

List of Publications by Year in descending order

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IF # ARTICLE CITATIONS Optimal Multi-dimensional Mechanism Design: Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization., 2012,,. 1 An algorithmic characterization of multi-dimensional mechanisms., 2012,,. 9 85 Simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality., 2017, , . A duality based unified approach to Bayesian mechanism design., 2016,,. 4 49 Understanding Incentives: Mechanism Design Becomes Algorithm Design., 2013,,. 6 Extreme-Value Theorems for Optimal Multidimensional Pricing., 2011, , . 34 Simultaneous bayesian auctions and computational complexity., 2014,,. Api hyperlinking via structural overlap., 2009,,. 8 26 Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization: Approximation Algorithms and other Generalizations., 2013,,. 10 On Minmax Theorems for Multiplayer Games., 2011,,. 24 Zero-Sum Polymatrix Games: A Generalization of Minmax. Mathematics of Operations Research, 2016, 1.3 41, 648-655. Learning Multi-Item Auctions with (or without) Samples., 2017,,. 12 23 Approximating Gains from Trade in Two-sided Markets via Simple Mechanisms., 2017,,. On optimal multidimensional mechanism design., 2011, 10, 29-33. 14 15 Simple and Nearly Optimal Multi-Item Auctions., 2013, , . Multi-Item Mechanisms without Item-Independence: Learnability via Robustness., 2020,,. 16 13 Extreme value theorems for optimal multidimensional pricing. Games and Economic Behavior, 2015, 92, 0.8 266-305.

An Improved Lower Bound for the Complementation of Rabin Automata., 2009,,.

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#	Article	IF	CITATIONS
19	A duality-based unified approach to Bayesian mechanism design. , 2016, 15, 71-77.		8
20	The Best of Both Worlds. , 2018, , .		7
21	A Duality-Based Unified Approach to Bayesian Mechanism Design. SIAM Journal on Computing, 2021, 50, STOC16-160-STOC16-200.	1.0	6
22	An Efficient <i>â^Š</i> -BIC to BIC Transformation and Its Application to Black-Box Reduction in Revenue Maximization. , 2021, , 1337-1356.		6
23	On Multi-Dimensional Gains from Trade Maximization. , 2021, , 1079-1098.		4
24	On Simple Mechanisms for Dependent Items. , 2021, , .		4
25	Welfare and Rationality Guarantees for the Simultaneous Multiple-Round Ascending Auction. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2015, , 216-229.	1.3	3
26	Third-Party Data Providers Ruin Simple Mechanisms. Proceedings of the ACM on Measurement and Analysis of Computing Systems, 2020, 4, 1-31.	1.8	3
27	Simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality. , 2019, 17, 39-53.		2
28	Computing simple mechanisms: Lift-and-round over marginal reduced forms. , 2022, , .		2
29	Simple Mechanisms for Profit Maximization in Multi-item Auctions. , 2019, , .		1
30	Reducing Bayesian Mechanism Design to Algorithm Design. , 2015, , 1-9.		1
31	Can Nondeterminism Help Complementation?. Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science, EPTCS, 0, 96, 57-70.	0.8	1
32	On the Economic Efficiency of the Combinatorial Clock Auction. , 2016, , .		1
33	Third-Party Data Providers Ruin Simple Mechanisms. , 2020, , .		1
34	Reducing Bayesian Mechanism Design to Algorithm Design. , 2016, , 1801-1808.		0
35	Simple and Approximately Optimal Pricing for Proportional Complementarities. , 2019, , .		0

Recommender Systems meet Mechanism Design. , 2022, , .

#	Article	IF	CITATIONS
37	Is Selling Complete Information (Approximately) Optimal?. , 2022, , .		0