
## Andrew Winton

List of Publications by Year in descending order

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ANDREW WINTON

#	Article	IF	CITATIONS
1	Monitoring in Originate-to-Distribute Lending: Reputation versus Skin in the Game. Review of Financial Studies, 2021, 34, 5886-5932.	3.7	5
2	Industry informational interactions and corporate fraud. Journal of Corporate Finance, 2021, 69, 102024.	2.7	8
3	Do banks still monitor when there is a market for credit protection?. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2019, 68, 101241.	1.7	36
4	Bank Capital, Borrower Power, and Loan Rates. Review of Financial Studies, 2019, 32, 4501-4541.	3.7	31
5	Liquidity Provision, Bank Capital, and the Macroeconomy. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 2017, 49, 5-37.	0.9	86
6	Risk Overhang and Loan Portfolio Decisions: Small Business Loan Supply before and during the Financial Crisis. Journal of Finance, 2015, 70, 2451-2488.	3.2	129
7	Cheating in China: Corporate Fraud and the Roles of Financial Markets. SSRN Electronic Journal, 2014, , .	0.4	3
8	Laying off credit risk: Loan sales versus credit default swaps. Journal of Financial Economics, 2013, 107, 25-45.	4.6	164
9	Lender Moral Hazard and Reputation in Originate-to-Distribute Markets. SSRN Electronic Journal, 2011, , .	0.4	10
10	Corporate Fraud and Business Conditions: Evidence from IPOs. Journal of Finance, 2010, 65, 2255-2292.	3.2	253
11	Bank Loans, Bonds, and Information Monopolies across the Business Cycle. Journal of Finance, 2008, 63, 1315-1359.	3.2	302
12	Entrepreneurial finance: Banks versus venture capital. Journal of Financial Economics, 2008, 88, 51-79.	4.6	142
13	Booms, Busts, and Fraud. Review of Financial Studies, 2007, 20, 1219-1254.	3.7	235
14	Risk Overhang and Loan Portfolio Decisions. SSRN Electronic Journal, 2005, , .	0.4	8
15	Moral Hazard and Optimal Subsidiary Structure for Financial Institutions. Journal of Finance, 2004, 59, 2531-2575.	3.2	86
16	Financial Intermediation. Handbook of the Economics of Finance, 2003, 1, 431-552.	3.1	211
17	Institutional Liquidity Needs and the Structure of Monitored Finance: Table 1. Review of Financial Studies, 2003, 16, 1273-1313.	3.7	32
18	Risk Overhang and Market Behavior. The Journal of Business, 2001, 74, 591-612.	2.1	41

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#	Article	IF	CITATIONS
19	Moral Hazard and Optimal Subsidiary Structure for Financial Institutions. SSRN Electronic Journal, 2001, , .	0.4	9
20	Liquidity Provision, Bank Capital, and the Macroeconomy. SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000, , .	0.4	83
21	Institutional Liquidity Needs and the Structure of Monitored Finance. SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000, ,	0.4	2
22	Don't Put All Your Eggs in One Basket? Diversification and Specialization in Lending. SSRN Electronic Journal, 1999, , .	0.4	154
23	Ownership Structure, Speculation, and Shareholder Intervention. Journal of Finance, 1998, 53, 99-129.	3.2	551
24	Competition among Financial Intermediaries When Diversification Matters. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 1997, 6, 307-346.	1.4	43
25	Chapter 22 Corporate financial structure, incentives and optimal contracting. Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science, 1995, 9, 693-720.	0.6	20
26	Delegated Monitoring and Bank Structure in a Finite Economy. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 1995, 4, 158-187.	1.4	78
27	Costly State Verification and Multiple Investors: The Role of Seniority. Review of Financial Studies, 1995, 8, 91-123.	3.7	131
28	Covenants and Collateral as Incentives to Monitor. Journal of Finance, 1995, 50, 1113-1146.	3.2	784
29	Covenants and Collateral as Incentives to Monitor. Journal of Finance, 1995, 50, 1113.	3.2	200
30	Limitation of Liability and the Ownership Structure of the Firm. Journal of Finance, 1993, 48, 487-512.	3.2	127
31	Do Banks Still Monitor When There Is a Market for Credit Protection?. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	2
32	Product Market Interactions and Corporate Fraud. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	11