

# David Martimort

## List of Publications by Year in descending order

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100  
papers

5,417  
citations

201674

27  
h-index

155660

55  
g-index

103  
all docs

103  
docs citations

103  
times ranked

2057  
citing authors

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
1	Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models. <i>Theoretical Economics</i> , 2022, 17, 1145-1181.	0.8	0
2	From Inefficient Behind-the-Border Policies to Inefficient Trade Agreements: A Two-Tier Asymmetric Information Model. <i>Economic Journal</i> , 2021, 131, 1555-1592.	3.6	1
3	Funding and financing infrastructure: The joint-use of public and private finance. <i>Journal of Development Economics</i> , 2021, 150, 102629.	4.5	16
4	Controlling Sellers Who Provide Advice: Regulation and Competition*. <i>Journal of Industrial Economics</i> , 2020, 68, 409-444.	1.3	5
5	Use and abuse of regulated prices in electricity markets: "How to regulate regulated prices?" <i>Journal of Economics and Management Strategy</i> , 2020, 29, 605-634.	0.8	3
6	"When Olson Meets Dahl" From Inefficient Groups Formation to Inefficient Policy Making. <i>Journal of Politics</i> , 2020, 82, 1026-1043.	2.2	3
7	Contract Theory in the Spotlight: Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström, 2016 Nobel Prize Winners. <i>Revue D'Economie Politique</i> , 2018, Vol. 128, 493-533.	0.5	1
8	A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game. <i>Theoretical Economics</i> , 2018, 13, 1151-1189.	0.8	4
9	Une revue critique de la théorie de l'agence commune appliquée aux jeux de lobbies. <i>Revue Economique</i> , 2018, Vol. 69, 1025-1053.	0.3	1
10	Contract Theory. , 2018, , 2204-2214.		0
11	A MECHANISM DESIGN APPROACH TO CLIMATE-CHANGE AGREEMENTS. <i>Journal of the European Economic Association</i> , 2016, 14, 669-718.	3.5	37
12	HOW TO DESIGN INFRASTRUCTURE CONTRACTS IN A WARMING WORLD: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS*. <i>International Economic Review</i> , 2016, 57, 61-88.	1.3	26
13	Dynamic Procurement under Uncertainty: Optimal Design and Implications for Incomplete Contracts. <i>American Economic Review</i> , 2016, 106, 3238-3274.	8.5	26
14	Corruption in PPPs, incentives and contract incompleteness. <i>International Journal of Industrial Organization</i> , 2016, 44, 85-100.	1.2	66
15	Vertical Contracting with Informational Opportunism. <i>American Economic Review</i> , 2015, 105, 2141-2182.	8.5	26
16	Introduction to the Special Issue on Public-Private Partnerships. <i>Journal of Public Economic Theory</i> , 2015, 17, 1-3.	1.1	2
17	Menu Auctions and Influence Games with Private Information. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 2015, , .	0.4	4
18	Pessimistic information gathering. <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i> , 2015, 91, 75-96.	0.8	19

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19	The Simple Microeconomics of Publicâ€Private Partnerships. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2015, 17, 4-48.	1.1	205
20	Representing Equilibrium Aggregates in Aggregate Games with Applications to Common Agency. SSRN Electronic Journal, 2014, , .	0.4	0
21	Accords environnementaux. Revue Economique, 2014, Vol. 65, 481-497.	0.3	1
22	Delegation, Ownership Concentration and <sc>R</sc>&<sc>D</sc> Spending: Evidence From <sc>I</sc>y. Journal of Industrial Economics, 2013, 61, 84-107.	1.3	18
23	Corrigendum to "Competing Mechanisms in a Common Value Environment". Econometrica, 2013, 81, 393-406.	4.2	14
24	Solving the global warming problem: beyond markets, simple mechanisms may help!. Canadian Journal of Economics, 2013, 46, 361-378.	1.2	16
25	The Cost of Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from the Local Public Sector. American Economic Review, 2013, 103, 2352-2383.	8.5	61
26	Le citoyen, l'expert et le politique : une rationalitÃ© complexe pour une rÃ©gulation excessive du risque. Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2012, , 153.	0.4	3
27	Representing equilibrium aggregates in aggregate games with applications to common agency. Games and Economic Behavior, 2012, 76, 753-772.	0.8	32
28	Optimal domestic regulation under asymmetric information and international trade: a simple general equilibrium approach. RAND Journal of Economics, 2012, 43, 650-676.	2.3	4
29	Risk allocation and the costs and benefits of publicâ€private partnerships. RAND Journal of Economics, 2012, 43, 442-474.	2.3	155
30	Optimal delegation with multi-dimensional decisions. Journal of Economic Theory, 2012, 147, 1850-1881.	1.1	24
31	Empirical Evidence on Satisfaction with Privatization in Latin America. World Bank Economic Review, 2012, 26, 1-33.	2.4	23
32	How much discretion for risk regulators?. RAND Journal of Economics, 2012, 43, 283-314.	2.3	31
33	â€œWhen Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?â€ New Insights from Asymmetric Information when Supply Chains Compete. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 2011, 20, 649-677.	0.8	6
34	Contracting and the Disclosure of Ideas in the Innovation Process. Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2011, , 287.	0.4	1
35	Weak Enforcement of Environmental Policies: A Tale of Limited Commitment and Limited Fines. Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2011, , 25.	0.4	4
36	The Strategic Value of Quantity Forcing Contracts. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2010, 2, 204-229.	1.2	20

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37	The public management of risk: Separating ex ante and ex post monitors. Journal of Public Economics, 2010, 94, 1008-1019.	4.3	30
38	CONTRACTING FOR AN INNOVATION UNDER BILATERAL ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION <sup>*</sup> . Journal of Industrial Economics, 2010, 58, 324-348.	1.3	21
39	Common agency and public good provision under asymmetric information. Theoretical Economics, 2010, 5, 159-213.	0.8	35
40	Selecting equilibria in common agency games. Journal of Economic Theory, 2009, 144, 604-634.	1.1	19
41	Infrastructure privatization and changes in corruption patterns: The roots of public discontent. Journal of Development Economics, 2009, 90, 69-84.	4.5	56
42	Market participation in delegated and intrinsic common agency games. RAND Journal of Economics, 2009, 40, 78-102.	2.3	64
43	Renégociation de contrats dans l'industrie du transport urbain en France. Revue Economique, 2009, Vol. 60, 927-947.	0.3	7
44	Ideological uncertainty and lobbying competition. Journal of Public Economics, 2008, 92, 456-481.	4.3	21
45	The informational effects of competition and collusion in legislative politics. Journal of Public Economics, 2008, 92, 1541-1563.	4.3	22
46	To build or not to build: Normative and positive theories of public-private partnerships. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2008, 26, 393-411.	1.2	234
47	Contract Theory. , 2008, , 1-11.		1
48	The pluralistic view of politics: Asymmetric lobbyists, ideological uncertainty and political entry. Economics Letters, 2007, 97, 155-161.	1.9	9
49	Resale price maintenance under asymmetric information. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2007, 25, 315-339.	1.2	22
50	Monitoring a common agent: Implications for financial contracting. Journal of Economic Theory, 2007, 135, 35-67.	1.1	38
51	Collusion and the organization of delegated expertise. Journal of Economic Theory, 2007, 137, 271-299.	1.1	102
52	Political Biases in Lobbying under Asymmetric Information. Journal of the European Economic Association, 2007, 5, 614-623.	3.5	10
53	Chapter 15 Political Stabilization by an Independent Regulator. Contributions To Economic Analysis, 2007, 282, 383-415.	0.1	4
54	The benefits of extended liability. RAND Journal of Economics, 2006, 37, 562-582.	2.3	41

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55	Signalling and the design of delegated management contracts for public utilities. RAND Journal of Economics, 2006, 37, 763-782.	2.3	37
56	Continuity in mechanism design without transfers. Economics Letters, 2006, 93, 182-189.	1.9	58
57	An Agency Perspective on the Costs and Benefits of Privatization. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2006, 30, 5-44.	1.4	56
58	An Incomplete Contract Perspective on Public Good Provision. Journal of Economic Surveys, 2005, 19, 149-180.	6.6	20
59	The design of transnational public good mechanisms for developing countries. Journal of Public Economics, 2005, 89, 159-196.	4.3	17
60	Jean-Jacques Laffont et la théorie des incitations de groupes. Revue D'Economie Politique, 2005, Vol. 115, 349-371.	0.5	1
61	The Agency Cost of Internal Collusion and Schumpeterian Growth. Review of Economic Studies, 2004, 71, 1119-1141.	5.4	14
62	On the optimal use of ex ante regulation and ex post liability. Economics Letters, 2004, 84, 231-235.	1.9	34
63	Delegated monitoring versus arm's-length contracting. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2004, 22, 951-981.	1.2	15
64	From Inside the Firm to the Growth Process. Journal of the European Economic Association, 2003, 1, 621-629.	3.5	4
65	Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information. Review of Economic Studies, 2003, 70, 253-279.	5.4	131
66	Regulatory Inertia. RAND Journal of Economics, 2003, 34, 413.	2.3	46
67	Risk Averse Supervisors and the Efficiency of Collusion. The BE Journal in Theoretical Economics, 2003, 2, .	0.1	9
68	Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria. The BE Journal in Theoretical Economics, 2003, 3, .	0.4	58
69	The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games. Econometrica, 2002, 70, 1659-1673.	4.2	166
70	On some agency costs of intermediated contracting. Economics Letters, 2001, 71, 75-82.	1.9	29
71	Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information. SSRN Electronic Journal, 2001, , .	0.4	11
72	Transaction Costs of Collusion and Organizational Design. SSRN Electronic Journal, 2001, , .	0.4	4

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73	Optimal Taxation and Strategic Budget Deficit Under Political Regime Switching. <i>Review of Economic Studies</i> , 2001, 68, 573-592.	5.4	16
74	Mechanism Design with Collusion and Correlation. <i>Econometrica</i> , 2000, 68, 309-342.	4.2	218
75	Competing Mechanisms in a Common Value Environment. <i>Econometrica</i> , 2000, 68, 799-837.	4.2	285
76	The Internal Organization of the Firm, Transaction Costs, and Macroeconomic Growth. <i>Journal of Economic Growth</i> , 2000, 5, 315-340.	1.9	15
77	The Life Cycle of Regulatory Agencies: Dynamic Capture and Transaction Costs. <i>Review of Economic Studies</i> , 1999, 66, 929-947.	5.4	129
78	Collusion-Proof Samuelson Conditions for Public Goods. <i>Journal of Public Economic Theory</i> , 1999, 1, 399-438.	1.1	7
79	Renegotiation Design with Multiple Regulators. <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 1999, 88, 261-293.	1.1	51
80	The endogenous transaction costs of delegated auditing. <i>European Economic Review</i> , 1999, 43, 1039-1048.	2.3	39
81	Separation of Regulators against Collusive Behavior. <i>RAND Journal of Economics</i> , 1999, 30, 232.	2.3	179
82	Transaction costs, institutional design and the separation of powers. <i>European Economic Review</i> , 1998, 42, 673-684.	2.3	31
83	Collusion and Delegation. <i>RAND Journal of Economics</i> , 1998, 29, 280.	2.3	153
84	Strategic trade policy with incompletely informed policymakers. <i>Journal of International Economics</i> , 1997, 42, 33-65.	3.0	71
85	Collusion Under Asymmetric Information. <i>Econometrica</i> , 1997, 65, 875.	4.2	239
86	The Firm as a Multicontract Organization. <i>Journal of Economics and Management Strategy</i> , 1997, 6, 201-234.	0.8	29
87	Exclusive Dealing, Common Agency, and Multiprincipals Incentive Theory. <i>RAND Journal of Economics</i> , 1996, 27, 1.	2.3	164
88	Strategic Trade Policy Design with Asymmetric Information and Public Contracts. <i>Review of Economic Studies</i> , 1996, 63, 81.	5.4	47
89	The multiprincipal nature of government. <i>European Economic Review</i> , 1996, 40, 673-685.	2.3	87
90	Multi-Contracting Mechanism Design. , 0, , 57-101.		22

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91	The Simple Micro-Economics of Public-Private Partnerships. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	49
92	The Theory of Incentives Applied to the Transport Sector. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	11
93	Post-Tender Corruption and Risk Allocation: Implications for Public-Private Partnerships. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	5
94	Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Optimal Control Problems with Linear State, Semicontinuous Lagrangians. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	2
95	Corruption in PPPs, Incentives and Contract Incompleteness. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	3
96	Public Contracting in Delegated Agency Games. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	3
97	Monitoring a Common Agent. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	6
98	The Public Management of Environmental Risk: Separating Ex Ante and Ex Post Monitors. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	1
99	Drugs, Showrooms and Financial Products: Competition and Regulation When Sellers Provide Expert Advice. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	0
100	Delegation, capture and endogenous information structures. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 0, , 095162982211075.	0.4	0