

Roger B Myerson

List of Publications by Year in descending order

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49
papers

14,949
citations

218677

26
h-index

302126

39
g-index

51
all docs

51
docs citations

51
times ranked

4685
citing authors

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
1	Local agency costs of political centralization. <i>Theoretical Economics</i> , 2021, 16, 425-448.	0.8	0
2	Outlook for democracy and democratic institutions. <i>Business Economics</i> , 2021, 56, 8-13.	1.5	1
3	Perfect Conditional Equilibria of Multi-Stage Games With Infinite Sets of Signals and Actions. <i>Econometrica</i> , 2020, 88, 495-531.	4.2	12
4	Fundamental theory of institutions: a lecture in honor of Leo Hurwicz. <i>Studies in Economic Design</i> , 2019, , 35-51.	0.0	0
5	Revelation Principle. , 2018, , 11646-11652.		0
6	Mechanism Design. , 2018, , 8632-8644.		0
7	Moral Hazard in High Office and the Dynamics of Aristocracy. <i>Econometrica</i> , 2015, 83, 2083-2126.	4.2	34
8	Standards for State-Building Interventions. , 2014, , 171-188.		1
9	Fundamentals of Social Choice Theory. <i>Quarterly Journal of Political Science</i> , 2013, 8, 305-337.	1.1	22
10	Decisiveness of contributors's perceptions in elections. <i>Economic Theory</i> , 2012, 49, 571-590.	0.9	11
11	Toward a theory of leadership and state building. <i>Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America</i> , 2011, 108, 21297-21301.	7.1	27
12	Capitalist investment and political liberalization. <i>Theoretical Economics</i> , 2010, 5, 73-91.	0.8	5
13	Fundamental theory of institutions: a lecture in honor of Leo Hurwicz. <i>Review of Economic Design</i> , 2009, 13, 59-75.	0.3	29
14	Learning from Schelling's <i>Strategy of Conflict</i> . <i>Journal of Economic Literature</i> , 2009, 47, 1109-1125.	6.5	54
15	The Autocrat's Credibility Problem and Foundations of the Constitutional State. <i>American Political Science Review</i> , 2008, 102, 125-139.	3.7	286
16	Perspectives on Mechanism Design in Economic Theory. <i>American Economic Review</i> , 2008, 98, 586-603.	8.5	89
17	Mechanism Design. , 2008, , 1-13.		7
18	Revelation Principle. , 2008, , 1-6.		3

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19	Sequential equilibria in Bayesian games with communication. <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i> , 2007, 60, 104-134.	0.8	20
20	Does Advertising Exposure Affect Turnout?. <i>Quarterly Journal of Political Science</i> , 2006, 1, 3-23.	1.1	100
21	Bipolar Multicandidate Elections with Corruption. <i>Scandinavian Journal of Economics</i> , 2006, 108, 727-742.	1.4	8
22	Population uncertainty in contests. <i>Economic Theory</i> , 2006, 27, 469-474.	0.9	64
23	Comments on "Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players, Ill Harsanyi's Games with Incomplete Information". <i>Management Science</i> , 2004, 50, 1818-1824.	4.1	37
24	Endogenous Formation of Links Between Players and of Coalitions: An Application of the Shapley Value. , 2003, , 207-220.		85
25	Comparison of Scoring Rules in Poisson Voting Games. <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 2002, 103, 219-251.	1.1	145
26	Large Poisson Games. <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 2000, 94, 7-45.	1.1	201
27	Bicameralism and Its Consequences for the Internal Organization of Legislatures. <i>American Economic Review</i> , 1999, 89, 1182-1196.	8.5	209
28	Nash Equilibrium and the History of Economic Theory. <i>Journal of Economic Literature</i> , 1999, 37, 1067-1082.	6.5	231
29	Theoretical comparisons of electoral systems. <i>European Economic Review</i> , 1999, 43, 671-697.	2.3	133
30	Population uncertainty and Poisson games. <i>International Journal of Game Theory</i> , 1998, 27, 375-392.	0.5	228
31	Extended Poisson Games and the Condorcet Jury Theorem. <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i> , 1998, 25, 111-131.	0.8	128
32	John Nash's Contribution to Economics. <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i> , 1996, 14, 287-295.	0.8	10
33	Analysis of Democratic Institutions: Structure, Conduct and Performance. <i>Journal of Economic Perspectives</i> , 1995, 9, 77-89.	5.9	81
34	Chapter 24 Communication, correlated equilibria and incentive compatibility. <i>Handbook of Game Theory With Economic Applications</i> , 1994, , 827-847.	1.3	8
35	Effectiveness of Electoral Systems for Reducing Government Corruption: A Game-Theoretic Analysis. <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i> , 1993, 5, 118-132.	0.8	222
36	Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities Under Alternative Electoral Systems. <i>American Political Science Review</i> , 1993, 87, 856-869.	3.7	355

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37	A Theory of Voting Equilibria. American Political Science Review, 1993, 87, 102-114.	3.7	383
38	Credible negotiation statements and coherent plans. Journal of Economic Theory, 1989, 48, 264-303.	1.1	49
39	Mechanism Design. , 1989, , 191-206.		32
40	Multistage Games with Communication. Econometrica, 1986, 54, 323.	4.2	421
41	Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal. Econometrica, 1983, 51, 1767.	4.2	328
42	Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading. Journal of Economic Theory, 1983, 29, 265-281.	1.1	1,943
43	Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs. Econometrica, 1982, 50, 911.	4.2	1,264
44	Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1982, 10, 67-81.	0.8	719
45	Optimal Auction Design. Mathematics of Operations Research, 1981, 6, 58-73.	1.3	4,299
46	Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem. Econometrica, 1979, 47, 61.	4.2	1,550
47	Graphs and Cooperation in Games. Mathematics of Operations Research, 1977, 2, 225-229.	1.3	1,086
48	Economic analysis of political institutions: an introduction. , 0, , 46-65.		3
49	Campaign Finance Levels as Coordinating Signals in Three-Way, Experimental Elections. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	6