
Manuela Moschella

List of Publications by Year in descending order

Source: https://exaly.com/author-pdf/3908650/publications.pdf Version: 2024-02-01



#	Article	IF	CITATIONS
1	The <scp>multiâ€agencies</scp> dilemma of delegation: Why do policymakers choose one or multiple agencies for financial regulation?. Regulation and Governance, 2022, 16, 1250-1264.	2.9	3
2	Political voice on monetary policy: Evidence from the parliamentary hearings of the European Central Bank. European Journal of Political Economy, 2022, 74, 102143.	1.8	12
3	Political brat or ruthless truth-teller: the dilemmas of IMF's intellectual authority. Comparative European Politics, 2020, 18, 85-90.	3.0	1
4	Incoherence in Regime Complexes: A Sentiment Analysis of EUâ€IMF Surveillance. Journal of Common Market Studies, 2020, 58, 419-437.	2.1	10
5	Does politics drive conflict in central banks' committees? Lifting the veil on the European Central Bank consensus. European Union Politics, 2020, 21, 183-203.	2.1	25
6	Let's speak more? How the ECB responds to public contestation. Journal of European Public Policy, 2020, 27, 400-418.	4.0	35
7	Central banks' communication as reputation management: How the Fed talks under uncertainty. Public Administration, 2019, 97, 513-529.	3.5	47
8	Central banks under stress: Reputation, accountability and regulatory coherence. Public Administration, 2019, 97, 489-498.	3.5	27
9	European Banking Union to the Rescue? How Supranational Institutions Influenced Crisis Management in Italy. South European Society and Politics, 2019, 24, 421-440.	1.2	3
10	When Some Are More Equal than Others: National Parliaments and Intergovernmental Bailout Negotiations in the Eurozone. Government and Opposition, 2017, 52, 239-265.	1.8	25
11	Italy and the Fiscal Compact: Why does a country commit to permanent austerity?. Rivista Italiana Di Scienza Politica, 2017, 47, 205-225.	0.7	11
12	The symbolic politics of delegation: macroprudential policy and independent regulatory authorities. New Political Economy, 2017, 22, 92-108.	4.4	50
13	Negotiating Greece. Layering, insulation, and the design of adjustment programs in the Eurozone. Review of International Political Economy, 2016, 23, 799-824.	4.7	30
14	To agree or not to agree? Explaining the cohesiveness of the European Union in the Group of Twenty. Journal of European Public Policy, 2016, 23, 906-924.	4.0	7
15	Domestic preferences and European banking supervision: Germany, Italy and the Single Supervisory Mechanism. West European Politics, 2016, 39, 462-482.	4.7	15
16	The government bond buying programmes of the European Central Bank: an analysis of their policy settings. Journal of European Public Policy, 2016, 23, 851-870.	4.0	38
17	The Institutional Roots of Incremental Ideational Change: The IMF and Capital Controls after the Global Financial Crisis. British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 2015, 17, 442-460.	2.7	51
18	Currency wars in the advanced world: Resisting appreciation at a time of change in central banking monetary consensus. Review of International Political Economy, 2015, 22, 134-161.	4.7	16

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#	Article	IF	CITATIONS
19	Governing Cross-border Capital Flows: The Dynamics of Capital Account Policies. , 2015, , 27-50.		1
20	Monitoring Macroeconomic Imbalances: Is <scp>EU</scp> Surveillance More Effective than <scp>IMF</scp> Surveillance?. Journal of Common Market Studies, 2014, 52, 1273-1289.	2.1	20
21	International organizations and organizational fields: explaining policy change in the IMF. European Political Science Review, 2014, 6, 143-165.	1.9	35
22	International organizations and organizational fields: explaining policy change in the IMF – ERRATUM. European Political Science Review, 2014, 6, 166-166.	1.9	0
23	Designing the Financial Stability Board: a theoretical investigation of mandate, discretion, and membership. Journal of International Relations and Development, 2013, 16, 380-405.	1.7	8
24	The IMF and civil society. International Politics, 2013, 50, 532-552.	1.9	3
25	Regulating finance after the crisis: Unveiling the different dynamics of the regulatory process. Regulation and Governance, 2013, 7, 407-416.	2.9	45
26	IMF Surveillance in Crisis: The Past, Present and Future of the Reform Process. Global Society, 2012, 26, 43-60.	1.7	15
27	Seeing Like the IMF on Capital Account Liberalisation. New Political Economy, 2012, 17, 59-76.	4.4	15
28	The EU, the IMF, and the <i>Representative Turn</i> : Addressing the Challenge of Legitimacy. Swiss Political Science Review, 2012, 18, 199-219.	1.7	11
29	Getting Hedge Funds Regulation into the EU Agenda: The Constraints of Agenda Dynamics. Journal of European Integration, 2011, 33, 251-266.	2.1	12
30	Different varieties of capitalism? British and Italian recapitalization policies in response to the sub-prime crisis. Comparative European Politics, 2011, 9, 76-99.	3.0	13
31	Lagged Learning and the Response to Equilibrium Shock: The Global Financial Crisis and IMF Surveillance. Journal of Public Policy, 2011, 31, 121-141.	1.3	33
32	Searching for a Fix for International Financial Markets: The European Union and Domestic Politico-Economic Changes. Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 2011, 19, 97-112.	2.0	4
33	International financial governance in hard times: tracing the transformations. Contemporary Politics, 2010, 16, 421-436.	2.0	3
34	Mexico and the IMF in the 1990s. Old and New Issues on Capital Account Liberalization and Emerging Market Countries. Comparative Economic Studies, 2010, 52, 589-609.	1.1	4
35	Back to the drawing board: The international financial architecture exercise. Review of International Political Economy, 2010, 17, 155-171.	4.7	10
36	When ideas fail to influence policy outcomes: Orderly liberalization and the International Monetary Fund. Review of International Political Economy, 2009, 16, 854-882.	4.7	15

#	Article	IF	CITATIONS
37	The IMF and capital account liberalization: a case of failed norm institutionalization. , 0, , 163-180.		26
38	Political Voice on Monetary Policy: Evidence from the Parliamentary Hearings of the European Central Bank. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	1