

John Turri

List of Publications by Year in descending order

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Version: 2024-02-01

108
papers

2,218
citations

257450

24
h-index

315739

38
g-index

115
all docs

115
docs citations

115
times ranked

450
citing authors

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
1	On the Relationship between Propositional and Doxastic Justification. <i>Philosophy and Phenomenological Research</i> , 2010, 80, 312-326.	0.8	153
2	The Express Knowledge Account of Assertion. <i>Australasian Journal of Philosophy</i> , 2011, 89, 37-45.	0.8	99
3	The test of truth: An experimental investigation of the norm of assertion. <i>Cognition</i> , 2013, 129, 279-291.	2.2	87
4	Belief through Thick and Thin. <i>Nous</i> , 2015, 49, 748-775.	2.2	85
5	Knowledge and luck. <i>Psychonomic Bulletin and Review</i> , 2015, 22, 378-390.	2.8	69
6	<i>The Ontology of Epistemic Reasons</i> . <i>Nous</i> , 2009, 43, 490-512.	2.2	64
7	Believing For a Reason. <i>Erkenntnis</i> , 2011, 74, 383-397.	0.9	64
8	Is knowledge justified true belief?. <i>Synthese</i> , 2012, 184, 247-259.	1.1	61
9	Knowledge Central: A Central Role for Knowledge Attributions in Social Evaluations. <i>Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology</i> , 2017, 70, 504-515.	1.1	59
10	Unreliable Knowledge. <i>Philosophy and Phenomenological Research</i> , 2015, 90, 529-545.	0.8	59
11	Vision, knowledge, and assertion. <i>Consciousness and Cognition</i> , 2016, 41, 41-49.	1.5	58
12	Prompting challenges. <i>Analysis</i> , 2010, 70, 456-462.	0.5	57
13	DESCARTES'S SCHISM, LOCKE'S REUNION: COMPLETING THE PRAGMATIC TURN IN EPISTEMOLOGY. <i>American Philosophical Quarterly</i> , 2017, 54, 25-45.	0.7	54
14	Is Probabilistic Evidence a Source of Knowledge?. <i>Cognitive Science</i> , 2015, 39, 1062-1080.	1.7	50
15	You Gotta Believe. , 2014, , 192-199.		50
16	Knowledge and suberogatory assertion. <i>Philosophical Studies</i> , 2014, 167, 557-567.	0.8	45
17	The truth about lying. <i>Cognition</i> , 2015, 138, 161-168.	2.2	44
18	Knowledge and the norm of assertion: a simple test. <i>Synthese</i> , 2015, 192, 385-392.	1.1	43

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19	Knowledge attributions in iterated fake barn cases. <i>Analysis</i> , 2017, 77, 104-115.	0.5	41
20	Excuse validation: a study in rule-breaking. <i>Philosophical Studies</i> , 2015, 172, 615-634.	0.8	39
21	Skeptical Appeal: The Sourceâ€œContent Bias. <i>Cognitive Science</i> , 2015, 39, 307-324.	1.7	38
22	Inability and Obligation in Moral Judgment. <i>PLoS ONE</i> , 2015, 10, e0136589.	2.5	38
23	Actionability Judgments Cause Knowledge Judgments. <i>Thought</i> , 2016, 5, 212-222.	0.3	37
24	Knowledge and assertion in â€œGettierâ€œcases. <i>Philosophical Psychology</i> , 2016, 29, 759-775.	0.9	37
25	Knowledge before belief. <i>Behavioral and Brain Sciences</i> , 2021, 44, e140.	0.7	36
26	Does Perceiving Entail Knowing?. <i>Theoria (Stockholm)</i> , 2010, 76, 197-206.	0.2	27
27	Knowledge as Achievement, More or Less. , 2016, , 124-134.		27
28	A Puzzle about withholding. <i>Philosophical Quarterly</i> , 2012, 62, 355-364.	0.5	26
29	When Words Speak Louder than Actions: Delusion, Belief, and the Power of Assertion. <i>Australasian Journal of Philosophy</i> , 2014, 92, 683-700.	0.8	25
30	Evidence of factive norms of belief and decision. <i>Synthese</i> , 2015, 192, 4009-4030.	1.1	23
31	Compatibilism can be natural. <i>Consciousness and Cognition</i> , 2017, 51, 68-81.	1.5	23
32	Experimental, Cross-Cultural, and Classical Indian Epistemology. <i>Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research</i> , 2017, 34, 501-516.	0.1	22
33	Irksome assertions. <i>Philosophical Studies</i> , 2013, 166, 123-128.	0.8	21
34	Telling, showing and knowing: A unified theory of pedagogical norms. <i>Analysis</i> , 2014, 74, 16-20.	0.5	21
35	On the regress argument for infinitism. <i>Synthese</i> , 2009, 166, 157-163.	1.1	20
36	Mythology of the Factive. <i>Logos and Episteme</i> , 2011, 2, 141-150.	0.1	20

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37	Knowledge Attributions and Lottery Cases. , 2021, , 28-47.		20
38	Selfless assertions: some empirical evidence. Synth�se, 2015, 192, 1221-1233.	1.1	19
39	Epistemic Contextualism: An Idle Hypothesis. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2017, 95, 141-156.	0.8	19
40	For the greater goods? Ownership rights and utilitarian moral judgment. Cognition, 2014, 133, 79-84.	2.2	18
41	Choosing and refusing: doxastic voluntarism and folk psychology. Philosophical Studies, 2018, 175, 2507-2537.	0.8	17
42	Epistemic Modals and Alternative Possibilities. Erkenntnis, 2018, 83, 1063-1084.	0.9	16
43	The Radicalism of Truth-insensitive Epistemology: Truth's Profound Effect on the Evaluation of Belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2016, 93, 348-367.	0.8	14
44	Experimental work on the norms of assertion. Philosophy Compass, 2017, 12, e12425.	1.3	14
45	Contingent A Priori Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2011, 83, 327-344.	0.8	13
46	Knowledge, certainty, and assertion. Philosophical Psychology, 2016, 29, 293-299.	0.9	13
47	An Infinitist Account of Doxastic Justification. Dialectica, 2009, 63, 209-218.	0.3	10
48	How "ought" exceeds but implies "can". Description and encouragement in moral judgment. Cognition, 2017, 168, 267-275.	2.2	9
49	KNOWLEDGE AND TRUTH: A SKEPTICAL CHALLENGE. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2020, 101, 93-101.	0.7	9
50	Knowledge, adequacy, and approximate truth. Consciousness and Cognition, 2020, 83, 102950.	1.5	9
51	Pyrrhonian Skepticism Meets Speech-Act Theory. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 2012, 2, 83-98.	0.1	8
52	Iffy predictions and proper expectations. Synth�se, 2014, 191, 1857-1866.	1.1	8
53	Understanding and the Norm of Explanation. Philosophia (United States), 2015, 43, 1171-1175.	0.4	8
54	The point of assertion is to transmit knowledge. Analysis, 2016, 76, 130-136.	0.5	8

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55	Knowledge Attributions and Behavioral Predictions. <i>Cognitive Science</i> , 2017, 41, 2253-2261.	1.7	8
56	Exceptionalist naturalism: Human agency and the causal order. <i>Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology</i> , 2018, 71, 396-410.	1.1	8
57	Knowledge Guaranteed. <i>Nous</i> , 2013, 47, 602-612.	2.2	7
58	Non-psychological weakness of will: self-control, stereotypes, and consequences. <i>Synthese</i> , 2014, 191, 3935-3954.	1.1	7
59	Compatibilism and Incompatibilism in Social Cognition. <i>Cognitive Science</i> , 2017, 41, 403-424.	1.7	7
60	The distinctive 'should' of assertability. <i>Philosophical Psychology</i> , 2017, 30, 481-489.	0.9	7
61	It's What's on the Inside that Counts... Or is It? Virtue and the Psychological Criteria of Modesty. <i>Review of Philosophy and Psychology</i> , 2017, 8, 653-669.	1.8	7
62	Knowledge from Falsehood. <i>Thought</i> , 2019, 8, 167-178.	0.3	7
63	You Can't Get Away with Murder That Easily: A Response to Timothy Mulgan. <i>International Journal of Philosophical Studies</i> , 2005, 13, 489-492.	0.4	6
64	Foundationalism for Modest Infallibilists. <i>Canadian Journal of Philosophy</i> , 2010, 40, 275-283.	0.9	6
65	Infallibilism, finitude and normativity. <i>Philosophical Studies</i> , 2013, 163, 791-795.	0.8	6
66	In the Thick of Moral Motivation. <i>Review of Philosophy and Psychology</i> , 2017, 8, 433-453.	1.8	6
67	Revisiting norms of assertion. <i>Cognition</i> , 2018, 177, 8-11.	2.2	6
68	A New Paradigm for Epistemology From Reliabilism to Abilism. <i>Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy</i> , 2016, 3, .	0.2	6
69	Perceived Weaknesses of Philosophical Inquiry: A Comparison to Psychology. <i>Philosophia (United Kingdom)</i> 43(1) 1-14. doi:10.1007/s11098-014-0414-5	0.4	5
70	Knowledge and Assertion in Korean. <i>Cognitive Science</i> , 2018, 42, 2060-2080.	1.7	5
71	Lying, fast and slow. <i>Synthese</i> , 2021, 198, 757-775.	1.1	5
72	Objective falsity is essential to lying: an argument from convergent evidence. <i>Philosophical Studies</i> , 2021, 178, 2101-2109.	0.8	5

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73	From Virtue Epistemology to Abilism. , 2015, , 315-330.		5
74	On the general argument against internalism. SynthÃse, 2009, 170, 147-153.	1.1	4
75	Promises to Keep: Speech Acts and the Value of Reflective Knowledge. Logos and Episteme, 2011, 2, 583-590.	0.1	4
76	Lying, Uptake, Assertion, and Intent. International Review of Pragmatics, 2016, 8, 314-333.	0.5	4
77	Epistemic Situationism and Cognitive Ability. , 2017, , 158-167.		4
78	Assertion and Assurance: Some Empirical Evidence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2015, 90, 214-222.	0.8	4
79	A Conspicuous Art: Putting Gettier to the Test. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	4
80	Experimental Epistemology and âGettierâCases. , 0, , 199-217.		3
81	Excuse Validation: A Crossâcultural Study. Cognitive Science, 2019, 43, e12748.	1.7	3
82	INABILITY AND OBLIGATION IN INTELLECTUAL EVALUATION. EpistÃmÃ, 2020, 17, 475-497.	0.9	3
83	Linguistic Intuitions in Context. , 2014, , 165-184.		3
84	In the Thick of Moral Motivation. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	3
85	Knowledge as Achievement, More or Less. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	3
86	Phenomenological Origins of Psychological Ownership. Review of General Psychology, 2022, 26, 446-463.	3.2	3
87	PRACTICAL AND EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION IN ALSTONâS PERCEIVING GOD. Faith and Philosophy, 2008, 25, 290-299.	0.1	2
88	Bi-Level Virtue Epistemology. , 2013, , 147-164.		2
89	Reid on the priority of natural language. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2014, 41, 214-223.	0.9	2
90	Perceptions of Philosophical Inquiry: a Survey. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2016, 7, 805-816.	1.8	2

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91	Truth, fallibility, and justification: new studies in the norms of assertion. <i>Synthese</i> , 2021, 198, 8073-8084.	1.1	2
92	A New And Improved Argument For A Necessary Being. <i>Australasian Journal of Philosophy</i> , 2011, 89, 357-359.	0.8	1
93	Reasons, Answers, and Goals. <i>Journal of Moral Philosophy</i> , 2012, 9, 491-499.	0.4	1
94	Preempting Paradox. <i>Logos and Episteme</i> , 2012, 3, 659-662.	0.1	1
95	The Non-Factive Turn in Epistemology: Some Hypotheses. , 0, , 219-228.		1
96	Toxic intentions. <i>Inquiry (United Kingdom)</i> , 0, , 1-14.	0.9	1
97	Deciding Without Intending. <i>Journal of Cognition</i> , 2020, 3, 12.	1.4	1
98	Knowledge and belief in Korean. <i>Philosophical Psychology</i> , 0, , 1-15.	0.9	1
99	Critical Notice of Robert C Roberts and W. Jay Wood, <i>Intellectual Virtues: An Essay in Regulative Epistemology</i>. <i>Philosophy and Phenomenological Research</i> , 2011, 82, 793-797.	0.8	0
100	Knowledge and Skepticism. <i>International Journal for the Study of Skepticism</i> , 2011, 1, 155-157.	0.1	0
101	Liberal Thinking. <i>Australasian Journal of Philosophy</i> , 2013, 91, 515-533.	0.8	0
102	Infinitismus. , 2019, , 225-237.		0
103	Evaluating objections to a factive norm of belief. <i>Synthese</i> , 2020, , 1.	1.1	0
104	A Peculiar and Perpetual Tendency: An Asymmetry in Knowledge Attributions for Affirmations and Negations. <i>Erkenntnis</i> , 2022, 87, 1795-1808.	0.9	0
105	Visual Self-Motion Feedback Affects the Sense of Self in Virtual Reality. <i>Multisensory Research</i> , 2020, 34, 323-336.	1.1	0
106	Actual knowledge. <i>Behavioral and Brain Sciences</i> , 2021, 44, e177.	0.7	0
107	Pathways from inability to blamelessness in moral judgment. <i>Philosophical Psychology</i> , 0, , 1-16.	0.9	0
108	Abilism, Ableism, and Reliabilism's Achievement Gap: A Normative Argument for A New Paradigm in Epistemology. <i>Philosophia (United States)</i> , 0, , 1.	0.4	0