

Federico Echenique

List of Publications by Year in descending order

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Version: 2024-02-01

73
papers

1,716
citations

331259

21
h-index

377514

34
g-index

73
all docs

73
docs citations

73
times ranked

883
citing authors

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
1	The Edgeworth Conjecture with Small Coalitions and Approximate Equilibria in Large Economies. <i>Mathematics of Operations Research</i> , 2023, 48, 313-331.	0.8	1
2	Twofold multiprior preferences and failures of contingent reasoning. <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 2022, 202, 105448.	0.5	1
3	Top of the Batch: Interviews and the Match. <i>American Economic Review Insights</i> , 2022, 4, 223-238.	1.6	0
4	A Characterisation of “Phelpsian” Statistical Discrimination. <i>Economic Journal</i> , 2021, 131, 2018-2032.	1.9	3
5	Recovering Preferences From Finite Data. <i>Econometrica</i> , 2021, 89, 1633-1664.	2.6	5
6	Stability and Median Rationalizability for Aggregate Matchings. <i>Games</i> , 2021, 12, 33.	0.4	0
7	Fairness and efficiency for allocations with participation constraints. <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 2021, 195, 105274.	0.5	5
8	Constrained Pseudo-Market Equilibrium. <i>American Economic Review</i> , 2021, 111, 3699-3732.	4.0	9
9	Statistical Discrimination and Affirmative Action in the Lab. <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i> , 2021, , .	0.4	6
10	Spherical preferences. <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 2020, 189, 105086.	0.5	0
11	The Pareto Comparisons of a Group of Exponential Discounters. <i>Mathematics of Operations Research</i> , 2020, 45, 622-640.	0.8	2
12	New Developments in Revealed Preference Theory: Decisions Under Risk, Uncertainty, and Intertemporal Choice. <i>Annual Review of Economics</i> , 2020, 12, 299-316.	2.4	11
13	On the falsifiability and learnability of decision theories. <i>Theoretical Economics</i> , 2020, 15, 1279-1305.	0.5	2
14	Testable Implications of Models of Intertemporal Choice: Exponential Discounting and Its Generalizations. <i>American Economic Journal: Microeconomics</i> , 2020, 12, 114-143.	0.7	7
15	General Luce model. <i>Economic Theory</i> , 2019, 68, 811-826.	0.5	45
16	The perception-adjusted Luce model. <i>Mathematical Social Sciences</i> , 2018, 93, 67-76.	0.3	44
17	A Characterization of Combinatorial Demand. <i>Mathematics of Operations Research</i> , 2018, 43, 222-227.	0.8	6
18	On path independent stochastic choice. <i>Theoretical Economics</i> , 2018, 13, 61-85.	0.5	10

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19	On Multiple Discount Rates. <i>Econometrica</i> , 2018, 86, 1325-1346.	2.6	29
20	Correspondence Principle. , 2018, , 2347-2349.		0
21	Ordinal and cardinal solution concepts for two-sided matching. <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i> , 2017, 101, 63-77.	0.4	10
22	Response time and utility. <i>Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization</i> , 2017, 139, 49-59.	1.0	32
23	General revealed preference theory. <i>Theoretical Economics</i> , 2017, 12, 493-511.	0.5	19
24	Clearinghouses for two-sided matching: An experimental study. <i>Quantitative Economics</i> , 2016, 7, 449-482.	0.9	46
25	EFFICIENCY AND BARGAINING POWER IN THE INTERBANK LOAN MARKET. <i>International Economic Review</i> , 2016, 57, 691-716.	0.6	7
26	Testing theories of financial decision making. <i>Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America</i> , 2016, 113, 4003-4008.	3.3	11
27	The Empirical Implications of Privacy-Aware Choice. <i>Operations Research</i> , 2016, 64, 67-78.	1.2	13
28	Strategic complementarities and unraveling in matching markets. <i>Theoretical Economics</i> , 2016, 11, 1-39.	0.5	14
29	The Core Matchings of Markets with Transfers. <i>American Economic Journal: Microeconomics</i> , 2015, 7, 144-164.	0.7	5
30	How to Control Controlled School Choice. <i>American Economic Review</i> , 2015, 105, 2679-2694.	4.0	120
31	Savage in the Market. <i>Econometrica</i> , 2015, 83, 1467-1495.	2.6	33
32	The empirical implications of privacy-aware choice. , 2014, , .		0
33	The Axiomatic Structure of Empirical Content. <i>American Economic Review</i> , 2014, 104, 2303-2319.	4.0	29
34	On the consistency of data with bargaining theories. <i>Theoretical Economics</i> , 2014, 9, 137-162.	0.5	11
35	On the Existence of Low-Rank Explanations for Mixed Strategy Behavior. <i>Lecture Notes in Computer Science</i> , 2014, , 447-452.	1.0	1
36	The Revealed Preference Theory of Stable and Extremal Stable Matchings. <i>Econometrica</i> , 2013, 81, 153-171.	2.6	48

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37	The empirical implications of rank in Bimatrix games. , 2013, , .		0
38	Finding a walrasian equilibrium is easy for a fixed number of agents. , 2012, , .		2
39	Contracts versus Salaries in Matching. American Economic Review, 2012, 102, 594-601.	4.0	83
40	When does aggregation reduce risk aversion?. Games and Economic Behavior, 2012, 76, 582-595.	0.4	20
41	Testable Implications of Gross Substitutes in Demand for Two Goods. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2011, 3, 129-136.	0.7	4
42	Implications of Pareto efficiency for two-agent (household) choice. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2011, 47, 129-136.	0.4	11
43	A revealed preference approach to computational complexity in economics. , 2011, , .		16
44	Complexity and economics. , 2011, 10, 2-5.		3
45	On behavioral complementarity and its implications. Journal of Economic Theory, 2010, 145, 2332-2355.	0.5	10
46	Supermodularity and preferences. Journal of Economic Theory, 2009, 144, 1004-1014.	0.5	36
47	English auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. Journal of Economic Theory, 2009, 144, 825-849.	0.5	15
48	Profit maximization and supermodular technology. Economic Theory, 2009, 40, 173-183.	0.5	2
49	Sequential entry in many-to-one matching markets. Social Choice and Welfare, 2009, 33, 87-99.	0.4	3
50	Testing Models With Multiple Equilibria by Quantile Methods. Econometrica, 2009, 77, 1281-1297.	2.6	28
51	Ordinal notions of submodularity. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2008, 44, 1243-1245.	0.4	6
52	What Matchings Can Be Stable? The Testable Implications of Matching Theory. Mathematics of Operations Research, 2008, 33, 757-768.	0.8	34
53	Correspondence Principle. , 2008, , 1-3.		0
54	A Measure of Segregation Based on Social Interactions. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2007, 122, 441-485.	3.8	204

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55	Counting combinatorial choice rules. <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i> , 2007, 58, 231-245.	0.4	25
56	A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues. <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i> , 2007, 59, 46-71.	0.4	81
57	Cohesion, Insurance and Redistribution. <i>Quarterly Journal of Political Science</i> , 2007, 2, 287-305.	0.7	5
58	Finding all equilibria in games of strategic complements. <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 2007, 135, 514-532.	0.5	33
59	Is School Segregation Good or Bad?. <i>American Economic Review</i> , 2006, 96, 265-269.	4.0	38
60	A short and constructive proof of Tarski's fixed-point theorem. <i>International Journal of Game Theory</i> , 2005, 33, 215-218.	0.5	74
61	A Theory of Stability in Many-to-many Matching Markets. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 2004, , .	0.4	49
62	Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods. <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 2004, 115, 358-376.	0.5	57
63	Mixed equilibria are unstable in games of strategic complements. <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 2004, 118, 61-79.	0.5	59
64	Information is not about measurability. <i>Mathematical Social Sciences</i> , 2004, 47, 177-185.	0.3	14
65	A weak correspondence principle for models with complementarities. <i>Journal of Mathematical Economics</i> , 2004, 40, 145-152.	0.4	9
66	A characterization of strategic complementarities. <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i> , 2004, 46, 325-347.	0.4	33
67	Extensive-form games and strategic complementarities. <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i> , 2004, 46, 348-364.	0.4	34
68	Mixed equilibria in games of strategic complementarities. <i>Economic Theory</i> , 2003, 22, 33-44.	0.5	21
69	Strong comparative statics of equilibria. <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i> , 2003, 42, 307-314.	0.4	14
70	Finding All Equilibria. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 2003, , .	0.4	4
71	A Characterization of Strategic Complementarities. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 2003, , .	0.4	1
72	Comparative Statics by Adaptive Dynamics and the Correspondence Principle. <i>Econometrica</i> , 2002, 70, 833-844.	2.6	93

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73	The Revealed Preference Theory of Stable and Extremal Stable Matchings. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	10