

Hans Rott

List of Publications by Year in descending order

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Version: 2024-02-01

67
papers

999
citations

516710

16
h-index

501196

28
g-index

72
all docs

72
docs citations

72
times ranked

186
citing authors

| # | ARTICLE | IF | CITATIONS |
|----|---|-----|-----------|
| 1 | Severe Withdrawal (and Recovery). <i>Journal of Philosophical Logic</i> , 1999, 28, 501-547. | 0.9 | 90 |
| 2 | Preferential belief change using generalized epistemic entrenchment. <i>Journal of Logic, Language and Information</i> , 1992, 1, 45. | 0.6 | 89 |
| 3 | Belief contraction in the context of the general theory of rational choice. <i>Journal of Symbolic Logic</i> , 1993, 58, 1426-1450. | 0.5 | 81 |
| 4 | Two methods of constructing contractions and revisions of knowledge systems. <i>Journal of Philosophical Logic</i> , 1991, 20, 149. | 0.9 | 79 |
| 5 | Two Dogmas of Belief Revision. <i>The Journal of Philosophy</i> , 2000, 97, 503. | 0.5 | 72 |
| 6 | Conditionals and theory change: Revisions, expansions, and additions. <i>Synthese</i> , 1989, 81, 91-113. | 1.1 | 61 |
| 7 | Shifting Priorities: Simple Representations for Twenty-Seven Iterated Theory Change Operators. , 2009, , 269-296. | | 45 |
| 8 | ifs, though, and because. <i>Erkenntnis</i> , 1986, 25, 345. | 0.9 | 43 |
| 9 | Coherence and Conservatism in the Dynamics of Belief II: Iterated Belief Change without Dispositional Coherence. <i>Journal of Logic and Computation</i> , 2003, 13, 111-145. | 0.8 | 34 |
| 10 | A nonmonotonic conditional logic for belief revision. <i>Lecture Notes in Computer Science</i> , 1991, , 135-181. | 1.3 | 32 |
| 11 | Revision by comparison. <i>Artificial Intelligence</i> , 2004, 157, 5-47. | 5.8 | 27 |
| 12 | Coherence and Conservatism in the Dynamics of Belief. <i>Erkenntnis</i> , 1999, 50, 387-412. | 0.9 | 25 |
| 13 | From probabilities to categorical beliefs: Going beyond toy models. <i>Journal of Logic and Computation</i> , 2018, 28, 1099-1124. | 0.8 | 22 |
| 14 | DIFFERENCE-MAKING CONDITIONALS AND THE RELEVANT RAMSEY TEST. <i>Review of Symbolic Logic</i> , 2022, 15, 133-164. | 0.7 | 22 |
| 15 | Stability, Strength and Sensitivity: Converting Belief into Knowledge. <i>Erkenntnis</i> , 2004, 61, 469-493. | 0.9 | 21 |
| 16 | Stability and Scepticism in the Modelling of Doxastic States: Probabilities and Plain Beliefs. <i>Minds and Machines</i> , 2017, 27, 167-197. | 4.8 | 21 |
| 17 | On the logic of theory change: More maps between different kinds of contraction functions. , 1992, , 122-141. | | 21 |
| 18 | Basic Entrenchment. <i>Studia Logica</i> , 2003, 73, 257-280. | 0.6 | 19 |

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|----|---|-----|-----------|
| 19 | Modellings for belief change: Prioritization and entrenchment*. <i>Theoria</i> (Stockholm), 1992, 58, 21-57. | 0.2 | 19 |
| 20 | Reapproaching Ramsey: Conditionals and Iterated Belief Change in the Spirit of AGM. <i>Journal of Philosophical Logic</i> , 2011, 40, 155-191. | 0.9 | 14 |
| 21 | A Counterexample to Six Fundamental Principles of Belief Formation. <i>Synthese</i> , 2004, 139, 225-240. | 1.1 | 13 |
| 22 | Belief Revision and Dynamic Logic. <i>Outstanding Contributions To Logic</i> , 2014, , 203-233. | 0.3 | 13 |
| 23 | Safe Contraction Revisited. <i>Outstanding Contributions To Logic</i> , 2014, , 35-70. | 0.3 | 13 |
| 24 | “Just Because” Taking Belief Bases Seriously. , 2017, , 387-408. | | 10 |
| 25 | Revision by comparison as a unifying framework: Severe withdrawal, irrevocable revision and irrefutable revision. <i>Theoretical Computer Science</i> , 2006, 355, 228-242. | 0.9 | 9 |
| 26 | Bounded Revision: Two-Dimensional Belief Change Between Conservative and Moderate Revision. <i>Journal of Philosophical Logic</i> , 2012, 41, 173-200. | 0.9 | 9 |
| 27 | Interpreting enthymematic arguments using belief revision. <i>Synthese</i> , 2013, 190, 4041-4063. | 1.1 | 8 |
| 28 | How Not to Change the Theory of Theory Change: A Reply to Tennant. <i>British Journal for the Philosophy of Science</i> , 1995, 46, 361-380. | 2.3 | 7 |
| 29 | Reduction: Some criteria and criticisms of the structuralist concept. <i>Erkenntnis</i> , 1987, 27, 231. | 0.9 | 6 |
| 30 | Modellings for belief change: Base contraction, multiple contraction, and epistemic entrenchment (preliminary report). , 1992, , 139-153. | | 6 |
| 31 | Belief Revision. , 0, , 514-534. | | 6 |
| 32 | Degrees All the Way Down: Beliefs, Non-Beliefs and Disbeliefs. <i>Synthese Library</i> , 2009, , 301-339. | 0.2 | 6 |
| 33 | A Puzzle About Disputes and Disagreements. <i>Erkenntnis</i> , 2015, 80, 167-189. | 0.9 | 5 |
| 34 | Negative Doxastic Voluntarism and the concept of belief. <i>Synthese</i> , 2017, 194, 2695-2720. | 1.1 | 5 |
| 35 | The Value of Truth and the Value of Information: On Isaac Levi's Epistemology. , 2006, , 179-200. | | 4 |
| 36 | INFORMATION STRUCTURES IN BELIEF REVISION. , 2008, , 457-482. | | 3 |

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|----|---|-----|-----------|
| 37 | Special Issue on Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents. <i>Journal of Applied Logic</i> , 2009, 7, 363. | 1.1 | 3 |
| 38 | Odd Choices: On the Rationality of Some Alleged Anomalies of Decision and Inference. <i>Topoi</i> , 2011, 30, 59-69. | 1.3 | 3 |
| 39 | Coherent choice and epistemic entrenchment (preliminary report). <i>Lecture Notes in Computer Science</i> , 1994, , 284-295. | 1.3 | 3 |
| 40 | Four Floors for the Theory of Theory Change: The Case of Imperfect Discrimination. <i>Lecture Notes in Computer Science</i> , 2014, , 368-382. | 1.3 | 3 |
| 41 | Drawing Inferences from Conditionals. <i>Trends in Logic</i> , 1997, , 149-179. | 0.2 | 3 |
| 42 | Stability, Strength and Sensitivity: Converting Belief into Knowledge. , 2004, , 327-351. | | 3 |
| 43 | A Plea for Accuracy. <i>Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics</i> , 1998, 8, 221-224. | 0.5 | 2 |
| 44 | Words in Contexts: Fregean Elucidations. <i>Linguistics and Philosophy</i> , 2000, 23, 621-643. | 1.0 | 2 |
| 45 | Economics and Economy in the Theory of Belief Revision. , 2003, , 57-86. | | 2 |
| 46 | Economics and Economy in the Theory of Belief Revision (Preliminary Report). <i>Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science</i> , 2003, 84, 30-44. | 0.9 | 2 |
| 47 | Vom FlieÄŸen theoretischer Begriffe: Begriffliches Wissen und theoretischer Wandel. <i>Kant-Studien</i> , 2004, 95, . | 0.1 | 2 |
| 48 | Probability, coherent belief and coherent belief changes. <i>Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence</i> , 2019, 87, 259-291. | 1.3 | 2 |
| 49 | Lehrerâ€™s Dynamic Theory of Knowledge. , 2003, , 219-242. | | 2 |
| 50 | Two Concepts of Plausibility in Default Reasoning. <i>Erkenntnis</i> , 2014, 79, 1219-1252. | 0.9 | 1 |
| 51 | Unvergleichbarkeit und unabhÄngige Bedeutung. <i>Zeitschrift Fur Philosophische Forschung</i> , 2014, 68, 237-241. | 0.0 | 1 |
| 52 | Preservation and Postulation: Lessons from the New Debate on the Ramsey Test. <i>Mind</i> , 0, , fzw028. | 0.6 | 1 |
| 53 | Unstable Knowledge, Unstable Belief. <i>Logos and Episteme</i> , 2019, 10, 395-407. | 0.1 | 1 |
| 54 | A Counterexample to Six Fundamental Principles of Belief Formation. , 2004, , 61-76. | | 1 |

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|----|---|-----|-----------|
| 55 | Idealizations, Intertheory Explanations and Conditionals. , 2010, , 59-75. | | 1 |
| 56 | Beyond Recovery? a Reply to Tennant. Erkenntnis, 1998, 49, 387-392. | 0.9 | 0 |
| 57 | Variably restricted necessity: Truth and fiction in the interpretation of indicative and subjunctive conditionals. , 0, , . | | 0 |
| 58 | Theoretical concepts in flux: Conceptual knowledge and theory change. , 0, , . | | 0 |
| 59 | A New Psychologism in Logic? Reflections from the Point of View of Belief Revision. Studia Logica, 2008, 88, 113-136. | 0.6 | 0 |
| 60 | Meinungsverschiedenheiten und MissverstÄndnisse. Literalität Und Liminalität, 2008, , 61-96. | 0.0 | 0 |
| 61 | Possibility and Reality. , 2003, , . | | 0 |
| 62 | Supplying Planks For Neurathâ€™s Boat: Can Economists Meet The Demands of The Dynamics of Scientific Theories?. Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook, 2004, , 225-245. | 0.2 | 0 |
| 63 | Seltsame Wahlen. Studia Philosophica, 0, , . | 0.0 | 0 |
| 64 | Belief Contraction in the Context of the General Theory of Rational Choice. , 2016, , 269-302. | | 0 |
| 65 | Unstimmigkeiten: Pragmatistische Gedanken Å¼ber Bedeutungs- und Meinungsverschiedenheiten. , 2004, , 295-321. | | 0 |
| 66 | â€A Formula Which I Derived Many Years Agoâ€™ Boole, Reichenbach and Popper on Probability and Conditionals. History and Philosophy of Logic, 0, , 1-8. | 0.6 | 0 |
| 67 | Introduction to <scp>S</scp> ten <scp>L</scp> industrÅ™m's â€A semantic approach to nonmonotonic reasoning: Inference operations and choiceâ€™; Theoria (Stockholm), 0, , . | 0.2 | 0 |