

# Amihai Glazer

## List of Publications by Year in descending order

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Version: 2024-02-01

60  
papers

619  
citations

687220

13  
h-index

752573

20  
g-index

63  
all docs

63  
docs citations

63  
times ranked

368  
citing authors

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
1	Motivating devoted workers. <i>International Journal of Industrial Organization</i> , 2004, 22, 427-440.	0.6	64
2	Local regulation may be excessively stringent. <i>Regional Science and Urban Economics</i> , 1999, 29, 553-558.	1.4	38
3	Allies as rivals: internal and external rent seeking. <i>Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization</i> , 2002, 48, 155-162.	1.0	35
4	The Electoral Politics of Extreme Policies. <i>Economic Journal</i> , 1998, 108, 1677-1685.	1.9	33
5	Federal grants and yardstick competition. <i>Journal of Urban Economics</i> , 2002, 52, 53-64.	2.4	32
6	ADVERTISING, INFORMATION, AND PRICES - A CASE STUDY. <i>Economic Inquiry</i> , 1981, 19, 661-671.	1.0	27
7	Taxation of rent-seeking activities. <i>Journal of Public Economics</i> , 1999, 72, 61-72.	2.2	27
8	Sequential Rent Seeking. <i>Public Choice</i> , 2000, 102, 219-228.	1.0	26
9	Voting to anger and to please others. <i>Public Choice</i> , 2008, 134, 247-254.	1.0	25
10	A new theory of voting: Why vote when millions of others do. <i>Theory and Decision</i> , 1987, 22, 257-270.	0.5	24
11	RENT SEEKING CAN PROMOTE THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS. <i>Economics and Politics</i> , 1994, 6, 131-145.	0.5	22
12	Setting the agenda: Electoral competition, commitment of policy, and issue salience. <i>Public Choice</i> , 1999, 99, 377-394.	1.0	22
13	The desire for impact. <i>Journal of Economic Psychology</i> , 2008, 29, 285-300.	1.1	20
14	Credibility may require discretion, not rules. <i>Journal of Public Economics</i> , 2000, 76, 295-306.	2.2	15
15	WAGES AND EMPLOYMENT IN PUBLIC SECTOR UNIONS. <i>Economic Inquiry</i> , 1997, 35, 532-543.	1.0	14
16	Preference heterogeneity, wage inequality, and trade. <i>Journal of International Economics</i> , 2003, 60, 455-469.	1.4	14
17	LEGISLATIVE TURNOVER, FISCAL POLICY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: EVIDENCE FROM U.S. STATE LEGISLATURES. <i>Economic Inquiry</i> , 2015, 53, 91-107.	1.0	14
18	AN EXPRESSIVE VOTING THEORY OF STRIKES. <i>Economic Inquiry</i> , 1992, 30, 733-741.	1.0	13

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19	Consumption variety and urban agglomeration. <i>Regional Science and Urban Economics</i> , 2003, 33, 653-661.	1.4	12
20	Elections with contribution-maximizing candidates. <i>Public Choice</i> , 2005, 122, 467-482.	1.0	12
21	On the incentives to establish and play political rent-seeking games. <i>Public Choice</i> , 1993, 75, 139-148.	1.0	11
22	Bequests, control rights, and cost-benefit analysis. <i>European Journal of Political Economy</i> , 2003, 19, 71-82.	1.0	11
23	Support and opposition to a Pigovian tax: Road pricing with reference-dependent preferences. <i>Journal of Urban Economics</i> , 2017, 99, 31-47.	2.4	10
24	Optimal coalition size when making proposals is costly. <i>Social Choice and Welfare</i> , 1990, 7, 369-380.	0.4	8
25	Amend the old or address the new: Broad-based legislation when proposing policies is costly. <i>Public Choice</i> , 1992, 74, 43.	1.0	7
26	Subsidizing Enjoyable Education. <i>Labour Economics</i> , 2008, 15, 1023-1039.	0.9	7
27	How a firm can induce legislators to adopt a bad policy. <i>Public Choice</i> , 2014, 159, 63-82.	1.0	7
28	A strategic model of job arrivals to a single machine with earliness and tardiness penalties. <i>IJSE Transactions</i> , 2018, 50, 265-278.	1.6	7
29	Regulation by prices and by command. <i>Journal of Regulatory Economics</i> , 1996, 9, 191.	0.8	6
30	Rational Response to Irrational Attitudes: The Level of the Gasoline Tax in the United States. <i>Journal of Policy Analysis and Management</i> , 2001, 20, 761-764.	1.1	6
31	Strategic Investment by a Regulated Firm. <i>International Tax and Public Finance</i> , 2004, 11, 123-132.	0.5	6
32	Credit claiming. <i>Economics of Governance</i> , 2005, 6, 125-137.	0.6	6
33	STRATEGIC LOBBYING BY POTENTIAL INDUSTRY ENTRANTS. <i>Economics and Politics</i> , 1995, 7, 167-179.	0.5	4
34	Increased capacity may exacerbate rationing problems: with applications to medical care. <i>Journal of Health Economics</i> , 1999, 18, 671-680.	1.3	4
35	Social security and conflict within the family. <i>Journal of Population Economics</i> , 2008, 21, 331-338.	3.5	4
36	Informational Benefits of International Treaties. <i>Environmental and Resource Economics</i> , 2012, 53, 185-202.	1.5	4

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37	Old money, the nouveaux riches and Brunhilde's marriage strategy. <i>Journal of Population Economics</i> , 2017, 30, 163-186.	3.5	4
38	Governmental failures in evaluating programs. <i>Public Choice</i> , 1998, 94, 105-115.	1.0	2
39	The Calculus of Stonewalling. <i>Journal of Theoretical Politics</i> , 2001, 13, 413-424.	0.3	2
40	Short-term leaders should make long-term appointments. <i>International Tax and Public Finance</i> , 2007, 14, 55-69.	0.5	2
41	Governmental transfers and altruistic private transfers. <i>Journal of Population Economics</i> , 2015, 28, 509-533.	3.5	2
42	THE ELECTORAL COSTS OF SPECIAL INTEREST POLITICS WHEN VOTERS ARE IGNORANT. <i>Economics and Politics</i> , 1989, 1, 225-237.	0.5	1
43	Commitment Problems Justify Subsidies for Medical Insurance. <i>Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory</i> , 1992, 17, 137-145.	0.4	1
44	Taxation and pricing when consumers value freedom. <i>Social Choice and Welfare</i> , 2005, 24, 211-220.	0.4	1
45	Rewarding political supporters. <i>Public Choice</i> , 2006, 126, 453-463.	1.0	1
46	When a Loser Gains: Free Riding in the Innovation of Network Goods. <i>Journal of Economics/ Zeitschrift Fur Nationalokonomie</i> , 2006, 87, 55-71.	0.5	1
47	How to avoid transferring a valuable asset. <i>Public Choice</i> , 2009, 138, 3-8.	1.0	1
48	Inducing search by periodic advertising. <i>Information Economics and Policy</i> , 2010, 22, 276-286.	1.7	1
49	Free riding on successors, delay, and extremism. <i>Social Choice and Welfare</i> , 2017, 48, 887-900.	0.4	1
50	Why principals tolerate biases of inaccurate agents. <i>Economics and Politics</i> , 2019, 31, 97-111.	0.5	1
51	Benefits to the majority from universal service. <i>International Tax and Public Finance</i> , 2020, 27, 391-408.	0.5	1
52	POLITICS WITH AND WITHOUT POLICY. <i>Economics and Politics</i> , 1996, 8, 251-265.	0.5	0
53	Regulatory tune-ups. <i>Information Economics and Policy</i> , 2001, 13, 427-438.	1.7	0
54	Ideological externalities, social pressures, and political parties. <i>Public Choice</i> , 2010, 144, 53-62.	1.0	0

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55	Up-or-out policies when a worker imitates another. <i>Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization</i> , 2012, 84, 432-438.	1.0	0
56	Inducing political action by workers. <i>Southern Economic Journal</i> , 2015, 81, 1117-1144.	1.3	0
57	Signaling, network externalities, and subsidies. <i>International Tax and Public Finance</i> , 2016, 23, 798-811.	0.5	0
58	Bargaining within the family can generate a political gender gap. <i>Review of Economics of the Household</i> , 2017, 15, 1399-1413.	2.6	0
59	Obtaining Information by Diversifying Projects or <i>Why Specialization is Inefficient</i> . <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 0, , .	0.4	0
60	Capital-Intensive Projects Induce More Effort than Labor-Intensive Projects. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 0, , .	0.4	0