
## Dirk Bergemann

List of Publications by Year in descending order

Source: https://exaly.com/author-pdf/11883772/publications.pdf Version: 2024-02-01



#	Article	IF	CITATIONS
1	Venture capital financing, moral hazard, and learning. Journal of Banking and Finance, 1998, 22, 703-735.	2.9	596
2	Robust Mechanism Design. Econometrica, 2005, 73, 1771-1813.	4.2	411
3	Information Design: A Unified Perspective. Journal of Economic Literature, 2019, 57, 44-95.	6.5	290
4	Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design. Econometrica, 2002, 70, 1007-1033.	4.2	264
5	Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games. Theoretical Economics, 2016, 11, 487-522.	0.8	255
6	The Limits of Price Discrimination. American Economic Review, 2015, 105, 921-957.	8.5	242
7	Information structures in optimal auctions. Journal of Economic Theory, 2007, 137, 580-609.	1.1	212
8	The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism. Econometrica, 2010, 78, 771-789.	4.2	195
9	Targeting in advertising markets: implications for offline versus online media. RAND Journal of Economics, 2011, 42, 417-443.	2.3	192
10	Robust Predictions in Games With Incomplete Information. Econometrica, 2013, 81, 1251-1308.	4.2	155
11	Markets for Information: An Introduction. Annual Review of Economics, 2019, 11, 85-107.	5.5	122
12	The Design and Price of Information. American Economic Review, 2018, 108, 1-48.	8.5	118
13	Robust monopoly pricing. Journal of Economic Theory, 2011, 146, 2527-2543.	1.1	115
14	Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion, and Bayes Correlated Equilibrium. American Economic Review, 2016, 106, 586-591.	8.5	102
15	Selling Cookies. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2015, 7, 259-294.	1.2	101
16	Pricing without Priors. Journal of the European Economic Association, 2008, 6, 560-569.	3.5	99
17	Experimentation in Markets. Review of Economic Studies, 2000, 67, 213-234.	5.4	90
18	Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms. Review of Economic Studies, 2009, 76, 1175-1204.	5.4	89

#	Article	IF	CITATIONS
19	Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction. Journal of Economic Literature, 2019, 57, 235-274.	6.5	64
20	Information and volatility. Journal of Economic Theory, 2015, 158, 427-465.	1.1	51
21	Ex post implementation. Games and Economic Behavior, 2008, 63, 527-566.	0.8	43
22	The economics of social data. RAND Journal of Economics, 2022, 53, 263-296.	2.3	43
23	Robust implementation in general mechanisms. Games and Economic Behavior, 2011, 71, 261-281.	0.8	41
24	Sequential information disclosure in auctions. Journal of Economic Theory, 2015, 159, 1074-1095.	1.1	37
25	Dynamic revenue maximization: A continuous time approach. Journal of Economic Theory, 2015, 159, 819-853.	1.1	31
26	Introduction to Symposium on Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design. Journal of Economic Theory, 2015, 159, 679-701.	1.1	22
27	Bandit Problems. , 2008, , 1-7.		21
28	An Introduction to Robust Mechanism Design. Foundations and Trends in Microeconomics, 2013, 8, 169-230.	0.5	17
29	Informationally Robust Optimal Auction Design. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	17
30	Information in Mechanism Design. , 0, , 186-221.		16
31	Revenue Guarantee Equivalence. American Economic Review, 2019, 109, 1911-1929.	8.5	16
32	Should First-Price Auctions Be Transparent?. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2018, 10, 177-218.	1.2	13
33	Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness. Games and Economic Behavior, 2017, 104, 744-759.	0.8	12
34	Multi-dimensional mechanism design with limited information. , 2012, , .		11
35	Third-degree price discrimination versus uniform pricing. Games and Economic Behavior, 2022, 131, 275-291.	0.8	11
36	Information and Market Power. SSRN Electronic Journal, 2015, , .	0.4	10

#	Article	IF	CITATIONS
37	Efficient Auctions and Interdependent Types. American Economic Review, 2012, 102, 319-324.	8.5	9
38	Information, market power, and price volatility. RAND Journal of Economics, 2021, 52, 125-150.	2.3	9
39	An Ascending Auctions for Independent Values: Uniqueness and Robustness to Strategic Uncertainty. American Economic Review, 2007, 97, 125-130.	8.5	8
40	Information Design: A Unified Perspective. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	8
41	The Economics of Social Data. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	8
42	Countering the winner's curse: Optimal auction design in a common value model. Theoretical Economics, 2020, 15, 1399-1434.	0.8	8
43	The Comparison of Information Structures in Games: Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and Individual Sufficiency. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	7
44	The Limits of Price Discrimination. SSRN Electronic Journal, 2013, , .	0.4	6
45	Information Design: A Unified Perspective. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	6
46	Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction. SSRN Electronic Journal, 2017, , .	0.4	6
47	Information Design: A Unified Perspective. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	6
48	Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	6
49	Information and Interaction. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	6
50	Markets for Information: An Introduction. SSRN Electronic Journal, 2018, , .	0.4	5
51	Mechanism Design with Limited Information: The Case of Nonlinear Pricing. Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, 2012, , 1-10.	0.3	5
52	Mechanism Design with Limited Information: The Case of Nonlinear Pricing. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	5
53	Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	4
54	Nonlinear pricing with finite information. Games and Economic Behavior, 2021, 130, 62-84.	0.8	4

#	Article	IF	CITATIONS
55	Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	4
56	Sequential Information Disclosure in Auctions. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	4
57	Selling Experiments: Menu Pricing of Information. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	4
58	Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	4
59	Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	4
60	First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue. SSRN Electronic Journal, 2015, , .	0.4	3
61	Interdependent preferences and strategic distinguishability. Journal of Economic Theory, 2017, 168, 329-371.	1.1	3
62	Selling Cookies. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	3
63	First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	3
64	Information, Interdependence, and Interaction: Where Does the Volatility Come From?. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	2
65	Sequential Information Disclosure in Auctions. SSRN Electronic Journal, 2014, , .	0.4	2
66	First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue. SSRN Electronic Journal, 2015, , .	0.4	2
67	Informational Robustness and Solution Concepts. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	2
68	First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	2
69	The Design and Price of Information. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	2
70	Information and Market Power. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	2
71	Dynamic Revenue Maximization: A Continuous Time Approach. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	2
72	Informational Robustness and Solution Concepts. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	2

#	Article	IF	CITATIONS
73	Counterfactuals with Latent Information. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	2
74	Ex Post Implementation. World Scientific Series in Economic Theory, 2012, , 97-152.	1.4	1
75	Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design with Limited Information. SSRN Electronic Journal, 2012, , .	0.4	1
76	Efficient Auctions and Interdependent Types. SSRN Electronic Journal, 2012, , .	0.4	1
77	First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	1
78	The Design and Price of Information. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	1
79	Counterfactuals with Latent Information. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	1
80	Calibrated Click-Through Auctions. , 2022, , .		1
81	Progressive participation. Theoretical Economics, 2022, 17, 1007-1039.	0.8	1
82	Efficient Search by Committee. SSRN Electronic Journal, 2011, , .	0.4	0
83	Information and Market Power. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	О
84	First-Price Auctions with General Information Structures: A Short Introduction. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	0
85	First-price auctions with general information structures. , 2019, 16, 27-37.		Ο
86	Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	0
87	Selling Cookies. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	Ο
88	Dynamic Revenue Maximization: A Continuous Time Approach. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	0
89	Introduction to: Jet Symposium Issue on 'Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design'. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	Ο
90	Nonlinear Pricing with Finite Information. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	0

#	Article	IF	CITATIONS
91	Dynamic Revenue Maximization: A Continuous Time Approach. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	Ο
92	Bandit Problems. , 2018, , 665-670.		0
93	The Economics of Social Data. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	Ο
94	Uniform Pricing Versus Third-Degree Price Discrimination. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	0
95	Is Selling Complete Information (Approximately) Optimal?. , 2022, , .		0