

Tim Roughgarden

List of Publications by Year in descending order

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46
papers

4,363
citations

304743
22
h-index

315739
38
g-index

47
all docs

47
docs citations

47
times ranked

1581
citing authors

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
1	Robust Auctions for Revenue via Enhanced Competition. Operations Research, 2020, 68, 1074-1094.	1.9	3
2	Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design. Annual Review of Economics, 2019, 11, 355-381.	5.5	15
3	Minimizing Regret with Multiple Reserves. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 2019, 7, 1-18.	1.1	5
4	Making the Most of Your Samples. SIAM Journal on Computing, 2018, 47, 651-674.	1.0	29
5	The Performance of Deferred-Acceptance Auctions. Mathematics of Operations Research, 2017, 42, 897-914.	1.3	13
6	Network Cost-Sharing without Anonymity. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 2016, 4, 1-24.	1.1	12
7	Optimal Cost-Sharing in General Resource Selection Games. Operations Research, 2016, 64, 1230-1238.	1.9	40
8	Optimal and Robust Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 2016, 4, 1-34.	1.1	13
9	Restoring Pure Equilibria to Weighted Congestion Games. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 2015, 3, 1-24.	1.1	22
10	Intrinsic Robustness of the Price of Anarchy. Journal of the ACM, 2015, 62, 1-42.	2.2	113
11	Revenue maximization with a single sample. Games and Economic Behavior, 2015, 91, 318-333.	0.8	87
12	Local smoothness and the price of anarchy in splittable congestion games. Journal of Economic Theory, 2015, 156, 317-342.	1.1	43
13	Barriers to Near-Optimal Equilibria. , 2014, , .		54
14	Weighted Congestion Games. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 2014, 2, 1-23.	1.1	42
15	Optimal Cost-Sharing in Weighted Congestion Games. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2014, , 72-88.	1.3	17
16	Network Cost-Sharing without Anonymity. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2014, , 134-145.	1.3	6
17	Intrinsic robustness of the price of anarchy. Communications of the ACM, 2012, 55, 116-123.	4.5	25
18	Bottleneck links, variable demand, and the tragedy of the commons. Networks, 2012, 60, 194-203.	2.7	10

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
19	Title is missing!. Theory of Computing, 2012, 8, 95-119.	0.5	12
20	Stronger Bounds on Braess's Paradox and the Maximum Latency of Selfish Routing. SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics, 2011, 25, 1667-1686.	0.8	38
21	Uncoupled potentials for proportional allocation markets. , 2011, , .		0
22	Restoring Pure Equilibria to Weighted Congestion Games. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2011, , 539-551.	1.3	11
23	Computing equilibria: a computational complexity perspective. Economic Theory, 2010, 42, 193-236.	0.9	46
24	Braess's Paradox in large random graphs. Random Structures and Algorithms, 2010, 37, 495-515.	1.1	28
25	Algorithmic game theory. Communications of the ACM, 2010, 53, 78-86.	4.5	134
26	Designing Network Protocols for Good Equilibria. SIAM Journal on Computing, 2010, 39, 1799-1832.	1.0	84
27	Black-Box Randomized Reductions in Algorithmic Mechanism Design. , 2010, , .		25
28	Weighted Congestion Games: Price of Anarchy, Universal Worst-Case Examples, and Tightness. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2010, , 17-28.	1.3	20
29	Intrinsic robustness of the price of anarchy. , 2009, , .		165
30	Network Design with Weighted Players. Theory of Computing Systems, 2009, 45, 302-324.	1.1	82
31	Worst-Case Efficiency Analysis of Queueing Disciplines. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2009, , 546-557.	1.3	7
32	Computing correlated equilibria in multi-player games. Journal of the ACM, 2008, 55, 1-29.	2.2	146
33	The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation. SIAM Journal on Computing, 2008, 38, 1602-1623.	1.0	383
34	Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter Agents. , 2008, , .		40
35	Optimal mechanism design and money burning. , 2008, , .		115
36	Algorithmic Game Theory: Some Greatest Hits and Future Directions. International Federation for Information Processing, 2008, , 21-42.	0.4	5

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
37	The price of anarchy in an exponential multi-server. Operations Research Letters, 2007, 35, 421-426.	0.7	58
38	On the severity of Braess's Paradox: Designing networks for selfish users is hard. Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 2006, 72, 922-953.	1.2	125
39	How much can taxes help selfish routing?. Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 2006, 72, 444-467.	1.2	91
40	Braess's Paradox, Fibonacci Numbers, and Exponential Inapproximability. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2005, , 497-512.	1.3	13
41	Bounding the inefficiency of equilibria in nonatomic congestion games. Games and Economic Behavior, 2004, 47, 389-403.	0.8	216
42	Stackelberg Scheduling Strategies. SIAM Journal on Computing, 2004, 33, 332-350.	1.0	148
43	The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology. Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 2003, 67, 341-364.	1.2	293
44	Pricing network edges for heterogeneous selfish users. , 2003, , .		131
45	How bad is selfish routing?. Journal of the ACM, 2002, 49, 236-259.	2.2	1,317
46	Stackelberg scheduling strategies. , 2001, , .		81