

J Adam Carter

List of Publications by Year in descending order

Source: <https://exaly.com/author-pdf/2980483/publications.pdf>

Version: 2024-02-01

79
papers

934
citations

623734

14
h-index

610901

24
g-index

85
all docs

85
docs citations

85
times ranked

324
citing authors

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
1	Therapeutic trust. <i>Philosophical Psychology</i> , 2024, 37, 38-61.	0.9	3
2	Trust, distrust, and testimonial injustice. <i>Educational Philosophy and Theory</i> , 2023, 55, 290-300.	1.8	3
3	Refitting the mirrors: on structural analogies in epistemology and action theory. <i>Synthese</i> , 2022, 200, 1.	1.1	2
4	<i>Epistemic Values: Collected Papers in Epistemology</i> . <i>Philosophical Review</i> , The, 2022, 131, 235-240.	0.4	0
5	Archimedean Metanorms. <i>Topoi</i> , 2021, 40, 1075-1085.	1.3	0
6	Absolutism, Relativism and Metaepistemology. <i>Erkenntnis</i> , 2021, 86, 1139-1159.	0.9	1
7	Technologically scaffolded atypical cognition: the case of YouTube's recommender system. <i>Synthese</i> , 2021, 199, 835-858.	1.1	41
8	Epistemic value in the subpersonal vale. <i>Synthese</i> , 2021, 198, 9243-9272.	1.1	3
9	Exercising abilities. <i>Synthese</i> , 2021, 198, 2495-2509.	1.1	5
10	Educating for Intellectual Virtue: A Critique from Action Guidance. <i>Episteme</i> , 2021, 18, 177-199.	0.9	15
11	Introduction to special issue: Skepticism and Epistemic Angst. <i>Synthese</i> , 2021, 198, 3517-3519.	1.1	0
12	Varieties of (Extended) Thought Manipulation. , 2021, , 291-309.		2
13	The philosophy of memory technologies: Metaphysics, knowledge, and values. <i>Memory Studies</i> , 2020, 13, 416-433.	1.4	26
14	Intellectual autonomy, epistemic dependence and cognitive enhancement. <i>Synthese</i> , 2020, 197, 2937-2961.	1.1	16
15	Sosa on knowledge, judgment and guessing. <i>Synthese</i> , 2020, 197, 5117-5136.	1.1	2
16	Epistemic perceptualism, skill and the regress problem. <i>Philosophical Studies</i> , 2020, 177, 1229-1254.	0.8	2
17	Varieties of Cognitive Integration. <i>Nous</i> , 2020, 54, 867-890.	2.2	8
18	On behalf of a bi-level account of trust. <i>Philosophical Studies</i> , 2020, 177, 2299-2322.	0.8	1

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
19	De Minimis Normativism: a New Theory of Full Aptness. <i>Philosophical Quarterly</i> , 2020, 71, 16-36.	0.5	8
20	Understanding a communicated thought. <i>Synthese</i> , 2020, 198, 12137.	1.1	1
21	Cognitive Goods, Open Futures and the Epistemology of Education. <i>Journal of Philosophy of Education</i> , 2020, 54, 449-466.	0.8	0
22	Introduction to special issue: knowledge, virtue and action—eastern and western perspectives. <i>Synthese</i> , 2020, 197, 2291-2294.	1.1	0
23	Skepticism Motivated: On the Skeptical Import of Motivated Reasoning. <i>Canadian Journal of Philosophy</i> , 2020, 50, 702-718.	0.9	10
24	The Epistemology of Cognitive Enhancement. <i>Journal of Medicine and Philosophy</i> , 2019, 44, 220-242.	0.8	11
25	Radical Scepticism and the Epistemology of Confusion. <i>International Journal for the Study of Skepticism</i> , 2019, 9, 223-237.	0.1	0
26	Knowledge-how, Understanding-why and Epistemic Luck: an Experimental Study. <i>Review of Philosophy and Psychology</i> , 2019, 10, 701-734.	1.8	10
27	Kornblith versus Sosa on grades of knowledge. <i>Synthese</i> , 2019, 196, 4989-5007.	1.1	7
28	Virtue Epistemology, Enhancement, and Control. <i>Metaphilosophy</i> , 2018, 49, 283-304.	0.3	2
29	On behalf of controversial view agnosticism. <i>European Journal of Philosophy</i> , 2018, 26, 1358-1370.	0.4	9
30	Meta-epistemic defeat. <i>Synthese</i> , 2018, 195, 2877-2896.	1.1	0
31	Autonomy, Cognitive Offloading, and Education. <i>Educational Theory</i> , 2018, 68, 657-673.	0.4	5
32	Extended Self-Knowledge. <i>Contributions To Phenomenology</i> , 2018, , 31-49.	0.5	2
33	Technological Seduction and Self-Radicalization. <i>Journal of the American Philosophical Association</i> , 2018, 4, 298-322.	0.4	50
34	THE BASING RELATION AND THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF THE DEBASING DEMON. <i>American Philosophical Quarterly</i> , 2018, 55, 203-215.	0.7	4
35	Semantic inferentialism as (a Form of) active externalism. <i>Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences</i> , 2017, 16, 387-402.	1.8	3
36	Assertion, uniqueness and epistemic hypocrisy. <i>Synthese</i> , 2017, 194, 1463-1476.	1.1	3

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
37	The modal account of luck revisited. <i>Synthese</i> , 2017, 194, 2175-2184.	1.1	14
38	Googled assertion. <i>Philosophical Psychology</i> , 2017, 30, 490-501.	0.9	5
39	(ANTI)Anti-Intellectualism and the Sufficiency Thesis. <i>Pacific Philosophical Quarterly</i> , 2017, 98, 374-397.	0.7	4
40	VIRTUOUS INSIGHTFULNESS. <i>Episteme</i> , 2017, 14, 539-554.	0.9	5
41	The Defeasibility of Knowledge-How. <i>Philosophy and Phenomenological Research</i> , 2017, 95, 662-685.	0.8	9
42	Robust Virtue Epistemology As Anti-Luck Epistemology: A New Solution. <i>Pacific Philosophical Quarterly</i> , 2016, 97, 140-155.	0.7	39
43	Objectual Understanding, Factivity and Belief. , 2016, , 423-442.		7
44	Is Having Your Computer Compromised a Personal Assault? The Ethics of Extended Cognition. <i>Journal of the American Philosophical Association</i> , 2016, 2, 542-560.	0.4	60
45	Group Peer Disagreement. <i>Ratio</i> , 2016, 29, 11-28.	0.5	6
46	On Epistemic Consequentialism and the Virtue Conflation Problem. <i>Thought</i> , 2016, 5, 239-248.	0.3	1
47	On the Epistemology of the Precautionary Principle: Reply to Steglich-Petersen. <i>Erkenntnis</i> , 2016, 81, 297-304.	0.9	1
48	Belief without credence. <i>Synthese</i> , 2016, 193, 2323-2351.	1.1	14
49	Extended Knowledge-How. <i>Erkenntnis</i> , 2016, 81, 259-273.	0.9	11
50	Extended Cognition and Propositional Memory. <i>Philosophy and Phenomenological Research</i> , 2016, 92, 691-714.	0.8	12
51	Richard Rorty and Epistemic Normativity. <i>Social Epistemology</i> , 2016, 30, 3-24.	1.2	2
52	Perceptual knowledge and relevant alternatives. <i>Philosophical Studies</i> , 2016, 173, 969-990.	0.8	6
53	Not Knowing a Cat is a Cat: Analyticity and Knowledge Ascriptions. <i>Review of Philosophy and Psychology</i> , 2016, 7, 817-834.	1.8	3
54	Extended emotion. <i>Philosophical Psychology</i> , 2016, 29, 198-217.	0.9	31

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
55	Varieties of cognitive achievement. <i>Philosophical Studies</i> , 2015, 172, 1603-1623.	0.8	16
56	Knowledge-How and Epistemic Value. <i>Australasian Journal of Philosophy</i> , 2015, 93, 799-816.	0.8	11
57	Knowledge-How and Cognitive Achievement. <i>Philosophy and Phenomenological Research</i> , 2015, 91, 181-199.	0.8	38
58	On Cognitive and Moral Enhancement: A Reply to Savulescu and Persson. <i>Bioethics</i> , 2015, 29, 153-161.	1.4	17
59	Active Externalism and Epistemic Internalism. <i>Erkenntnis</i> , 2015, 80, 753-772.	0.9	11
60	Knowledge-How and Epistemic Luck. <i>Nous</i> , 2015, 49, 440-453.	2.2	41
61	On the Epistemology of the Precautionary Principle. <i>Erkenntnis</i> , 2015, 80, 1-13.	0.9	8
62	Openmindedness and truth. <i>Canadian Journal of Philosophy</i> , 2014, 44, 207-224.	0.9	28
63	RELATIVISM, KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING. <i>Epistēmē</i> , 2014, 11, 35-52.	0.9	4
64	ON TESTIMONY AND TRANSMISSION. <i>Epistēmē</i> , 2014, 11, 145-155.	0.9	23
65	A new maneuver against the epistemic relativist. <i>Synthese</i> , 2014, 191, 1683-1695.	1.1	5
66	VARIETIES OF EXTERNALISM. <i>Nous-Supplement: Philosophical Issues</i> , 2014, 24, 63-109.	0.4	51
67	Disagreement, Relativism and Doxastic Revision. <i>Erkenntnis</i> , 2014, 79, 155-172.	0.9	6
68	Extended cognition and epistemic luck. <i>Synthese</i> , 2013, 190, 4201-4214.	1.1	24
69	Knowledge and the value of cognitive ability. <i>Synthese</i> , 2013, 190, 3715-3729.	1.1	26
70	A Problem for Pritchard's Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology. <i>Erkenntnis</i> , 2013, 78, 253-275.	0.9	11
71	Intelligence, Wellbeing and Procreative Beneficence. <i>Journal of Applied Philosophy</i> , 2013, 30, 122-135.	1.0	8
72	The Inquiring Mind: On Intellectual Virtues and Virtue Epistemology. By Jason Baehr. (Oxford UP, 2011.)	0.5	2

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
73	Knowledge: Value on the Cheap. <i>Australasian Journal of Philosophy</i> , 2013, 91, 249-263.	0.8	28
74	On Stanley's Intellectualism. <i>International Journal of Philosophical Studies</i> , 2012, 20, 749-762.	0.4	4
75	Kvanvig on Pointless Truths and the Cognitive Ideal. <i>Acta Analytica</i> , 2011, 26, 285-293.	0.3	2
76	Norms of Assertion: The Quantity and Quality of Epistemic Support. <i>Philosophia (United States)</i> , 2011, 39, 615-635.	0.4	17
77	Just the Right Thickness: A Defense of Second-Wave Virtue Epistemology. <i>Philosophical Papers</i> , 2008, 37, 413-434.	0.3	12
78	Epistemic Relativism and the Naturalistic Fallacy. , 0, , 251-264.		0
79	Radical Skepticism, Closure, and Robust Knowledge. <i>Journal of Philosophical Research</i> , 0, 36, 115-133.	0.2	4