## Roger B Myerson

List of Publications by Year in descending order

Source: https://exaly.com/author-pdf/11052032/publications.pdf

Version: 2024-02-01

49 papers 14,949 citations

218677 26 h-index 39 g-index

51 all docs

51 docs citations

times ranked

51

4685 citing authors

| #  | Article  | IF  | CITATIONS |
|----|--|-----|-----------|
| 1  | Optimal Auction Design. Mathematics of Operations Research, 1981, 6, 58-73.  | 1.3 | 4,299     |
| 2  | Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading. Journal of Economic Theory, 1983, 29, 265-281.   | 1.1 | 1,943     |
| 3  | Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem. Econometrica, 1979, 47, 61.  | 4.2 | 1,550     |
| 4  | Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs. Econometrica, 1982, 50, 911.   | 4.2 | 1,264     |
| 5  | Graphs and Cooperation in Games. Mathematics of Operations Research, 1977, 2, 225-229.   | 1.3 | 1,086     |
| 6  | Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal–agent problems. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1982, 10, 67-81.                     | 0.8 | 719       |
| 7  | Multistage Games with Communication. Econometrica, 1986, 54, 323.  | 4.2 | 421       |
| 8  | A Theory of Voting Equilibria. American Political Science Review, 1993, 87, 102-114.   | 3.7 | 383       |
| 9  | Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities Under Alternative Electoral Systems. American Political Science Review, 1993, 87, 856-869.            | 3.7 | 355       |
| 10 | Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal. Econometrica, 1983, 51, 1767.   | 4.2 | 328       |
| 11 | The Autocrat's Credibility Problem and Foundations of the Constitutional State. American Political Science Review, 2008, 102, 125-139.           | 3.7 | 286       |
| 12 | Nash Equilibrium and the History of Economic Theory. Journal of Economic Literature, 1999, 37, 1067-1082.  | 6.5 | 231       |
| 13 | Population uncertainty and Poisson games. International Journal of Game Theory, 1998, 27, 375-392.   | 0.5 | 228       |
| 14 | Effectiveness of Electoral Systems for Reducing Government Corruption: A Game-Theoretic Analysis. Games and Economic Behavior, 1993, 5, 118-132. | 0.8 | 222       |
| 15 | Bicameralism and Its Consequences for the Internal Organization of Legislatures. American Economic Review, 1999, 89, 1182-1196.                  | 8.5 | 209       |
| 16 | Large Poisson Games. Journal of Economic Theory, 2000, 94, 7-45.   | 1.1 | 201       |
| 17 | Comparison of Scoring Rules in Poisson Voting Games. Journal of Economic Theory, 2002, 103, 219-251.   | 1.1 | 145       |
| 18 | Theoretical comparisons of electoral systems. European Economic Review, 1999, 43, 671-697.   | 2.3 | 133       |

| #  | Article   | IF        | Citations |
|----|---|-----------|-----------|
| 19 | Extended Poisson Games and the Condorcet Jury Theorem. Games and Economic Behavior, 1998, 25, 111-131.  | 0.8       | 128       |
| 20 | Does Advertising Exposure Affect Turnout?. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2006, 1, 3-23.   | 1.1       | 100       |
| 21 | Perspectives on Mechanism Design in Economic Theory. American Economic Review, 2008, 98, 586-603.   | 8.5       | 89        |
| 22 | Endogenous Formation of Links Between Players and of Coalitions: An Application of the Shapley Value., 2003,, 207-220.  |           | 85        |
| 23 | Analysis of Democratic Institutions: Structure, Conduct and Performance. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1995, 9, 77-89.  | 5.9       | 81        |
| 24 | Population uncertainty in contests. Economic Theory, 2006, 27, 469-474.   | 0.9       | 64        |
| 25 | Learning from Schelling's <i>Strategy of Conflict</i> . Journal of Economic Literature, 2009, 47, 1109-1125.  | 6.5       | 54        |
| 26 | Credible negotiation statements and coherent plans. Journal of Economic Theory, 1989, 48, 264-303.  | 1.1       | 49        |
| 27 | Comments on "Games with Incomplete Information Played by â€~Bayesian' Players, l–III Harsanyi's Gam<br>with Incoplete Information― Management Science, 2004, 50, 1818-1824. | es<br>4.1 | 37        |
| 28 | Moral Hazard in High Office and the Dynamics of Aristocracy. Econometrica, 2015, 83, 2083-2126.   | 4.2       | 34        |
| 29 | Mechanism Design. , 1989, , 191-206.  |           | 32        |
| 30 | Fundamental theory of institutions: a lecture in honor of Leo Hurwicz. Review of Economic Design, 2009, 13, 59-75.  | 0.3       | 29        |
| 31 | Toward a theory of leadership and state building. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 2011, 108, 21297-21301.                  | 7.1       | 27        |
| 32 | Fundamentals of Social Choice Theory. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2013, 8, 305-337.   | 1.1       | 22        |
| 33 | Sequential equilibria in Bayesian games with communication. Games and Economic Behavior, 2007, 60, 104-134.   | 0.8       | 20        |
| 34 | Perfect Conditional εâ€Equilibria of Multiâ€Stage Games With Infinite Sets of Signals and Actions. Econometrica, 2020, 88, 495-531.   | 4.2       | 12        |
| 35 | Decisiveness of contributors' perceptions in elections. Economic Theory, 2012, 49, 571-590.   | 0.9       | 11        |
| 36 | John Nash's Contribution to Economics. Games and Economic Behavior, 1996, 14, 287-295.  | 0.8       | 10        |

| #  | Article   | IF  | Citations |
|----|---|-----|-----------|
| 37 | Chapter 24 Communication, correlated equilibria and incentive compatibility. Handbook of Game Theory With Economic Applications, 1994, , 827-847. | 1.3 | 8         |
| 38 | Bipolar Multicandidate Elections with Corruption. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2006, 108, 727-742.  | 1.4 | 8         |
| 39 | Mechanism Design., 2008, , 1-13.  |     | 7         |
| 40 | Campaign Finance Levels as Coordinating Signals in Three-Way, Experimental Elections. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .                             | 0.4 | 6         |
| 41 | Capitalist investment and political liberalization. Theoretical Economics, 2010, 5, 73-91.  | 0.8 | 5         |
| 42 | Economic analysis of political institutions: an introduction. , 0, , 46-65.   |     | 3         |
| 43 | Revelation Principle. , 2008, , 1-6.  |     | 3         |
| 44 | Standards for State-Building Interventions. , 2014, , 171-188.  |     | 1         |
| 45 | Outlook for democracy and democratic institutions. Business Economics, 2021, 56, 8-13.  | 1.5 | 1         |
| 46 | Fundamental theory of institutions: a lecture in honor of Leo Hurwicz. Studies in Economic Design, 2019, , 35-51.                                 | 0.0 | 0         |
| 47 | Local agency costs of political centralization. Theoretical Economics, 2021, 16, 425-448.   | 0.8 | 0         |
| 48 | Revelation Principle. , 2018, , 11646-11652.  |     | 0         |
| 49 | Mechanism Design. , 2018, , 8632-8644.  |     | 0         |