

David Enoch

List of Publications by Year in descending order

Source: <https://exaly.com/author-pdf/2169519/publications.pdf>

Version: 2024-02-01

29
papers

1,387
citations

840119

11
h-index

642321

23
g-index

32
all docs

32
docs citations

32
times ranked

391
citing authors

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
1	Statistical Evidence, Sensitivity, and the Legal Value of Knowledge. <i>Philosophy and Public Affairs</i> , 2012, 40, 197-224.	1.1	142
2	The epistemological challenge to metanormative realism: how best to understand it, and how to cope with it. <i>Philosophical Studies</i> , 2010, 148, 413-438.	0.5	133
3	Against Public Reason. , 2015, , 112-142.		119
4	The Case Against Moral Luck. <i>Law and Philosophy</i> , 2007, 26, 405-436.	0.4	91
5	A Defense of Moral Deference. <i>The Journal of Philosophy</i> , 2014, 111, 229-258.	0.3	71
6	The Disorder of Public Reason. <i>Ethics</i> , 2013, 124, 141-176.	0.3	59
7	Why Idealize?. <i>Ethics</i> , 2005, 115, 759-787.	0.3	56
8	How is Moral Disagreement a Problem for Realism?. <i>Journal of Ethics</i> , 2009, 13, 15-50.	0.3	54
9	Authority and Reason—Giving ¹ . <i>Philosophy and Phenomenological Research</i> , 2014, 89, 296-332.	0.5	53
10	Hypothetical Consent and the Value(s) of Autonomy. <i>Ethics</i> , 2017, 128, 6-36.	0.3	36
11	What’s Wrong with Paternalism: Autonomy, Belief, and Action. <i>Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society</i> , 2016, 116, 21-48.	0.3	24
12	Epistemicism and Nihilism about Vagueness: What’s the Difference?. <i>Philosophical Studies</i> , 2007, 133, 285-311.	0.5	23
13	How Principles Ground. , 2019, , 1-22.		17
14	False Consciousness for Liberals, Part I: Consent, Autonomy, and Adaptive Preferences. <i>Philosophical Review</i> , The, 2020, 129, 159-210.	0.2	15
15	SENSITIVITY, SAFETY, AND THE LAW: A REPLY TO PARDO. <i>Legal Theory</i> , 2019, 25, 178-199.	0.3	13
16	Autonomy as Non-alienation, Autonomy as Sovereignty, and Politics*. <i>Journal of Political Philosophy</i> , 2022, 30, 143-165.	1.0	11
17	Statistical resentment, or: what’s wrong with acting, blaming, and believing on the basis of statistics alone. <i>Synthese</i> , 2021, 199, 5687-5718.	0.6	8
18	How Noncognitivists Can Avoid Wishful Thinking. <i>Southern Journal of Philosophy</i> , 2003, 41, 527-545.	0.4	6

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
19	What do you mean "This isn't the question"? Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2017, 47, 820-840.	0.6	6
20	In defense of Taking Morality Seriously: reply to Manne, Sobel, Lenman, and Joyce. Philosophical Studies, 2014, 168, 853-865.	0.5	5
21	IN DEFENSE OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS (OR ANYWAY, PROCEDURAL DUTIES): A RESPONSE TO WELLMAN. Legal Theory, 2018, 24, 40-49.	0.3	5
22	Sobel, David. <i>From Valuing to Value: A Defense of Subjectivism</i>. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp. 352. \$85.00 (cloth).. Ethics, 2018, 128, 672-677.	0.3	2
23	Thanks, We're good: why moral realism is not morally objectionable. Philosophical Studies, 2021, 178, 1689-1699.	0.5	2
24	Does legal epistemology rest on a mistake? On fetishism, two-tier system design, and conscientious fact-finding. Nous-Supplement: Philosophical Issues, 2021, 31, 85-103.	0.3	2
25	Principles of Taking Morality Seriously (Oxford University Press, 2011). Philosophical Studies, 2014, 168, 819-821.	0.5	1
26	Impartiality and Realism: Reply to Mancuso. Topoi, 2018, 37, 603-606.	0.8	0
27	"No, actually your life is going considerably worse": a comment on Nir Eyal. Journal of Law and the Biosciences, 2020, 7, lsa046.	0.8	0
28	Statistical Resentment: Or, What's Wrong with Acting, Blaming, and Believing on the Basis of Statistics Alone. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	0
29	How to Theorize about Statistical Evidence (and Really, about Everything Else): A comment on Allen. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	0