

Juan Comesaña

List of Publications by Year in descending order

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Version: 2024-02-01

22
papers

484
citations

1040056

9
h-index

794594

19
g-index

22
all docs

22
docs citations

22
times ranked

139
citing authors

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
1	Unsafe Knowledge. <i>Synthese</i> , 2005, 146, 395-404.	1.1	112
2	A Well-Founded Solution to the Generality Problem. <i>Philosophical Studies</i> , 2006, 129, 27-47.	0.8	89
3	<i>Evidentialist Reliabilism</i> . <i>Nous</i> , 2010, 44, 571-600.	2.2	74
4	Is Evidence Knowledge?. <i>Philosophy and Phenomenological Research</i> , 2010, 80, 447-454.	0.8	40
5	We Are (Almost) All Externalists Now*. <i>Nous-Supplement: Philosophical Perspectives</i> , 2005, 19, 59-76.	0.6	32
6	Justified vs. Warranted Perceptual Belief: Resisting Disjunctivism. <i>Philosophy and Phenomenological Research</i> , 2005, 71, 367-383.	0.8	31
7	Being Rational and Being Right. , 2020, , .		17
8	Perceptual reasons. <i>Philosophical Studies</i> , 2016, 173, 991-1006.	0.8	16
9	WHAT LOTTERY PROBLEM FOR RELIABILISM?. <i>Pacific Philosophical Quarterly</i> , 2009, 90, 1-20.	0.7	13
10	Knowledge and Subjunctive Conditionals. <i>Philosophy Compass</i> , 2007, 2, 781-791.	1.3	9
11	Difference-Making in Epistemology. <i>Nous</i> , 2014, 48, 368-387.	2.2	7
12	Epistemic Pragmatism: An Argument Against Moderation. <i>Res Philosophica</i> , 2013, 90, 237-260.	0.1	7
13	Falsehood and Entailment. <i>Nous-Supplement: Philosophical Perspectives</i> , 2015, 29, 82-94.	0.6	6
14	Normative Requirements and Contrary-to-Duty Obligations. <i>The Journal of Philosophy</i> , 2015, 112, 600-626.	0.5	6
15	Could there be exactly two things?. <i>Synthese</i> , 2008, 162, 31-35.	1.1	5
16	Can We Believe for Practical Reasons?. <i>Nous-Supplement: Philosophical Issues</i> , 2015, 25, 189-207.	0.4	5
17	A Plea for Falsehoods. <i>Philosophy and Phenomenological Research</i> , 2020, 100, 247-276.	0.8	5
18	On Sharon and Spectre's argument against closure. <i>Philosophical Studies</i> , 2017, 174, 1039-1046.	0.8	4

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
19	Rigidity, symmetry and defeasibility: On Weisberg's puzzle for perceptual justification. <i>Nous-Supplement: Philosophical Issues</i> , 2020, 30, 54-70.	0.4	4
20	Whither Evidentialist Reliabilism?. <i>Synthese Library</i> , 2018, , 307-325.	0.2	2
21	Empirical justification and defeasibility. <i>Synthese</i> , 2021, 198, 1771-1786.	1.1	0
22	An appraisal of the evolution of some of the main themes in Sosa's epistemology. <i>Trans/Form/Acao</i> , 2021, 44, 29-42.	0.1	0