Dmitry Ryvkin

List of Publications by Year in descending order

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567281 610901 47 846 15 24 citations h-index g-index papers 48 48 48 469 docs citations times ranked citing authors all docs

#	Article	IF	CITATIONS
1	The Predictive Power of Three Prominent Tournament Formats. Management Science, 2008, 54, 492-504.	4.1	59
2	Biased contests for symmetric players. Games and Economic Behavior, 2017, 103, 116-144.	0.8	56
3	Contests with private costs: Beyond two players. European Journal of Political Economy, 2010, 26, 558-567.	1.8	55
4	How corruptible are you? Bribery under uncertainty. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2012, 81, 466-477.	2.0	53
5	Fatigue in Dynamic Tournaments. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 2011, 20, 1011-1041.	0.8	44
6	An experimental study of bidding in contests of incomplete information. Experimental Economics, 2014, 17, 245-261.	2.1	41
7	Strive to be first or avoid being last: An experiment on relative performance incentives. Games and Economic Behavior, 2015, 94, 39-56.	0.8	37
8	Are the unskilled doomed to remain unaware?. Journal of Economic Psychology, 2012, 33, 1012-1031.	2.2	36
9	The optimal sorting of players in contests between groups. Games and Economic Behavior, 2011, 73, 564-572.	0.8	33
10	I paid a bribe: An experiment on information sharing and extortionary corruption. European Economic Review, 2017, 94, 1-22.	2.3	33
11	Peak–End rule versus average utility: How utility aggregation affects evaluations of experiences. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 2008, 52, 326-335.	1.8	32
12	The selection efficiency of tournaments. European Journal of Operational Research, 2010, 206, 667-675.	5.7	29
13	An experimental study of sorting in group contests. Labour Economics, 2015, 35, 16-25.	1.7	25
14	Environmental context and termination uncertainty in games with a dynamic public bad. Environment and Development Economics, 2013, 18, 27-49.	1.5	23
15	Heterogeneity of Players and Aggregate Effort in Contests. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 2013, 22, 728-743.	0.8	22
16	Contests with group size uncertainty: Experimental evidence. Games and Economic Behavior, 2017, 105, 212-229.	0.8	20
17	Tournament rewards and heavy tails. Journal of Economic Theory, 2020, 190, 105116.	1.1	19
18	Tullock contests of weakly heterogeneous players. Public Choice, 2007, 132, 49-64.	1.7	18

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19	Optimal sorting in group contests with complementarities. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2015, 112, 311-323.	2.0	18
20	The shape of luck and competition in winnerâ€ŧakeâ€all tournaments. Theoretical Economics, 2020, 15, 1587-1626.	0.8	17
21	How noise affects effort in tournaments. Journal of Economic Theory, 2020, 188, 105065.	1.1	16
22	Sorting and communication in weak-link group contests. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2018, 152, 64-80.	2.0	15
23	Corruption and competition among bureaucrats: An experimental study. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2020, 175, 439-451.	2.0	15
24	Equilibrium existence in group contests. Economic Theory Bulletin, 2016, 4, 265-276.	0.5	13
25	<scp>Tournaments of Weakly Heterogeneous Players</scp> . Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2009, 11, 819-855.	1.1	12
26	An experimental study of democracy breakdown, income and inequality. Experimental Economics, 2017, 20, 420-447.	2.1	11
27	Information Disclosure in Contests with Endogenous Entry: An Experiment. Management Science, 2020, 66, 5128-5150.	4.1	10
28	Contests With Doping. Journal of Sports Economics, 2013, 14, 253-275.	1.9	9
29	Reducing within-group overconfidence through group identity and between-group confidence judgments. Journal of Economic Psychology, 2014, 44, 1-12.	2.2	9
30	THE OPTIMAL ALLOCATION OF PRIZES IN TOURNAMENTS OF HETEROGENEOUS AGENTS. Economic Inquiry, 2017, 55, 461-478.	1.8	9
31	Piece-rates and tournaments: Implications for learning in a cognitively challenging task. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2017, 142, 11-23.	2.0	8
32	Contests between groups of unknown size. Games and Economic Behavior, 2019, 113, 756-769.	0.8	8
33	IS MORE COMPETITION ALWAYS BETTER? AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF EXTORTIONARY CORRUPTION. Economic Inquiry, 2019, 57, 50-72.	1.8	6
34	Policy errors in executive and legislative decision-making. Public Choice, 2010, 144, 37-51.	1.7	5
35	Corrupt police. Games and Economic Behavior, 2020, 123, 101-119.	0.8	5
36	Does Competition Among Public Officials Reduce Corruption? An Experiment. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	4

#	Article	IF	CITATIONS
37	PRIMING THE CHARITABLE PUMP: AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF TWO TAGE RAFFLES. Economic Inquiry, 2016, 54, 508-519.	1.8	4
38	Indefinitely repeated contests: An experimental study. Experimental Economics, 2021, 24, 1390-1419.	2.1	4
39	The Industrial Organization of Corruption: Monopoly, Competition and Collusion. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	2
40	Three Prominent Tournament Formats: Predictive Power and Costs. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	2
41	The default of special district financing: Evidence from California. , 2015, 27, 37-48.		1
42	Corrupt Police. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	1
43	Indefinitely Repeated Contests: An Experimental Study. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	1
44	Behavior in a Dynamic Environment with Costs of Climate Change and Heterogeneous Technologies: An Experiment. Research in Experimental Economics, 2011, , 115-150.	0.2	0
45	The effect of options to reward and punish on behavior in bargaining. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 2022, 31, 171-192.	0.8	O
46	Information Disclosure in Contests With Endogenous Entry: An Experiment. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	0
47	To Fight or to Give Up? Dynamic Contests with a Deadline. Management Science, 2022, 68, 8144-8165.	4.1	O