

Kyung Hwan Baik

List of Publications by Year in descending order

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Version: 2024-02-01

39
papers

1,172
citations

430874

18
h-index

434195

31
g-index

39
all docs

39
docs citations

39
times ranked

330
citing authors

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
1	Effort Levels in Contests with Two Asymmetric Players. <i>Southern Economic Journal</i> , 1994, 61, 367.	2.1	176
2	Contests with group-specific public-good prizes. <i>Social Choice and Welfare</i> , 2007, 30, 103-117.	0.8	95
3	Bidding for a group-specific public-good prize. <i>Journal of Public Economics</i> , 2001, 82, 415-429.	4.3	92
4	Effort levels in contests. <i>Economics Letters</i> , 1993, 41, 363-367.	1.9	83
5	Difference-form contest success functions and effort levels in contests. <i>European Journal of Political Economy</i> , 1998, 14, 685-701.	1.8	77
6	Delegation in contests. <i>European Journal of Political Economy</i> , 1997, 13, 281-298.	1.8	72
7	Strategic Groups and Rent Dissipation. <i>Economic Inquiry</i> , 2001, 39, 672-684.	1.8	62
8	Two-Stage Rent-Seeking Contests with Carryovers. <i>Public Choice</i> , 2000, 103, 285-296.	1.7	54
9	Collective rent seeking with endogenous group sizes. <i>European Journal of Political Economy</i> , 1997, 13, 121-130.	1.8	50
10	Collective rent seeking when sharing rules are private information. <i>European Journal of Political Economy</i> , 2007, 23, 768-776.	1.8	42
11	Competitive-share group formation in rent-seeking contests. <i>Public Choice</i> , 1995, 83, 113-126.	1.7	40
12	Two-Player Asymmetric Contests with Ratio-Form Contest Success Functions. <i>Economic Inquiry</i> , 2004, 42, 679-689.	1.8	34
13	Contingent fees versus legal expenses insurance. <i>International Review of Law and Economics</i> , 2007, 27, 351-361.	0.8	33
14	WINNER-HELP-LOSER GROUP FORMATION IN RENT-SEEKING CONTESTS. <i>Economics and Politics</i> , 1994, 6, 147-162.	1.1	32
15	Contests with spying. <i>European Journal of Political Economy</i> , 1995, 11, 441-451.	1.8	27
16	RENT-SEEKING FIRMS, CONSUMER GROUPS, AND THE SOCIAL COSTS OF MONOPOLY. <i>Economic Inquiry</i> , 1999, 37, 541-553.	1.8	26
17	Endogenous Timing in a Gaming Tournament. <i>Theory and Decision</i> , 1999, 47, 1-21.	1.0	25
18	STRATEGIC DECISIONS ON LAWYERS' COMPENSATION IN CIVIL DISPUTES. <i>Economic Inquiry</i> , 2007, 45, 854-863.	1.8	20

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
19	DO RENT-SEEKING GROUPS ANNOUNCE THEIR SHARING RULES?. <i>Economic Inquiry</i> , 2012, 50, 348-363.	1.8	20
20	The effects of conflict budget on the intensity of conflict: an experimental investigation. <i>Experimental Economics</i> , 2020, 23, 240-258.	2.1	15
21	Variable valuations and voluntarism under group selection: An evolutionary public goods game. <i>Journal of Theoretical Biology</i> , 2010, 265, 238-244.	1.7	14
22	Decisions of Duopoly Firms on Sharing Information on Their Delegation Contracts. <i>Review of Industrial Organization</i> , 2020, 57, 145-165.	0.7	14
23	Equilibrium Contingent Compensation in Contests with Delegation. <i>Southern Economic Journal</i> , 2007, 73, 986-1002.	2.1	14
24	The equivalence of rent-seeking outcomes for competitive-share and strategic groups. <i>European Journal of Political Economy</i> , 2006, 22, 337-342.	1.8	10
25	ENDOGENOUS TIMING IN CONTESTS WITH DELEGATION. <i>Economic Inquiry</i> , 2013, 51, 2044-2055.	1.8	9
26	Contests with Bilateral Delegation: Unobservable Contracts. <i>Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics</i> , 2014, 170, 387.	0.2	8
27	Endogenous Group Formation in Contests: Unobservable Sharing Rules. <i>Journal of Economics and Management Strategy</i> , 2016, 25, 400-419.	0.8	6
28	Attorneys' Compensation in Litigation with Bilateral Delegation. <i>Review of Law and Economics</i> , 2008, 4, .	0.3	5
29	Concealment and verification over environmental regulations: a game-theoretic analysis. <i>Journal of Regulatory Economics</i> , 2017, 51, 235-268.	1.4	4
30	Asymmetric contests with initial probabilities of winning. <i>International Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 2019, 15, 385-398.	0.6	4
31	Observable versus unobservable R&D investments in duopolies. <i>Journal of Economics/ Zeitschrift Fur Nationalokonomie</i> , 2020, 130, 37-66.	0.7	3
32	Contests with Alternative Public-Good Prizes. <i>Journal of Public Economic Theory</i> , 2016, 18, 545-559.	1.1	2
33	Contests with multiple alternative prizes: Public-good/bad prizes and externalities. <i>Journal of Mathematical Economics</i> , 2021, 92, 103-116.	0.8	2
34	Contests with spying: Reply. <i>European Journal of Political Economy</i> , 1996, 12, 735-737.	1.8	1
35	Group size and matching protocol in contests. <i>Canadian Journal of Economics</i> , 2021, 54, 1716-1736.	1.2	1
36	The Political Economy of Attorneys and Human Resources. , 2021, , 1-20.		0

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
37	Contests for catch shares. <i>Review of Economic Design</i> , 0, , 1.	0.3	0
38	The equivalence of rent-seeking outcomes for competitive-share and strategic groups. , 2005, , 323-328.		0
39	Endogenous timing in three-player Tullock contests. <i>Social Choice and Welfare</i> , 2022, , 1-29.	0.8	0