Harry J Paarsch

List of Publications by Year in descending order

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#	Article	IF	CITATIONS
1	Deciding between the common and private value paradigms in empirical models of auctions. Journal of Econometrics, 1992, 51, 191-215.	6.5	230
2	Piece Rates, Fixed Wages, and Incentive Effects: Statistical Evidence from Payroll Records. International Economic Review, 2000, 41, 59-92.	1.3	195
3	The Response of Worker Effort to Piece Rates: Evidence from the British Columbia Tree-Planting Industry. Journal of Human Resources, 1999, 34, 643.	3.1	115
4	Piecewise Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood Estimation in Empirical Models of Auctions. International Economic Review, 1993, 34, 121.	1.3	109
5	Deriving an estimate of the optimal reserve price: An application to British Columbian timber sales. Journal of Econometrics, 1997, 78, 333-357.	6.5	98
6	Identification, Estimation, and Testing in Parametric Empirical Models of Auctions within the Independent Private Values Paradigm. Econometric Theory, 1996, 12, 517-567.	0.7	93
7	A Monte Carlo comparison of estimators for censored regression models. Journal of Econometrics, 1984, 24, 197-213.	6.5	89
8	Deriving an estimate of the optimal reserve price: An application to British Columbian timber sales. Journal of Econometrics, 1997, 78, 333-357.	6.5	54
9	Investigating bid preferences at low-price, sealed-bid auctions with endogenous participation. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2009, 27, 1-14.	1.2	51
10	Semiparametric estimation in models of first-price, sealed-bid auctions with affiliation. Journal of Econometrics, 2012, 168, 4-16.	6.5	33
11	Superconsistent estimation and inference in structural econometric models using extreme order statistics. Journal of Econometrics, 2002, 109, 305-340.	6.5	31
12	Identification and estimation in sequential, asymmetric, English auctions. Journal of Econometrics, 2006, 134, 69-94.	6.5	31
13	An empirical model of the multi-unit, sequential, clock auction. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 2006, 21, 1221-1247.	2.3	30
14	Do women react differently to incentives? Evidence from experimental data and payroll records. European Economic Review, 2007, 51, 1682-1707.	2.3	28
15	The response to incentives and contractual efficiency: Evidence from a field experiment. European Economic Review, 2009, 53, 481-494.	2.3	25
16	Using Economic Theory to Guide Numerical Analysis: Solving for Equilibria in Models of Asymmetric First-Price Auctions. Computational Economics, 2013, 42, 241-266.	2.6	21
17	On the Numerical Solution of Equilibria in Auction Models with Asymmetries within the Private-Values Paradigm. Handbook of Computational Economics, 2014, , 37-115.	1.6	21
18	Bounding Revenue Comparisons across Multi-Unit Auction Formats under ε-Best Response. American Economic Review, 2007, 97, 455-458.	8.5	18

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19	Semiparametric identification and estimation in multi-object, English auctions. Journal of Econometrics, 2007, 141, 84-108.	6.5	18
20	Identification and estimation of a bidding model for electronic auctions. Quantitative Economics, 2017, 8, 505-551.	1.4	15
21	Structural Econometrics of Auctions: A Review. Foundations and Trends in Econometrics, 2018, 9, 79-302.	1.4	15
22	Is the â€~Linkage Principle' Valid? Evidence from the Field. Journal of Industrial Economics, 2014, 62, 346-375.	1.3	13
23	Smoothed safety first and the holding of assets. Quantitative Finance, 2013, 13, 167-176.	1.7	8
24	The Response to Incentives and Contractual Efficiency: Evidence from a Field Experiment. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	6
25	A flexible framework for intervention analysis applied to credit-card usage during the coronavirus pandemic. International Journal of Forecasting, 2022, 38, 1129-1157.	6.5	5
26	On the asymptotic distribution of the transaction price in a clock model of a multiâ€unit, oral, ascendingâ€price auction within the commonâ€value paradigm. RAND Journal of Economics, 2013, 44, 664-685.	2.3	4
27	Non-Parametric Identification and Estimation of Multi-Unit, Sequential, Oral, Ascending-Price Auctions With Asymmetric Bidders. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	1