
## **Robert Zeithammer**

List of Publications by Year in descending order

Source: https://exaly.com/author-pdf/6409365/publications.pdf Version: 2024-02-01



#	Article	IF	CITATIONS
1	Soft Floors in Auctions. Management Science, 2019, 65, 4204-4221.	4.1	10
2	Beyond Posted Prices: the Past, Present, and Future of Participative Pricing Mechanisms. Customer Needs and Solutions, 2018, 5, 121-136.	0.8	34
3	The pivotal role of fairness: Which consumers like annuities?. Financial Planning Review, 2018, 1, e1019.	2.0	2
4	Bidding for Bidders? How the Format for Soliciting Supplier Participation in NYOP Auctions Impacts Channel Profit. Management Science, 2017, 63, 4324-4344.	4.1	7
5	Consumer Preferences for Annuity Attributes: Beyond Net Present Value. Journal of Marketing Research, 2016, 53, 240-262.	4.8	29
6	The Modern Advertising Agency Selection Contest: A Case for Stipends to New Participants. Journal of Marketing Research, 2016, 53, 773-789.	4.8	5
7	<i>Pay What You Want</i> as a Marketing Strategy in Monopolistic and Competitive Markets. Management Science, 2015, 61, 1217-1236.	4.1	101
8	Optimal selling strategies when buyers name their own prices. Quantitative Marketing and Economics, 2015, 13, 135-171.	1.5	8
9	Erratum to "Optimal Reverse-Pricing Mechanisms―by Martin Spann, Robert Zeithammer, and Gerald HÃæbl. Marketing Science, 2015, 34, 297-299.	4.1	1
10	Vertical Differentiation with Variety-Seeking Consumers. Management Science, 2013, 59, 390-401.	4.1	37
11	The Hesitant <i>Hai Gui</i> : Return-Migration Preferences of U.SEducated Chinese Scientists and Engineers. Journal of Marketing Research, 2013, 50, 644-663.	4.8	12
12	A reflection on analytical work in marketing: Three points of consensus. Marketing Letters, 2012, 23, 381-389.	2.9	5
13	The Sealed-Bid Abstraction in Online Auctions. Marketing Science, 2010, 29, 964-987.	4.1	53
14	<b>Rejoinder</b> —Causes and Implications of Some Bidders Not Conforming to the Sealed-Bid Abstraction. Marketing Science, 2010, 29, 998-1000.	4.1	0
15	Optimal Reverse-Pricing Mechanisms. Marketing Science, 2010, 29, 1058-1070.	4.1	23
16	Commitment in sequential auctioning: advance listings and threshold prices. Economic Theory, 2009, 38, 187-216.	0.9	9
17	Statistical Benefits of Choices from Subsets. Journal of Marketing Research, 2009, 46, 816-831.	4.8	13
18	Research Note—Optimal Selling in Dynamic Auctions: Adaptation Versus Commitment. Marketing Science, 2007, 26, 859-867.	4.1	14

**ROBERT ZEITHAMMER** 

#	Article	IF	CITATIONS
19	Research Note—Strategic Bid-Shading and Sequential Auctioning with Learning from Past Prices. Management Science, 2007, 53, 1510-1519.	4.1	33
20	Forward-Looking Bidding in Online Auctions. Journal of Marketing Research, 2006, 43, 462-476.	4.8	125
21	Bayesian estimation of multivariate-normal models when dimensions are absent. Quantitative Marketing and Economics, 2006, 4, 241-265.	1.5	27
22	Economics, Psychology, and Social Dynamics of Consumer Bidding in Auctions. Marketing Letters, 2005, 16, 401-413.	2.9	40
23	Forecasting new product trial in a controlled test market environment. Journal of Forecasting, 2003, 22, 391-410.	2.8	43