

# David Martimort

## List of Publications by Year in descending order

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100  
papers

5,417  
citations

201674

27  
h-index

155660

55  
g-index

103  
all docs

103  
docs citations

103  
times ranked

2057  
citing authors

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
1	Competing Mechanisms in a Common Value Environment. <i>Econometrica</i> , 2000, 68, 799-837.	4.2	285
2	Collusion Under Asymmetric Information. <i>Econometrica</i> , 1997, 65, 875.	4.2	239
3	To build or not to build: Normative and positive theories of public-private partnerships. <i>International Journal of Industrial Organization</i> , 2008, 26, 393-411.	1.2	234
4	Mechanism Design with Collusion and Correlation. <i>Econometrica</i> , 2000, 68, 309-342.	4.2	218
5	The Simple Microeconomics of Public-Private Partnerships. <i>Journal of Public Economic Theory</i> , 2015, 17, 4-48.	1.1	205
6	Separation of Regulators against Collusive Behavior. <i>RAND Journal of Economics</i> , 1999, 30, 232.	2.3	179
7	The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games. <i>Econometrica</i> , 2002, 70, 1659-1673.	4.2	166
8	Exclusive Dealing, Common Agency, and Multiprincipals Incentive Theory. <i>RAND Journal of Economics</i> , 1996, 27, 1.	2.3	164
9	Risk allocation and the costs and benefits of public-private partnerships. <i>RAND Journal of Economics</i> , 2012, 43, 442-474.	2.3	155
10	Collusion and Delegation. <i>RAND Journal of Economics</i> , 1998, 29, 280.	2.3	153
11	Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information. <i>Review of Economic Studies</i> , 2003, 70, 253-279.	5.4	131
12	The Life Cycle of Regulatory Agencies: Dynamic Capture and Transaction Costs. <i>Review of Economic Studies</i> , 1999, 66, 929-947.	5.4	129
13	Collusion and the organization of delegated expertise. <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 2007, 137, 271-299.	1.1	102
14	The multiprincipal nature of government. <i>European Economic Review</i> , 1996, 40, 673-685.	2.3	87
15	Strategic trade policy with incompletely informed policymakers. <i>Journal of International Economics</i> , 1997, 42, 33-65.	3.0	71
16	Corruption in PPPs, incentives and contract incompleteness. <i>International Journal of Industrial Organization</i> , 2016, 44, 85-100.	1.2	66
17	Market participation in delegated and intrinsic common agency games. <i>RAND Journal of Economics</i> , 2009, 40, 78-102.	2.3	64
18	The Cost of Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from the Local Public Sector. <i>American Economic Review</i> , 2013, 103, 2352-2383.	8.5	61

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
19	Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria. <i>The BE Journal in Theoretical Economics</i> , 2003, 3, .	0.4	58
20	Continuity in mechanism design without transfers. <i>Economics Letters</i> , 2006, 93, 182-189.	1.9	58
21	An Agency Perspective on the Costs and Benefits of Privatization. <i>Journal of Regulatory Economics</i> , 2006, 30, 5-44.	1.4	56
22	Infrastructure privatization and changes in corruption patterns: The roots of public discontent. <i>Journal of Development Economics</i> , 2009, 90, 69-84.	4.5	56
23	Renegotiation Design with Multiple Regulators. <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 1999, 88, 261-293.	1.1	51
24	The Simple Micro-Economics of Public-Private Partnerships. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 0, , .	0.4	49
25	Strategic Trade Policy Design with Asymmetric Information and Public Contracts. <i>Review of Economic Studies</i> , 1996, 63, 81.	5.4	47
26	Regulatory Inertia. <i>RAND Journal of Economics</i> , 2003, 34, 413.	2.3	46
27	The benefits of extended liability. <i>RAND Journal of Economics</i> , 2006, 37, 562-582.	2.3	41
28	The endogenous transaction costs of delegated auditing. <i>European Economic Review</i> , 1999, 43, 1039-1048.	2.3	39
29	Monitoring a common agent: Implications for financial contracting. <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 2007, 135, 35-67.	1.1	38
30	Signalling and the design of delegated management contracts for public utilities. <i>RAND Journal of Economics</i> , 2006, 37, 763-782.	2.3	37
31	A MECHANISM DESIGN APPROACH TO CLIMATE-CHANGE AGREEMENTS. <i>Journal of the European Economic Association</i> , 2016, 14, 669-718.	3.5	37
32	Common agency and public good provision under asymmetric information. <i>Theoretical Economics</i> , 2010, 5, 159-213.	0.8	35
33	On the optimal use of ex ante regulation and ex post liability. <i>Economics Letters</i> , 2004, 84, 231-235.	1.9	34
34	Representing equilibrium aggregates in aggregate games with applications to common agency. <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i> , 2012, 76, 753-772.	0.8	32
35	Transaction costs, institutional design and the separation of powers. <i>European Economic Review</i> , 1998, 42, 673-684.	2.3	31
36	How much discretion for risk regulators?. <i>RAND Journal of Economics</i> , 2012, 43, 283-314.	2.3	31

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37	The public management of risk: Separating ex ante and ex post monitors. <i>Journal of Public Economics</i> , 2010, 94, 1008-1019.	4.3	30
38	On some agency costs of intermediated contracting. <i>Economics Letters</i> , 2001, 71, 75-82.	1.9	29
39	The Firm as a Multicontract Organization. <i>Journal of Economics and Management Strategy</i> , 1997, 6, 201-234.	0.8	29
40	Vertical Contracting with Informational Opportunism. <i>American Economic Review</i> , 2015, 105, 2141-2182.	8.5	26
41	HOW TO DESIGN INFRASTRUCTURE CONTRACTS IN A WARMING WORLD: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS*. <i>International Economic Review</i> , 2016, 57, 61-88.	1.3	26
42	Dynamic Procurement under Uncertainty: Optimal Design and Implications for Incomplete Contracts. <i>American Economic Review</i> , 2016, 106, 3238-3274.	8.5	26
43	Optimal delegation with multi-dimensional decisions. <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 2012, 147, 1850-1881.	1.1	24
44	Empirical Evidence on Satisfaction with Privatization in Latin America. <i>World Bank Economic Review</i> , 2012, 26, 1-33.	2.4	23
45	Multi-Contracting Mechanism Design. , 0, , 57-101.		22
46	Resale price maintenance under asymmetric information. <i>International Journal of Industrial Organization</i> , 2007, 25, 315-339.	1.2	22
47	The informational effects of competition and collusion in legislative politics. <i>Journal of Public Economics</i> , 2008, 92, 1541-1563.	4.3	22
48	Ideological uncertainty and lobbying competition. <i>Journal of Public Economics</i> , 2008, 92, 456-481.	4.3	21
49	CONTRACTING FOR AN INNOVATION UNDER BILATERAL ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION <sup>*</sup> . <i>Journal of Industrial Economics</i> , 2010, 58, 324-348.	1.3	21
50	An Incomplete Contract Perspective on Public Good Provision. <i>Journal of Economic Surveys</i> , 2005, 19, 149-180.	6.6	20
51	The Strategic Value of Quantity Forcing Contracts. <i>American Economic Journal: Microeconomics</i> , 2010, 2, 204-229.	1.2	20
52	Selecting equilibria in common agency games. <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 2009, 144, 604-634.	1.1	19
53	Pessimistic information gathering. <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i> , 2015, 91, 75-96.	0.8	19
54	Delegation, Ownership Concentration and $R$ & $D$ Spending: Evidence From Italy. <i>Journal of Industrial Economics</i> , 2013, 61, 84-107.	1.3	18

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55	The design of transnational public good mechanisms for developing countries. <i>Journal of Public Economics</i> , 2005, 89, 159-196.	4.3	17
56	Optimal Taxation and Strategic Budget Deficit Under Political Regime Switching. <i>Review of Economic Studies</i> , 2001, 68, 573-592.	5.4	16
57	Solving the global warming problem: beyond markets, simple mechanisms may help!. <i>Canadian Journal of Economics</i> , 2013, 46, 361-378.	1.2	16
58	Funding and financing infrastructure: The joint-use of public and private finance. <i>Journal of Development Economics</i> , 2021, 150, 102629.	4.5	16
59	The Internal Organization of the Firm, Transaction Costs, and Macroeconomic Growth. <i>Journal of Economic Growth</i> , 2000, 5, 315-340.	1.9	15
60	Delegated monitoring versus arm's-length contracting. <i>International Journal of Industrial Organization</i> , 2004, 22, 951-981.	1.2	15
61	The Agency Cost of Internal Collusion and Schumpeterian Growth. <i>Review of Economic Studies</i> , 2004, 71, 1119-1141.	5.4	14
62	Corrigendum to "Competing Mechanisms in a Common Value Environment". <i>Econometrica</i> , 2013, 81, 393-406.	4.2	14
63	Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 2001, , .	0.4	11
64	The Theory of Incentives Applied to the Transport Sector. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 0, , .	0.4	11
65	Political Biases in Lobbying under Asymmetric Information. <i>Journal of the European Economic Association</i> , 2007, 5, 614-623.	3.5	10
66	Risk Averse Supervisors and the Efficiency of Collusion. <i>The BE Journal in Theoretical Economics</i> , 2003, 2, .	0.1	9
67	The pluralistic view of politics: Asymmetric lobbyists, ideological uncertainty and political entry. <i>Economics Letters</i> , 2007, 97, 155-161.	1.9	9
68	Collusion-Proof Samuelson Conditions for Public Goods. <i>Journal of Public Economic Theory</i> , 1999, 1, 399-438.	1.1	7
69	Renégociation de contrats dans l'industrie du transport urbain en France. <i>Revue Economique</i> , 2009, Vol. 60, 927-947.	0.3	7
70	“When Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?” New Insights from Asymmetric Information when Supply Chains Compete. <i>Journal of Economics and Management Strategy</i> , 2011, 20, 649-677.	0.8	6
71	Monitoring a Common Agent. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 0, , .	0.4	6
72	Post-Tender Corruption and Risk Allocation: Implications for Public-Private Partnerships. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 0, , .	0.4	5

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73	Controlling Sellers Who Provide Advice: Regulation and Competition*. Journal of Industrial Economics, 2020, 68, 409-444.	1.3	5
74	Transaction Costs of Collusion and Organizational Design. SSRN Electronic Journal, 2001, , .	0.4	4
75	From Inside the Firm to the Growth Process. Journal of the European Economic Association, 2003, 1, 621-629.	3.5	4
76	Weak Enforcement of Environmental Policies: A Tale of Limited Commitment and Limited Fines. Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2011, , 25.	0.4	4
77	Optimal domestic regulation under asymmetric information and international trade: a simple general equilibrium approach. RAND Journal of Economics, 2012, 43, 650-676.	2.3	4
78	Menu Auctions and Influence Games with Private Information. SSRN Electronic Journal, 2015, , .	0.4	4
79	Chapter 15 Political Stabilization by an Independent Regulator. Contributions To Economic Analysis, 2007, 282, 383-415.	0.1	4
80	A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game. Theoretical Economics, 2018, 13, 1151-1189.	0.8	4
81	Le citoyen, l'expert et le politique : une rationalit� complexe pour une r�gulation excessive du risque. Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2012, , 153.	0.4	3
82	Corruption in PPPs, Incentives and Contract Incompleteness. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	3
83	Use and abuse of regulated prices in electricity markets: â€œHow to regulate regulated prices?â€ Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 2020, 29, 605-634.	0.8	3
84	â€œWhen Olson Meets Dahlâ€ From Inefficient Groups Formation to Inefficient Policy Making. Journal of Politics, 2020, 82, 1026-1043.	2.2	3
85	Public Contracting in Delegated Agency Games. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	3
86	Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Optimal Control Problems with Linear State, Semicontinuous Lagrangians. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	2
87	Introduction to the Special Issue on Publicâ€Private Partnerships. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2015, 17, 1-3.	1.1	2
88	Contracting and the Disclosure of Ideas in the Innovation Process. Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2011, , 287.	0.4	1
89	Contract Theory in the Spotlight: Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmstr�m, 2016 Nobel Prize Winners. Revue D'Economie Politique, 2018, Vol. 128, 493-533.	0.5	1
90	From Inefficient Behind-the-Border Policies to Inefficient Trade Agreements: A Two-Tier Asymmetric Information Model. Economic Journal, 2021, 131, 1555-1592.	3.6	1

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91	Contract Theory. , 2008, , 1-11.		1
92	Jean-Jacques Laffont et la th�orie des incitations de groupes. Revue D'Economie Politique, 2005, Vol. 115, 349-371.	0.5	1
93	The Public Management of Environmental Risk: Separating Ex Ante and Ex Post Monitors. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	1
94	Accords environnementaux. Revue Economique, 2014, Vol. 65, 481-497.	0.3	1
95	Une revue critique de la th�orie de l'agence commune appliqu�e aux jeux de lobbies. Revue Economique, 2018, Vol. 69, 1025-1053.	0.3	1
96	Representing Equilibrium Aggregates in Aggregate Games with Applications to Common Agency. SSRN Electronic Journal, 2014, , .	0.4	0
97	Drugs, Showrooms and Financial Products: Competition and Regulation When Sellers Provide Expert Advice. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	0
98	Contract Theory. , 2018, , 2204-2214.		0
99	Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models. Theoretical Economics, 2022, 17, 1145-1181.	0.8	0
100	Delegation, capture and endogenous information structures. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 0, , 095162982211075.	0.4	0