

Pierre-Andr © Chiappori

List of Publications by Year in descending order

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83
papers

7,203
citations

172443

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118840

62
g-index

94
all docs

94
docs citations

94
times ranked

2317
citing authors

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
1	Le pouvoir dans la famille. Commentaire, 2021, Numéro 175, 599-604.	0.0	0
2	The Theory and Empirics of the Marriage Market. Annual Review of Economics, 2020, 12, 547-578.	5.5	22
3	Changes in Assortative Matching and Inequality in Income: Evidence for the UK*. Fiscal Studies, 2020, 41, 39-63.	1.5	11
4	The Engel Curves of Non-Cooperative Households. Economic Journal, 2020, 130, 653-674.	3.6	3
5	The intra-spousal balance of power within the family: Cross-cultural evidence. , 2020, , 185-209.		2
6	Transferable utility and demand functions. Theoretical Economics, 2020, 15, 1307-1333.	0.8	5
7	On Human Capital and Team Stability. Journal of Human Capital, 2019, 13, 236-259.	1.3	7
8	From Aggregate Betting Data to Individual Risk Preferences. Econometrica, 2019, 87, 1-36.	4.2	38
9	Transition to nestedness in multi- to one-dimensional optimal transport. European Journal of Applied Mathematics, 2019, 30, 1220-1228.	2.9	2
10	Bidimensional Matching with Heterogeneous Preferences: Education and Smoking in the Marriage Market. Journal of the European Economic Association, 2018, 16, 161-198.	3.5	23
11	The Marriage Market, Labor Supply, and Education Choice. Journal of Political Economy, 2018, 126, S26-S72.	4.5	58
12	Static and Intertemporal Household Decisions. Journal of Economic Literature, 2017, 55, 985-1045.	6.5	106
13	A note on identifying heterogeneous sharing rules. Quantitative Economics, 2017, 8, 201-218.	1.4	8
14	Multi- to One-Dimensional Optimal Transport. Communications on Pure and Applied Mathematics, 2017, 70, 2405-2444.	3.1	16
15	Partner Choice, Investment in Children, and the Marital College Premium. American Economic Review, 2017, 107, 2109-2167.	8.5	114
16	The Marriage Market, Labor Supply and Education Choice. SSRN Electronic Journal, 2016, , .	0.4	0
17	Welfare and the Household. , 2016, , .		1
18	BLACK-WHITE MARITAL MATCHING: RACE, ANTHROPOMETRICS, AND SOCIOECONOMICS. Journal of Demographic Economics, 2016, 82, 399-421.	1.2	7

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19	The Econometrics of Matching Models. <i>Journal of Economic Literature</i> , 2016, 54, 832-861.	6.5	89
20	Matching to share risk. <i>Theoretical Economics</i> , 2016, 11, 227-251.	0.8	35
21	GARY BECKER��S CONTRIBUTION TO THE ECONOMICS OF MATCHING AND MARRIAGE. <i>Journal of Demographic Economics</i> , 2015, 81, 7-11.	1.2	4
22	The Marriage Market, Labor Supply and Education Choice. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 2015, , .	0.4	0
23	THE BECKER��COASE THEOREM RECONSIDERED. <i>Journal of Demographic Economics</i> , 2015, 81, 157-177.	1.2	21
24	Intrahousehold Inequality. <i>Handbook of Income Distribution</i> , 2015, , 1369-1418.	3.1	20
25	Nonparametric identification and estimation of transformation models. <i>Journal of Econometrics</i> , 2015, 188, 22-39.	6.5	34
26	Heterogeneity and risk sharing in village economies. <i>Quantitative Economics</i> , 2014, 5, 1-27.	1.4	41
27	Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets: Predictions and Tests. , 2013, , 397-422.		53
28	Fatter Attraction: Anthropometric and Socioeconomic Matching on the Marriage Market. <i>Journal of Political Economy</i> , 2012, 120, 659-695.	4.5	167
29	Process and context in choice models. <i>Marketing Letters</i> , 2012, 23, 439-456.	2.9	68
30	Mod��les d'appariement en ��conomie. <i>Revue Economique</i> , 2012, Vol. 63, 437-452.	0.3	6
31	RELATIVE RISK AVERSION IS CONSTANT: EVIDENCE FROM PANEL DATA. <i>Journal of the European Economic Association</i> , 2011, 9, 1021-1052.	3.5	208
32	Nonunitary Models of Household Behavior: A Survey of the Literature. , 2011, , 1-40.		37
33	AN INTERVIEW WITH ROGER GUESNERIE. <i>Macroeconomic Dynamics</i> , 2010, 14, 388-404.	0.7	3
34	Hedonic price equilibria, stable matching, and optimal transport: equivalence, topology, and uniqueness. <i>Economic Theory</i> , 2010, 42, 317-354.	0.9	155
35	Testable implications of transferable utility. <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 2010, 145, 1302-1317.	1.1	17
36	Efficient Intra-Household Allocations and Distribution Factors: Implications and Identification. <i>Review of Economic Studies</i> , 2009, 76, 503-528.	5.4	127

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37	Investment in Schooling and the Marriage Market. <i>American Economic Review</i> , 2009, 99, 1689-1713.	8.5	268
38	Identifying Preferences under Risk from Discrete Choices. <i>American Economic Review</i> , 2009, 99, 356-362.	8.5	24
39	Modeling Competition and Market Equilibrium in Insurance: Empirical Issues. <i>American Economic Review</i> , 2008, 98, 146-150.	8.5	8
40	Collective Labour Supply: Heterogeneity and Non-Participation. <i>Review of Economic Studies</i> , 2007, 74, 417-445.	5.4	162
41	Asymmetric information in insurance: general testable implications. <i>RAND Journal of Economics</i> , 2006, 37, 783-798.	2.3	217
42	Les modèles non unitaires de comportement du ménage: un survol de la littérature. <i>L'Actualité Économique</i> , 2006, 82, 9-52.	0.1	17
43	Collective and Unitary Models: A Clarification. <i>Review of Economics of the Household</i> , 2006, 4, 5-14.	4.2	112
44	Divorce, Remarriage, and Welfare: A General Equilibrium Approach. <i>Journal of the European Economic Association</i> , 2006, 4, 415-426.	3.5	42
45	Conférence François-Albert-Angers 2004. <i>L'Actualité Économique</i> , 2005, 81, 405-419.	0.1	1
46	Moral Hazard and Dynamic Insurance Data. <i>Journal of the European Economic Association</i> , 2003, 1, 767-820.	3.5	121
47	Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Insurance: Can Dynamic Data Help to Distinguish?. <i>Journal of the European Economic Association</i> , 2003, 1, 512-521.	3.5	123
48	An Examination of the Influence of Theory and Individual Theorists on Empirical Research in Microeconomics. <i>American Economic Review</i> , 2003, 93, 151-155.	8.5	11
49	Econometric Models of Insurance under Asymmetric Information. <i>Häbner International Series on Risk, Insurance, and Economic Security</i> , 2000, , 365-393.	0.2	85
50	Moral hazard and the demand for physician services: First lessons from a French natural experiment. <i>European Economic Review</i> , 1998, 42, 499-511.	2.3	143
51	Household Labor Supply, Sharing Rule and the Marriage Market. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 1998, , .	0.4	24
52	Introducing Household Production in Collective Models of Labor Supply. <i>Journal of Political Economy</i> , 1997, 105, 191-209.	4.5	240
53	Empirical contract theory: The case of insurance data. <i>European Economic Review</i> , 1997, 41, 943-950.	2.3	88
54	UNITARY VERSUS COLLECTIVE MODELS OF THE HOUSEHOLD: IS IT TIME TO SHIFT THE BURDEN OF PROOF?. <i>World Bank Research Observer</i> , 1995, 10, 1-19.	6.0	333

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55	Income and Outcomes: A Structural Model of Intra-household Allocation. <i>Journal of Political Economy</i> , 1994, 102, 1067-1096.	4.5	704
56	Repeated moral hazard: The role of memory, commitment, and the access to credit markets. <i>European Economic Review</i> , 1994, 38, 1527-1553.	2.3	107
57	Collective Models of Household Behavior. <i>Developments in Agricultural Economics</i> , 1994, 10, 205-216.	0.1	6
58	Sunspot Fluctuations Around a Steady State: The Case of Multidimensional One-Step Forward Looking Economic Models. <i>Econometrica</i> , 1992, 60, 1097.	4.2	39
59	Collective Labor Supply and Welfare. <i>Journal of Political Economy</i> , 1992, 100, 437-467.	4.5	1,133
60	Collective models of household behavior. <i>European Economic Review</i> , 1992, 36, 355-364.	2.3	169
61	Nash-Bargained Household Decisions: A Rejoinder. <i>International Economic Review</i> , 1991, 32, 761.	1.3	33
62	Nash-Bargained Households Decisions: A Comment. <i>International Economic Review</i> , 1988, 29, 791.	1.3	85
63	Rational Household Labor Supply. <i>Econometrica</i> , 1988, 56, 63.	4.2	1,010
64	Revealed Preferences and Differentiable Demand. <i>Econometrica</i> , 1987, 55, 687.	4.2	63
65	Distribution of Income and the "Law of Demand". <i>Econometrica</i> , 1985, 53, 109.	4.2	25
66	Testing Contract Theory: A Survey of Some Recent Work. , 0, , 115-149.		98
67	An Assignment Model with Divorce and Remarriage. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 0, , .	0.4	10
68	Preferences and Decision Making. , 0, , 80-132.		0
69	The Collective Model: A Formal Analysis. , 0, , 133-175.		0
70	Uncertainty and Dynamics in the Collective Model. , 0, , 223-274.		0
71	Matching on the Marriage Market: Theory. , 0, , 277-315.		0
72	Investment in Schooling and the Marriage Market. , 0, , 371-413.		12

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73	An Equilibrium Model of Marriage, Fertility, and Divorce. , 0, , 414-437.		0
74	Empirical Issues for the Collective Model. , 0, , 176-222.		0
75	Sharing the Gains from Marriage. , 0, , 316-370.		0
76	Facts. , 0, , 11-57.		13
77	Better Safe than Sorry? Ex Ante and Ex Post Moral Hazard in Dynamic Insurance Data. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	35
78	The Roommate Problem: Is More Stable than You Think. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	10
79	Learning from a Piece of Pie: The Empirical Content of Nash Bargaining. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	14
80	Intrahousehold Inequality. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	1
81	Changes in Assortative Matching and Inequality in Income: Evidence for the UK. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	0
82	Changes in Assortative Matching: Theory and Evidence for the US. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	1
83	The Roommate Problem is More Stable than You Think. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	6