Harry J Paarsch

List of Publications by Year in descending order

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#	Article	IF	CITATIONS
1	A flexible framework for intervention analysis applied to credit-card usage during the coronavirus pandemic. International Journal of Forecasting, 2022, 38, 1129-1157.	6.5	5
2	Structural Econometrics of Auctions: A Review. Foundations and Trends in Econometrics, 2018, 9, 79-302.	1.4	15
3	Identification and estimation of a bidding model for electronic auctions. Quantitative Economics, 2017, 8, 505-551.	1.4	15
4	Is the â€ [~] Linkage Principle' Valid? Evidence from the Field. Journal of Industrial Economics, 2014, 62, 346-375.	1.3	13
5	On the Numerical Solution of Equilibria in Auction Models with Asymmetries within the Private-Values Paradigm. Handbook of Computational Economics, 2014, , 37-115.	1.6	21
6	Using Economic Theory to Guide Numerical Analysis: Solving for Equilibria in Models of Asymmetric First-Price Auctions. Computational Economics, 2013, 42, 241-266.	2.6	21
7	Smoothed safety first and the holding of assets. Quantitative Finance, 2013, 13, 167-176.	1.7	8
8	On the asymptotic distribution of the transaction price in a clock model of a multiâ€unit, oral, ascendingâ€price auction within the commonâ€value paradigm. RAND Journal of Economics, 2013, 44, 664-685.	2.3	4
9	Semiparametric estimation in models of first-price, sealed-bid auctions with affiliation. Journal of Econometrics, 2012, 168, 4-16.	6.5	33
10	The response to incentives and contractual efficiency: Evidence from a field experiment. European Economic Review, 2009, 53, 481-494.	2.3	25
11	Investigating bid preferences at low-price, sealed-bid auctions with endogenous participation. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2009, 27, 1-14.	1.2	51
12	Bounding Revenue Comparisons across Multi-Unit Auction Formats under Îμ-Best Response. American Economic Review, 2007, 97, 455-458.	8.5	18
13	Do women react differently to incentives? Evidence from experimental data and payroll records. European Economic Review, 2007, 51, 1682-1707.	2.3	28
14	Semiparametric identification and estimation in multi-object, English auctions. Journal of Econometrics, 2007, 141, 84-108.	6.5	18
15	Identification and estimation in sequential, asymmetric, English auctions. Journal of Econometrics, 2006, 134, 69-94.	6.5	31
16	An empirical model of the multi-unit, sequential, clock auction. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 2006, 21, 1221-1247.	2.3	30
17	Superconsistent estimation and inference in structural econometric models using extreme order statistics. Journal of Econometrics, 2002, 109, 305-340.	6.5	31
18	Piece Rates, Fixed Wages, and Incentive Effects: Statistical Evidence from Payroll Records. International Economic Review, 2000, 41, 59-92.	1.3	195

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19	The Response of Worker Effort to Piece Rates: Evidence from the British Columbia Tree-Planting Industry. Journal of Human Resources, 1999, 34, 643.	3.1	115
20	Deriving an estimate of the optimal reserve price: An application to British Columbian timber sales. Journal of Econometrics, 1997, 78, 333-357.	6.5	54
21	Deriving an estimate of the optimal reserve price: An application to British Columbian timber sales. Journal of Econometrics, 1997, 78, 333-357.	6.5	98
22	Identification, Estimation, and Testing in Parametric Empirical Models of Auctions within the Independent Private Values Paradigm. Econometric Theory, 1996, 12, 517-567.	0.7	93
23	Piecewise Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood Estimation in Empirical Models of Auctions. International Economic Review, 1993, 34, 121.	1.3	109
24	Deciding between the common and private value paradigms in empirical models of auctions. Journal of Econometrics, 1992, 51, 191-215.	6.5	230
25	A Monte Carlo comparison of estimators for censored regression models. Journal of Econometrics, 1984, 24, 197-213.	6.5	89
26	The Response to Incentives and Contractual Efficiency: Evidence from a Field Experiment. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	6
27	Non-Parametric Identification and Estimation of Multi-Unit, Sequential, Oral, Ascending-Price Auctions With Asymmetric Bidders. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	1