

Randall G Holcombe

List of Publications by Year in descending order

Source: <https://exaly.com/author-pdf/5764071/publications.pdf>

Version: 2024-02-01

62
papers

1,591
citations

623574

14
h-index

395590

33
g-index

88
all docs

88
docs citations

88
times ranked

638
citing authors

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
1	Contractarian ideology and the legitimacy of government. <i>Journal of Institutional Economics</i> , 2021, 17, 379-391.	1.3	2
2	Entrepreneurial Economies. <i>Economies</i> , 2021, 9, 123.	1.2	4
3	Elite Influence on General Political Preferences. <i>Journal of Government and Economics</i> , 2021, 3, 100021.	0.7	7
4	Progressive Democracy: the ideology of the modern predatory state. <i>Public Choice</i> , 2020, 182, 287-301.	1.0	10
5	Creative destruction: getting ahead and staying ahead in a capitalist economy. <i>Review of Austrian Economics</i> , 2020, , 1.	0.7	0
6	James M. Buchanan's constitutional project: past and future. <i>Public Choice</i> , 2020, 183, 371-387.	1.0	5
7	Transitional gains and rent extraction. <i>Public Choice</i> , 2019, 181, 127-139.	1.0	7
8	Corruption and destructive entrepreneurship. <i>Small Business Economics</i> , 2018, 51, 181-202.	4.4	57
9	Interest group support for non-group issues. <i>Constitutional Political Economy</i> , 2018, 29, 303-316.	0.7	2
10	Is institutional improvement possible?. <i>Applied Economics Letters</i> , 2018, 25, 758-761.	1.0	2
11	Checks and Balances: Enforcing Constitutional Constraints. <i>Economies</i> , 2018, 6, 57.	1.2	9
12	Institutional quality and the wealth of autocrats. <i>European Journal of Government and Economics</i> , 2018, 6, 106-125.	0.4	0
13	Malinvestment. <i>Review of Austrian Economics</i> , 2017, 30, 153-167.	0.7	7
14	Political incentives for rent creation. <i>Constitutional Political Economy</i> , 2017, 28, 62-78.	0.7	13
15	Economic Institutions and the Durability of Democracy. <i>Atlantic Economic Journal</i> , 2017, 45, 17-28.	0.3	4
16	Institutional Quality and the Wealth of Autocrats. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 2016, , .	0.4	0
17	Regulation and corruption. <i>Public Choice</i> , 2015, 164, 75-85.	1.0	98
18	Capital and labor, Past and present, in the context of Piketty's Capital. <i>Review of Austrian Economics</i> , 2015, 28, 195-207.	0.7	4

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
19	The economic theory of rights. <i>Journal of Institutional Economics</i> , 2014, 10, 471-491.	1.3	13
20	The common pool of transitional profits. <i>Review of Austrian Economics</i> , 2014, 27, 387-401.	0.7	7
21	Politics as exchange: the classical liberal economics and politics of James M. Buchanan. <i>Constitutional Political Economy</i> , 2014, 25, 265-279.	0.7	8
22	Firms as knowledge repositories. <i>Review of Austrian Economics</i> , 2013, 26, 259-275.	0.7	18
23	Institutional quality and the tenure of autocrats. <i>Public Choice</i> , 2013, 156, 409-421.	1.0	25
24	Rule of law and the size of government. <i>Journal of Institutional Economics</i> , 2012, 8, 49-69.	1.3	11
25	Public choice in a local government setting. <i>Public Choice</i> , 2011, 149, 1-3.	1.0	3
26	The cartelization of local governments. <i>Public Choice</i> , 2011, 149, 65-74.	1.0	7
27	Pluralism and heterodoxy in economic methodology. <i>Review of Austrian Economics</i> , 2011, 24, 57-65.	0.7	1
28	Consent or Coercion? A Critical Analysis of the Constitutional Contract. <i>Studies in Public Choice</i> , 2011, , 9-23.	0.0	6
29	Policy errors in executive and legislative decision-making. <i>Public Choice</i> , 2010, 144, 37-51.	1.0	5
30	The social sub-optimality of competitive elections: comment. <i>Public Choice</i> , 2009, 138, 217-219.	1.0	2
31	Principles and politics: Like oil and water. <i>Review of Austrian Economics</i> , 2009, 22, 151-157.	0.7	3
32	A reformulation of the foundations of welfare economics. <i>Review of Austrian Economics</i> , 2009, 22, 209-224.	0.7	4
33	Does restricting choice in referenda enable governments to spend more?. <i>Public Choice</i> , 2008, 136, 87-101.	1.0	10
34	Why does government produce national defense?. <i>Public Choice</i> , 2008, 137, 11-19.	1.0	18
35	Advancing economic analysis beyond the equilibrium framework. <i>Review of Austrian Economics</i> , 2008, 21, 225-249.	0.7	8
36	Evidence on voter preferences from unrestricted choice referendums. <i>Public Choice</i> , 2007, 131, 197-215.	1.0	14

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
37	Does the invisible hand hold or lead? Market adjustment in an entrepreneurial economy. Review of Austrian Economics, 2006, 19, 189-201.	0.7	3
38	Government growth in the twenty-first century. Public Choice, 2005, 124, 95-114.	1.0	29
39	The New Urbanism Versus the Market Process. Review of Austrian Economics, 2004, 17, 285-300.	0.7	22
40	National Income Accounting and Public Policy. Review of Austrian Economics, 2004, 17, 387-405.	0.7	13
41	Patrick A. McNutt, The Economics of Public Choice. Public Choice, 2003, 116, 238-241.	1.0	0
42	The Size and Significance of the Pareto Set in Spatial Voting Models. Public Choice, 2003, 116, 19-29.	1.0	0
43	Title is missing!. Public Choice, 2003, 117, 231-234.	1.0	0
44	The Origins of Entrepreneurial Opportunities. Review of Austrian Economics, 2003, 16, 25-43.	0.7	133
45	Progress and entrepreneurship. Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics, 2003, 6, 3-26.	0.5	14
46	Political Entrepreneurship and the Democratic Allocation of Economic Resources. Review of Austrian Economics, 2002, 15, 143-159.	0.7	123
47	The Unanimous Voting Rule is not the Political Equivalent to Market Exchange. Public Choice, 2001, 106, 233-242.	1.0	11
48	Public Goods Theory and Public Policy. Journal of Value Inquiry, 2000, 34, 273-286.	0.2	10
49	Absence of Envy Does Not Imply Fairness: Reply. Southern Economic Journal, 2000, 67, 485-487.	1.3	0
50	Equilibrium Versus the Invisible Hand. Review of Austrian Economics, 1999, 12, 227-243.	0.7	21
51	Entrepreneurship and economic growth. Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics, 1998, 1, 45-62.	0.5	268
52	The stability of international coalitions in United Nations voting from 1946 to 1973. Public Choice, 1996, 86, 17-34.	1.0	10
53	Vibert's vision: Constitutional theory in search of a constitution. Constitutional Political Economy, 1996, 7, 281-291.	0.7	2
54	Empirical evidence on the publicness of state legislative activities. Public Choice, 1995, 83, 47-58.	1.0	29

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
55	The Economic Foundations of Government. , 1994, , .		46
56	Revolving Fund Finance: The Case of Wastewater Treatment. Public Budgeting and Finance, 1992, 12, 50-65.	0.5	19
57	The coasian and knightian theories of the firm. Managerial and Decision Economics, 1989, 10, 147-154.	1.3	88
58	The median voter model in public choice theory. Public Choice, 1989, 61, 115-125.	1.0	133
59	A note on seniority and political competition. Public Choice, 1989, 61, 285-288.	1.0	16
60	Non-optimal unanimous agreement. Public Choice, 1986, 48, 229-244.	1.0	17
61	INFORMATION, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS. Advances in Austrian Economics, 0, , 173-195.	0.4	4
62	Economic Institutions and the Durability of Democracy. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	0