Congress: The Emergence of a Social Network. Political Research Quarterly, 2020, 73, 759-773.	1.1	0
29	Congressional apportionment and the fourteenth amendment. Public Choice, 0, , .	1.0	О