

Ioannis Votsis

List of Publications by Year in descending order

Source: <https://exaly.com/author-pdf/11004383/publications.pdf>

Version: 2024-02-01

20
papers

232
citations

1307594

7
h-index

996975

15
g-index

20
all docs

20
docs citations

20
times ranked

77
citing authors

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
1	Everything you always wanted to know about structural realism but were afraid to ask. <i>European Journal for Philosophy of Science</i> , 2011, 1, 227-276.	1.1	106
2	Is Structure Not Enough?. <i>Philosophy of Science</i> , 2003, 70, 879-890.	1.0	19
3	A frame-theoretic analysis of two rival conceptions of heat. <i>Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A</i> , 2012, 43, 105-114.	1.2	18
4	The Prospective Stance in Realism. <i>Philosophy of Science</i> , 2011, 78, 1223-1234.	1.0	17
5	The Upward Path to Structural Realism. <i>Philosophy of Science</i> , 2005, 72, 1361-1372.	1.0	16
6	Unification: Not Just a Thing of Beauty. <i>Theoria (Spain)</i> , 2015, 30, 97.	0.4	10
7	Uninterrupted Equations and the Structure-Nature Distinction. <i>Philosophical Inquiry</i> , 2007, 29, 57-71.	0.2	7
8	Perception and observation unladen. <i>Philosophical Studies</i> , 2015, 172, 563-585.	0.8	7
9	Structural Realism: Continuity and Its Limits. <i>Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science</i> , 2010, , 105-117.	0.9	7
10	Objectivity in confirmation: Post hoc monsters and novel predictions. <i>Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A</i> , 2014, 45, 70-78.	1.2	6
11	Saving the intuitions: polythetic reference. <i>Synthese</i> , 2011, 180, 121-137.	1.1	5
12	Data meet theory: up close and inferentially personal. <i>Synthese</i> , 2011, 182, 89-100.	1.1	4
13	Theory-ladenness: testing the "untestable"™. <i>Synthese</i> , 2020, 197, 1447-1465.	1.1	3
14	Editorial introduction to scientific realism quo vadis? Theories, structures, underdetermination and reference. <i>Synthese</i> , 2011, 180, 79-85.	1.1	2
15	Reconstructing Scientific Theory Change by Means of Frames. <i>Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy</i> , 2014, , 93-109.	0.0	2
16	Structural Realism and its Variants. , 2017, , 108-119.		1
17	Ad Hoc Hypotheses and the Monsters Within. , 2016, , 301-315.		1
18	How Not to Be a Realist. <i>The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science</i> , 2012, , 59-76.	0.2	1

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
19	Unification through Confirmation. <i>European Studies in Philosophy of Science</i> , 2017, , 83-93.	0.4	0
20	Introduction to the Special Issue: Towards Foolproof Democracy: Improving Public Debate and Political Decision-Making. <i>Moral Philosophy and Politics</i> , 2019, 6, 203-209.	0.9	0